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In recent years, the publication of a series of texts, which had been languishing
unedited in the BnF’s collection, has opened a fertile debate on the legacy of
the late Foucault. My intention in this work is to revise the place that literature
occupied within the work of the Frenchman. In order to do so, I will review
texts from the most recent Folie, langage, littérature1 [Madness, Language,
Literature] (2019) and La grande étrangère (2013) [published in English as
Language, Madness, and Desire: On Literature (2015)], which are devoted exclu-
sively to literature, to the references Foucault makes to literature regarding
other questions, as in the Louvain, Berkeley, and Collège de France lectures on
Greek tragedy and modern literature, among others.
As Judith Revel has already stated in “Un heŕitage de Foucault. Entre fideĺ-
ite ́ et libres usages”, the opening of the Foucault collection by the BnF in 2013
“reopened and revived everything that we believed we knew up until now”
(Revel, 2019: 183). And it gave even more meaning to the statement that the
work of Foucault was wide-ranging and that there was no one bearer of a leg-
acy as to the final and closed meaning of his texts. Undoubtedly, Foucault’s
oeuvre, in the light of the diverse publications that have appeared in the 21st
century, is one that has a discontinuous, resignified history that is necessarily
under constant revision. And this is because, as with the scholia in Spinoza’s
Ethics, every one of Foucault’s “minor” texts forms a part of his corpus – dis-
continuous and broken – of as much importance as the rest of his works. With
the aim of clarifying some of these discontinuities, it is necessary to revise the
classic readings of Foucault’s work. Among texts that have caused a revision of
the classic interpretations of the Foucauldian oeuvre, Foucault(s) (2017) is note-
worthy. This is a broad collection of texts that each considers the question:
what meaning does Foucault’s thought hold today? To which they answer at
the book’s beginning, that of a space of thought that is always alive, like
thought about the present.
Here I aim to review the relations between literature, subjectivity and poli-
tics in the early Foucault. In order to do so, I begin with a hypothesis: that we
find in late Foucault not a forgetting of literature but a reformulation of the role
that literature had come to occupy in his work; and that there is a trace of the
texts that Foucault had devoted to the thought of literature since the sixties up
until the mid-seventies in the works of his later years.
1 Translations of this book are mine.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668902-001
In “Politics of Literature in Late Foucault”, I address the definition of the
concept of democracy in the literary thought of Michel Foucault, the functions
of literature in the social space and a politics of literary form. This literary writ-
ing is a critique of the principle of social partition that in modernity is associ-
ated with madness. Due to the long tradition that links literature and madness,
since the classical period (as inspired poet), literature is shown as a privileged
space for political criticism.
In “Literature, Subjectivity and Veridiction”, I set forth an analysis of the
forms of veridiction, in which Foucault shows the necessary intertwining of sub-
ject and truth, through the analyses of literary texts that he made in the 1970s
and the early 1980s. The writings that Foucault devotes to the work of the
Marquis de Sade at the start of the seventies show the relation between writing
and novel forms of being. Sade’s logic provides Foucault with an alternative to
the attributive logic that restricts the forms of being and that would be funda-
mental in the last stage of his productive output. And it therefore puts forward
the connection between truth and desire as a performative truth of self, which
Foucault later develops in the concept of parrhesia in the lectures of the 1980s.
The concept of desire here is, as Daniele Lorenzini shows, a transhistorical con-
stant and a theory of speech as passion. The technologies of self took up a large
part of Foucault’s analyses from the late 1970s until his death. The forms of self-
transformation of subjects since the classical era do not make an exception of
Christianity – far from it. Hence I will analyze these works from a post-secular
perspective that I consider necessary for understanding the ethical and dissident
value of these behaviors. Lastly, this chapter discusses the legacy of Foucault in
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. His concept of subject has been debated
and developed by other thinkers, such as Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben,
who both maintain a far-reaching dialogue with the Frenchman. In the case of
Butler, her concept of the retroactive subject is of particular interest, as is
Agamben’s revision of the Heideggerian concept of the subject for death in the
light of Foucault’s work. As a result of these readings, I propose a concept of
[being] subject to the “intemperie”.
The chapter entitled “Tragedy and Historical Event” looks at the texts of
the eighties in which Foucault makes use of the tragedies of Sophocles (Oedipus
Rex) and Euripides (Ion, The Trojan Women, and Orestes), in order to study the
emergence and analysis of the notion of parrhesia. In these lectures, Foucault
presents literature as a place of “event”, hence the time of literature is the time of
Kairos. Foucault also analyzes the pre-democratic concept of truth as symbol, a
truth that can be reconstructed from different testimonies, which is in the origin
of this right to free speech in the Assembly, as Oedipus Rex shows. The problem-
atization of this concept, which presents a parrhesia that is open “to anyone”,
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proceeds from a truth that can no longer be reconstructed into one single truth
(symbol), instead it will be plural, fragmentary and, ultimately, difficult to man-
age. Therefore, Foucault shows that democracy is based upon an idealization of
truth as symbol, a truth that could be reconstructed univocally through the testi-
monies of all the citizens. In its different stages, however, parrhesia demonstrates
that the truth is not univocal. Thus, from Ion to Cassandra, parrhesia loses its
positive attributes until it is ejected from the democracy. It is at this juncture that
it is considered that in order to exercise parrhesia one needs mathesis or paideia.
Then, technologies became a part of the self and not a supplement to it. It is at
this moment that the truth about oneself, the truth about the world and the tech-
nologies of self are left interwoven until modernity. As a consequence, they
begin to draw the outlines of a concept of power that will be coercive and pro-
ductive at the same time. In Deleuze’s words, “Foucault’s fundamental idea is
that of a dimension of subjectivity derived from power and knowledge without
being dependent on them” (Deleuze, Spinoza, 101).
Among the different destinations of this concept, I here look at what ties it
to modern literature, from tragedy, passing through Menippean satire, down to
the polyphonic novel. Literature acquires from this mode the capacity to act
critically in the world.
Finally, the last chapter, “Foucault and Literary Theory in the 21st
Century”, is a proposal for the dialogue of this later Foucault with the literary
theory of the twenty-first century. On the one hand, I take up elements from
Foucault the “reader of literature”, from his texts of the sixties, to show his
strategies of reading, framed in principle by a Nietzschean legacy and his pluri-
significant consideration of text. I have examined the wide use of the metaphor
of the eye as reader in his first texts and shown his closeness to Barthes in the
early sixties. In the second part, I have set up a dialogue between Foucault and
the Marxist tradition of literature, through the Althusserian concept of “Donner
à voir”, in particular with Lukács, Bakhtin and his circle, Althusser and
Adorno. Lastly, I consider that Foucault’s politics of literature most fruitfully
engages with that proposal by Jacques Rancière. For this reason, the last sec-
tion is devoted to analysing the similarities and differences, principally, based
on their respective concepts of truth and literature.
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2 Towards a Politics of Literature in Foucault
2.1 Democracy of Literature
The publication of the Collège de France lectures in 2013 have made it necessary
to reconsider the question of literature in Foucault’s work. We can affirm that in
the early 1960s, literature principally occupied a transgressive “outside”, a mar-
ginal-central corpus in relation to his work on the history of thought.2 Literature
was then an archaeology of discursive forms in a privileged relation to a non-
contradictory logos (madness-truth), which enabled Foucault to construct, as
Judith Revel would observe, a discourse of experience as passage to a limit that
is based in the blurring of the subject (Revel, Foucault, une pensée du discontinu).
At the end of the 1960s, however, following the critique made by Derrida in
1967 in “Cogito and the History of Madness” and his readings of the Anglophone
analytic philosophers, Foucault3 accepted the impossibility of thinking a free
and freed subject from a position of exteriority, that zero point to which Derrida
had referred. As a consequence, the Foucauldian project of the search for novel
forms of being would outline in his later works a genealogy that, responding to
Derrida, did indeed plant its Greek roots. This was in concordance with his work
from the sixties, in which he announced that “fût-il celui de la dissolution du
sujet-demeure une expérience, et c’est probablement en cela que reside l’étrangeté
de la position de Foucault” (Revel, Foucault, une pensée du discontinu, 143).
After this turn at the end of the 1960s, Foucault sought an alternative to the
inside/outside, self/other, law/transgression dichotomy, and literature ceased
to occupy that privileged and marginal place that had associated it with Unreason.
Following the Buffalo lectures on Sade in 1971 – which I consider to be the thresh-
old between the two definitions – literature is formed as an eventual historical dis-
course for resistance, which entails consequences for the configuration of common
space.
It is therefore at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, as Antonio
Campillo states in “Foucault y Derrida: historia de un debate – sobre la historia”
[“Foucault and Derrida: history of a debate – on history”] (1995), that a model of
thought, Nietzschean in nature, appears: that of thought as resistance. This con-
cept evinces the abandonment of the inside/outside dialectical structure, because
2 Here his monographs on R. Roussel and M. Blanchot and his articles on Artaud, Bataille and
Sade, among others, stand out.
3 For analysis of the debate between Foucault and Derrida in the direction proposed here, see
Blanco, “Razón y Sinrazón”.
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it appears inseparably united to power as a reversible concept, in the words of
Judith Revel. If power relations are established everywhere, and if there is no out-
side to transgress towards, resistance implies the possibility of opening new spaces
of struggle. The relations of power and resistance are founded contemporaneously
and reciprocally. The concept of power in Foucault is now more complex, and it
cannot be judged as positive or negative: power is, simultaneously, coercive and
productive.
Therefore, neither will literature be the mere production of a word outside
the order of discourse; rather, it is spread as “real” discourse. Yet, Revel says,
this literature would be a real “that overflows, exceeds, disorders, abandons
‘nature’” (Foucault, une pensée du discontinu, 121), and which would be close to
Deleuze’s concept of plane of immanence. We now find the references to litera-
ture in Foucault’s work not in the margins or at the periphery, but threaded
throughout his principal works. In “The Stage of Philosophy” (1978), Foucault
states that the theatre always deals with the event, but this statement can be
extended to literature in general. The status of literature shifts, and it now
forms part of the discourses that work on the possible as opposed to the immu-
table. Literature is a historical testimony of an event, which in Foucault, since
The Archaeology of Knowledge, always has a linguistic nature.
In an interview given in 1975, “Se débarrasser de la philosophie: À propos
de la littérature” [“The Functions of Literature”], Foucault refers to this step as
a shift toward “bad literature”. This designation is very similar to what Gilles
Deleuze, in that same year, defines in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature as
“minor literature”. We must remember that in Deleuze’s definition of “minor
literature”, in reference to Kafka, the second characteristic is that “everything
in it is political”, insofar as each individual problem is immediately connected
with the political, and with the collective – literature is the affair of the people,
Deleuze emphasizes in his reading of Kafka (Deleuze, Kafka, 17). Literature is
defined by Deleuze as a collective device of utterance and as a machine of de-
sire. “There isn’t a subject; there are only collective assemblages of enunciation,
and literature expresses these acts insofar as they’re not imposed from without
and insofar as they exist only as diabolical powers to come or revolutionary
forces to be constructed” (18).
This evolution toward a politics of literature also has an internal connec-
tion with his contemporary works on a political ontology of the present. At the
same time, it entails a distancing from his original proposal of an ontology of
literature, in which the influence of Martin Heidegger had been fundamental.
The relation with Heidegger is particularly interesting in this evolution. In 1947,
Heidegger published his Letter on Humanism, in which he confronts the question
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of the current state of “Humanism”, and for the first time introduces the debate
that would culminate in what has been called “posthumanism”. Heidegger consi-
ders that the question for the human being passes through a critique of the language
of logic and grammar. Philosophy and poetry, says Heidegger, would therefore be
responsible for freeing language in order to make possible the happening of being
in language, and to expose the truth of being as disclosure:
Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. Those who think and
those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accom-
plishes the manifestation of being insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and
preserve it in language through their saying. […] The liberation of language from grammar
into a more original essential framework is reserved for thought and poetic creation.
(Letter on Humanism, 11–12)
This event or Ereignis is an ontology of language and is dependent on the clas-
sic concept of truth as aletheia. We can consider that Foucault, for his part, at
first shared with Heidegger that search for alternative modes of discourse for
philosophy in hand with literature, by which I refer to the pieces on literature
that he published in the 1960s. But I think that Foucault, in his project of the
search for novel forms of being, sets off from a definition of truth that is radi-
cally changed, no longer understood as aletheia – in the sense in which
Heidegger defined it – but as “games of truth” or veridiction (that is, the modes
in which truth is enunciated). InWrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, Foucault stated:
If critical philosophy is a philosophy that starts not from the wonderment that there is
being but from the surprise that there is truth, then we can clearly see that there are two
forms of critical philosophy. On the one hand, there is that which asks under what condi-
tions – formal or transcendental – there can be true statements. And on the other, there
is that which investigates the forms of veridiction, the different forms of truth-telling. In
the case of a critical philosophy that investigates veridiction, the problem is that of know-
ing not under what conditions a statement is true, but rather what are the different games
of truth and falsehood that are established, and according to what forms they are estab-
lished. In the case of a critical philosophy of veridictions, the problem is not that of know-
ing how a subject in general may understand an object in general. The problem is that of
knowing how subjects are effectively tied within and by the forms of veridiction in which
they engage.
(Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 20)
This distance with respect to Heidegger is crucial, since the constitution of sub-
jectivity will no longer depend on the being of language but on the political
subject’s ability to speak, which is defined by their linguistic capability – a lin-
guistic capability that, nonetheless, both for Foucault and for Heidegger, was
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dominated by rationality, or what in “The Stage of Philosophy” (1978) Foucault
called “the theatre of truth”.
Therefore, the concept of literature as event differs from the Heideggerian
concept of an ontology of literature.
2.2 The Political Functions of True Literature
Although it is true that, as Foucault defined in “Langage et littérature” (1966),
the concept of literature as we know it belongs to modernity, in the works in
which Foucault studies the relations between law and literature, he traces a
brief genealogy of the political function of the discourse denominated “literary”
from the classical era until his time. In Wrong-Doing, Truth Telling, the Louvain
lectures (1981), Foucault states:
From the time of Greek theatre up to at least the end of the eighteenth century, one of the
functions, although certainly not the sole function, of theatre in European societies was
to be the place or a stage for debating the problem of the law. This was unlike the novel,
but not, perhaps, unlike the epic or the American Western which, after all, also presents
a problem of law, of the confrontation of rights, of the confrontation of law and ven-
geance, of the right of conquest.
(Wrong-Doing, Truth Telling, 59)
The functions of discourses are not, therefore, exclusive, and, at the same time,
each discourse defines its functions historically. So that if the modern concept
of literature is of recent origin, we may declare that some of the functions of the
classical tragedies would have occupied a new place in contemporary literature
and cinema.
The uses of classical tragedy in Foucault’s later works are framed in a politics
of literature, mainly based on its relation to law. Classical tragedy is associated
in his later works with a concept of truth which is that of parrhesia. In his last
two seminars at the Collège de France (The Courage of Truth and The Government
of Self and Others) and in his lectures given at Berkeley in 1983, Michel Foucault
defines parrhesia as a concept of Greek origin that appears for the first time in
the Greek tragedy of Euripides, and spreads throughout the Greek literary world of
antiquity from the end of the fifth century BCE. Etymologically, parrhesia means to
say everything (pan-rhema). It is a discourse of truth, political in character, which
comes into being associated with Athenian democracy and what is possible, firstly,
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by the composition of a truth, which is, at the same time, an ethical truth of the
care of oneself and a democratic truth typical of the Athenian assembly where it
came into being (the democratic community).
As I have expounded up to now, literature in its historical dimension is
capable of creating spaces of resistance from the introduction of excessive dis-
course practices that interrupt the normativity of a determined historical mo-
ment (or episteme). They do this from the very inside of the system. It seems
to me that this third area that Foucault had been developing since the 1960s
holds a fundamental relation to the concept of parrhesia. In Littérature et lan-
gage, Foucault says that literature is founded on an excess of language, not
on silence or the ineffable. This excess of literature inherits the political func-
tions of the concept of parrhesia that likewise produces an excess as its etymo-
logical meaning is “say everything”.
But how is this excess of literature a political risk? Parrhesia in literature is
a mode of political performativity through which alternative modes of being
and understanding occur (“Ce qui charge ce langage, ce n’est pas ce qu’il veut
dire, mais faire”, Dits et ècrits, II: 245–246). I shall refer to two examples, to be
developed later: firstly, to the lectures on “Sade” that Foucault gave in Buffalo
in 1970, published in La grande étrangère. À propos de littérature (2013); and
secondly the attention he pays to Baudelaire in one of his last texts on the
Kantian Aufklärung (“What is Enlightenment?”, 1984).
In his Buffalo lectures, Foucault begins with Sade’s statement “everything
I am going to say is true”, but, Foucault asks, what is this truth? The truth of
Sade’s text is not referential but parrhesiastic, such that in its repetitive tell-
ing it is capable, through the force of its writing, of denying the existence of
God, the soul, nature or the law (as performative force). His writing is a “de-
sire-passion” for writing, a writing that is capable of affirming other modes of
being (denial of the attributive logic) whereas the subject-libertine is formed
as self-affirmation (as long as the libertine declares himself, he denies God).
Sade is thus opposed to the modes of exclusion that Foucault described in
L’ordre du discours (10–11). This desire, says Walter Privitera “can be dated
back to time in ancient Greek history when the truth of a discourse coincided
with the power of whoever uttered it” (Problems of style. Michel Foucault’s
Epistemology, 67).
In his work on the Aufklärung, Foucault analyzes the modern roots of philoso-
phy with a type of philosophical interrogation that problematizes, simultaneously,
the relation to the present, the historical mode of being and the constitution of self
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as emancipated subject. This philosophical concern for the present in modernity is
also the concern of modern literature. Foucault gives Baudelairean modernity as
example. This is described as “an exercise in which extreme attention to what is
real is confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects this
reality and violates it”. Modern literature is not the mere production of a word out-
side of the order of the discourse but is spread as “real” discourse. But it is a ques-
tion of a real, Judith Revel says, “that overflows, exceeds, disorders, abandons
‘nature’”. The modernity of Baudelaire does not consist in accepting it as everlast-
ing movement, nor as fashion, but of taking a certain voluntary attitude in relation
to that movement: it consists in being capable of extracting “the poetic within his-
tory”, which is defined as “something eternal that is neither beyond nor behind
the present instant, but within it”. It is the attitude that enables grasping what is
“poetic” in the present moment; it is a will to “heroize” [héroïser] the present.4
This ironic heroism entails for the modern man an invention of its own, which
does not “liberate man in his own being”, but which compels him to the task of
creating himself. The modern project is a permanent criticism of our historical
being. There it finds, in the present that it cannot be allowed to despise, that
which is urgent to say.
But how does literature say that which, being in everyone’s sight, we do
not manage to see? Literature fulfils a parrhesiastic function in that it means an
introduction of other modes of parasitic fiction that are considered inverisimilar
in a determined moment, that is, against common sense. And it does this
through the parrhesiastic function of literature as “idiot speak”, in Gilles Deleuze’s
words, that is characterized by its singularity and by its capacity to be receptive to
events, to the events yet to come (Immanence: A Life).
This definition of literature as memory and as event allows us to distin-
guish it from a concept of classical literary realism: literature is not a reflection
of a real exterior, but in literature collective forms of expression occur, or, in
the words of Deleuze, “a collective device of expression” and “a machine of de-
sire, the most individual literary enunciation,” he says, “is a particular case of
collective enunciation” (Deleuze, Kafka, 117–121).
4 “De l´héroïsme de la vie moderne”, Baudelaire.
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I consider that literature is functioning as a polyvalent concept in Foucault’s
work: literature is capable of gathering collective forms of expression as a lin-
guistic space of resistance (speak/parole), while also of subjection as institution
or norm (language/langage) and without omitting the chance of its own material-
ity (tongue/langue):
On peut saisir maintenant la cohérence entre les modes de la fiction, les formes de la
fable et le contenu des thèmes (…). Contre les vérités scientifiques et brisant leur voix
glacée, les discours de la fiction remontaient sans cesse vers la plus grande improbabilité.
Au-dessus de ce murmure monotone en qui s’énonçait la fin du monde, ils faisaient fuser
l’ardeur asymétrique de la chance, de l’invraisemblable hasard, de la déraison impatiente.
Les romans de Jules Verne, c’est la négentropie du savoir.
(Dits et écrits I, 540)
This polyvalence not only questions the causal and dialectic logic but also
makes it possible to analyze the different functions that the same concept of
discourse is capable of developing on different levels (cultural, historical, re-
lated to a discipline). And, through its relationship with which a culture admits
or not some experiences as verisimilar. This will have certain consequences in
Foucault’s concept of history and discourse. And, as “truth itself has a history”
(“Truth and Juridical Forms”), it settles on the principle of Aristotelian verisi-
militude: “to tell History is, ultimately, to tell a story”.
Therefore, Foucault’s work on literature works on at least two levels:
1. As a corpus of work on the institutional level: Foucault’s reading of mar-
ginal literary texts supposes a decentring of discourses of knowledge, at
the same time as deautomatizing normative fictional discourses. Indeed,
the recovery of these marginal, forgotten, censured texts is to literature
what infamous lives are to the discourse of history: a calling into question
of the ordering of discourses.
2. With regard to the political function of literature: we can conclude that lit-
erature actualizes the historically impossible as virtuality of the present.
Thus Foucault responds to the tyranny of fiction as verisimilitude that,
since Aristotle, has aligned truth with coherence and left out that which
was possible and true but improbable. Hence Foucault redefines the con-
cept of literary mimesis as an actual rendering visible. A mimesis that,
therefore, is no longer constative nor dependent on the classical truth as
veritas, but on a saying-truth (parrhesia) as resistance, as emerging force
and as problematization of the present. The political function of literature
would consist, therefore, of the introduction of improbable modes of being
as virtuality of the present.
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It seems to me that the function of literature as a place of event of virtuals that
are visible to everyone but that we are incapable of seeing holds a close connec-
tion with the immanence of Deleuze, for whom:
A life contains only virtuals. It is made up of virtualities, events, singularities. What we
call virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process
of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular reality. The immanent
event is actualized in a state of things and of the lived that make it happen.
(Immanence: A Life, 31)
And it is fiction that introduces an imbalance in the normative forces as a kind
of event:
What disturbs the din of language and restores it to the disequilibrium of its sovereign
powers is not knowledge (always more and more probable); it is not the fable (which has
its obligatory forms); it is, between the two, as if in a limbolike invisibility, the ardent
games of fiction.
(Foucault, Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, 144)
2.3 Madness and Literature as Principle of Social Partition
In Folie, langage, littérature, the first seven texts define madness in its two
senses: madness in relation to society, where it acts as a principle of partition
between what a society finds reasonable and what it does not – a classification
that equally affects social subjects and that distinguishes between reasonable
and non-reasonable subjects. These categories of social division, however, are
not stable but historical and, therefore, under constant modification. Precisely
because of this, it proves difficult for us to see this partition principle, given
that at present madness is associated with mental illness, being confused with
it. As a consequence, two perfectly distinct regions of experience are identified:
mental illness and the category of the people who are considered foolish, irra-
tional, alienated, useless and unproductive (Folie, langage, littérature, 112).
In “La littérature et la folie (La folie dans le theát̂re baroque et le théat̂re
d’Artaud)” [“Literature and madness. Madness in the Baroque Theatre and
Artaud’s theatre”], Foucault declares: “There is no culture without partition”
[“Il n’y a pas de culture sans partage”] (43). Thus, all society finds itself divided
and shaped, at the same time, by that which values and that which rejects and
prohibits. In this way, Foucault is giving materiality to a society’s negativity –
what in L’ordre du discours he called “materialism of the incorporeal” – which
is that which aims to exclude but that in any case forms part of it, because it is
present. Because, according to Foucault, the limits that all culture establishes
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are not only against others but in the very interior of its own dominion. Moreover,
the mechanism of a society’s organization (for example, to be Athenian or not in
order to be a free man and be able to speak with freedom in classical Athens) lies
simultaneously inside and outside society. Madness, therefore, as a dividing mech-
anism, both forms a part and does not form a part of the society that organizes it.
As Foucault sets forth in “Madness and Civilization”, the reasons for which
our civilization leaves certain behaviors and subjects “outside” do not come
only from Cartesian rationalism – remember the dispute with Jacques Derrida
over this – but also from an economic and political motivation typical of the
mercantile politics that had just been established in the modern age: the law of
work. In the face of this new change that determines exclusion, these subjects
occupy a purely negative role. They are non-productive subjects: useless indi-
viduals who do not work, deviants. Given this double exclusion, the insane per-
son becomes a “sociologically neutralized” character.
But if the word of this useless subject who is insane maintains such a sin-
gular relation with the truth of the society that excludes them – even if it be by
chance or by obscure means that makes it necessary to seek this hidden truth
in their words – it is because, like madness, it shapes and covers over the con-
cept of modern man like its obverse. That is, as madness is the category of
social partition that founds and excludes at the same time, the subjects con-
sidered “insane” represent the negativity of modern subjectivity (I speak/I
think), subjects who will be key to understanding the redefinition of the sub-
ject as process that Foucault undertook in later years. It is with this madness
that is unproductive at the same time as organizing that literature is associa-
ted. As Foucault asserts, following Mikhail Bakhtin, the defining trait of madness
in the West is its proximity to the feast. For this reason, art and literature belong to
this order of separation. However, this does not mean, according to Foucault, that
madness and literature remain under the same regime in the future, although
currently it remains that way.
In “Literature and Madness. Madness in the Work of Raymond Roussel”
[Folie, langage, littérature, 111–126] Foucault shows the importance of the rela-
tionship between literature and madness. For if there has been literature without
love and without war, there has not been without madness and without death.
Above all, in the present and in the Baroque. Indeed, certain works have even
been called madness. According to Foucault, when madness is associated with
literature, it shows three truths: it speaks of social reality, it shows the edges/bor-
ders of the story of literature itself, the fiction of which it is made: “The role of
madness is not only to show, as if by trickery, the truth of things, but also to tell
the truth of literature, theatre, fiction (to manifest it in its ambiguous role as a
false truth, and a true lie)” (Folie, langage, littérature, 112). But above all, says
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Foucault, “madness makes you see the invisible […] Don Quixote evokes the
small, miserable, greedy and often grotesque world of sixteenth-century Spain;
and at the same time denounces what lies in its reality of falsehoods, chival-
resque romances with which Spain is enchanted” (115). But in the 19th century,
says Foucault, what governs the relation between literature, madness and society
is no longer representation: “It is in the heart itself of madness that one experien-
ces what literature is” (115). Insanity, which in the nineteenth century is consid-
ered a mental illness, expresses this new relation in literature, from Mallarmé to
Roussel and the Surrealists – although, as Foucault declares, it is necessary to be
already a great writer in order to be a madman and a great writer.
Therefore, at this point I can conclude that, on the one hand, literature in
its connection with madness is capable of making visible the invisible in two
ways in accordance with its nature: namely, the material outside such as that
which has been socially excluded, and, at the same time, the outside as other
possible forms of partition from the real. As Etienne Balibar puts it, Foucault
has superimposed two schema or topologies: “that of internal exclusion or ex-
clusion from within, the institutional model of which is confinement and that
of the excess of externality (or beyond externality) that makes it inaccessible
(or ‘invisible’) as such” (Balibar, “Pensée du dehors?”). Furthermore, the litera-
ture of modernity establishes a new relationship with madness that, on occasion,
is marked by the counter-subject, the madman. Furthermore, in accordance with
this, the outside is both material negativity, those negative phenomena of exclu-
sion, of rejection, of prohibition, of choice, that shape a society; and the same
mechanism that shapes society. The outside is simultaneously inside and outside
the social system, and this configuration is historical.
2.4 The Extralinguistic Outside of Literature
This ambiguous character of literature defines its nature and also affects its au-
tonomy. The concept of the outside defines literature by its autonomy which oc-
curred, according to Foucault, at the end of the 19th century, with Mallarmé. At
the beginning of Modernity, literature, on ceasing to be subject to the code of
rhetoric or that of images or ideas, becomes its own language and “a certain ex-
perience common to madness and literature” emerges (the outside). Literature
thus acquires the capacity/incapacity to say everything: “in one sense it has the
possibility and the right to say everything, perhaps it would even have the obli-
gation to say everything, since nothing exists […]. In every literary work, there is
an excess” (Folie, langage, littérature, 230). However, this capacity to be able to
say everything becomes a limit, because who is capable of saying everything? So
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it is that this “being able to say everything” that modern literature gains with its
autonomy also brings about its impossibility of saying everything. It is dependent
on the extralinguistic because who is capable of really saying everything in a
book of limited pages (as much as Borges yearned to write the infinite book)?
In “The extralinguistic and literature”, Foucault introduces a variant to the
concept of the outside that is of great importance for understanding concepts
he develops in the last years of his output. Literature is presented here not as
an outside of social partition, but rather necessarily involving the immanent ex-
tralinguistic. Foucault cites as his sources linguists such as Roman Jakobson
and Noam Chomsky, although the fundamental contribution for his thought is
How to Do Things with Words (1962), in which John L. Austin propounds his the-
ory of the speech act. This text is a crucial contribution to understanding the
later development of a political history of truth, already typical of the 1970s, as
has been shown; and the renewal of the process of subjectivation as aesthetics
of existence. Thus, following Austin, Foucault agrees that what introduces the
extralinguistic in literature is where and who reads it.
The author here proposes taking a step from the intralinguistic outside to
the extralinguistic outside. If the outside was, at the same time, the material
negativity of society – all of that which, existing, was excluded by the partition
of madness – and the partition that inaugurates and founds all society. The ex-
tralinguistic is defined, according to Foucault, by the situation, by real objects –
present or absent – and the relation with these objects; and for the speaking
subject, in accordance with the position that he/she occupies and with exposi-
tory ritualization in the case of performative acts (Folie, langage, littérature, 225).
Austin’s studies allow Foucault to begin to examine statements there where they
are directed and interrelate with their historical moment, which he would go on
to develop fully in his studies on parrhesia in the 1980s.
However, in this study, what Foucault proposes is the analysis of the con-
sequences of the extralinguistic for literature. Certainly literature is made up of
statements but is literature related to the extralinguistic? How is literature con-
nected to and how does it interfere with the extralinguistic outside? And, vice
versa, does the extralinguistic outside interfere in literature? To the third ques-
tion, Foucault answers that the extralinguistic undoubtedly interferes in the lit-
erary tradition since – as T.S. Eliot had already stated in “Tradition and the
Individual Talent” – the literary tradition, what is considered literature or not,
changes in history. Moreover, as Foucault says, it is vitally important in the cir-
culation of the book in the world and for literary criticism itself:
It is this “outside”, this extralinguistic immanent to the work, which criticism, precisely,
must not exclude from its purpose. Literary analysis need not mimic the work, nor repeat
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it, nor retrieve its intimacy, nor interpret it (as a sacred text). It must lodge itself precisely
in that exterior that is its proper place. One can define the role of literary analysis by say-
ing that it has transformed the extralinguistic immanent to the work’s discourse into
statements.
(Folie, Langage, Littérature, 251)
Literature’s interference in the historical moment is more complex. For Foucault,
the extralinguistic is an insurmountable wall in the study of the relations be-
tween language and history, which affects form and content:
In the analysis of language or statements, linguists and logicians encounter the “wall”,
the limit of the extralinguistic, in two ways: at the level of the content (meaning) […],
[and] at the level of the form of the statement and in the act itself that states it, the extra-
linguistic appears.
(Folie, Langage, Littérature, 229)
According to Foucault, the relationship of literature with the extralinguistic has a
formal nature and one of content. The former originates in a lack, an incapacity:
that of not being able to say everything, for which literature constantly refers to
the historical moment of the reader in order to fill out the gaps in the finitude of
the work. Therefore, we can no longer declare that literature is a self-referential
activity: “literature is the barbarism of the extralinguistic immanent to discourse”
(226). The signs of these relations can be seen at the level of meaning: the “origi-
nal”meaning disappears, as the extralinguistic is what conditions the interpreta-
tion of the text, because all text refers to its historical outside. But how does
literature intervene in the world? For Foucault, the arrival in the 18th century of
the horror novel – and he had already underlined the importance of these novels
in “Language and literature” – is key, because the reader is exposed to the read-
ing experience in order “to be afraid”.5 The reading places the text in the world
and its meaning is historical/cultural. It happens: literature, in its performative
capacity, exists and makes exist.
Therefore, literature relates with the extralinguistic as event in the margin
between autonomy – “the literary text is immanent to the discourse” – and its
place in the world. In other words, its activity is not self-referential but perfor-
mative. This would explain the ambiguity with which in his work Foucault re-
fers to the historical and ahistorical character of literature, an ambiguity noted
by Laurent Jenny, among others, in “Foucault et la littérature: une passante”
5 For Edgar Allan Poe the connections between the work and the reader were considered the
positive foundations of the art.
16 2 Towards a Politics of Literature in Foucault
(2016). We can argue that literature is historical in its action as event, but this is
only possible for the autonomous character of its statements.
To this making visible the invisible corporeal, Foucault adds the ability
to make visible the possible that is contingent to every historical moment.
Literature establishes the extralinguistic for itself, which allows it to not have to
say everything. Thus the very ambiguity of literature, which says too much: lite-
rature is an excess that names that part that had remained outside of the so-
cial partition, making the invisible visible, material and possible – at the
same time as not being able to say everything – in its formal finitude. This
making visible the “not necessary possible” is what Foucault calls verisimili-
tude. For him, verisimilitude has a certain affinity of nature with truth, a kin-
ship, and was made in order to make it reality: “there is something of internal
truth in discourse”. Discourse creates a certain truth, in such a way that litera-
ture modifies the nature of truth not as descriptive mimesis but as performa-
tivity of the literary discourse. At the same time, it is because the work must
be verisimilar that the relation between the work and the extralinguistic –
which is the historical present – are related in a necessary way.
Therefore, at the same time as literature acts on history, the relationship of
literature with history has an impact on literature, which is why literature is
never closed nor complete, and its meaning is not finite insofar as it is historical.
But this does not mean that there is a hidden, everlasting truth that literature is
capable of letting us see. In literature, as Foucault reminds us in “Behind the
Fable” (1966), the relationship between fable and fiction is determined by “the
mythical possibilities of the culture”: its writing or weaving depends on the pos-
sibilities of the language (langue), while its fiction is determined by the possibili-
ties of the speech act (parole) (Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, 48). In other
words, the verisimilitude of a narrative, what a society is prepared to accept as
credible, depends on a specific historical moment, and not on the structure of
the narrative (which it did for Aristotle). Therefore, literature has among its func-
tions to actualize (act) in every episteme the possibilities (potential) of speaking
(parole). No era, says Foucault, simultaneously utilizes all the modes of fic-
tion: those that are excluded in a determined historical moment are marginal-
ized, while those that a determined era privileges are those that define a norm
(Foucault, L’ordre du discours, 10–12). Every episteme, therefore, admits new
modes of fiction in the literary oeuvre and it becomes possible to read again
texts that, “populated by parasitic discourses”, had been expelled. Literature
makes visible, therefore, through its historical variations, the different possi-
bilities that live together in the same culture, in the actualization of its “para-
sitic discourses”.
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As Judith Revel has stated in “The invention and the déjà-là of the world”,
the “revelatory” function of literature comes from the influence of Merleau-
Ponty. For Revel, the “revelatory” use of literature must be separated from the
ontology of literature. Instead, she considers the term in an almost “photo-
graphic” sense: “what enables a certain image to appear”, and literature as ex-
perience that is operative of change. It is through this experience of writing
that escapes the “discursive mass”, as it is possible to understand literature as
a practice, as a practice of speaking, that shows the outside of all language and
that “denounces its internal economy and its founding divisions at the same
time” (33). This concerns the models of exteriority that Foucault develops in his
texts from the sixties: transgression as “inexorability of the denial of limit”, in-
debted to the thinking of Bataille; and exteriority, having its roots in Blanchot.
However, the model that accompanies Foucault’s work until his last writings
are those that he calls “the processes”, which show that “it is the change of the
world’s grammar that allows the change of the world’s imagination, and not
the other way around”. For Foucault, overcoming the influence of Blanchot,
“the outside is a myth”; thus there is no outside of history. The issue, therefore,
for the literature that is recurrent in Foucault, is to answer the following ques-
tion: how is it possible that, from the very interior of a given epistemic and his-
torical configuration, from the very interior of the ‘weave of the real’ unfolded
by an economy of the discourses and practices of a specific moment – in short,
from the interior of a grammar of the world historically determined – it can dis-
mantle and replace its articulations, shift its lines, move its points, empty its
meaning and reinvent its balances? (43). That is to say, Foucault’s work on litera-
ture has its heart precisely in the practices of reinvention, eruption, freedom, in
the very interior of the system, which he develops through “compossibility”. The
Foucauldian expression of “making one’s life a work of art” carries with it, in
turn, an involvement with others, and a style. This allows the subject to carry out
practices of freedom from history itself, surpassing the present state of things.
The style in Foucault makes reference to Baudelaire but also to the definition of
style understood as a “coherent deformation” as Merleau-Ponty understood it in
“Le langage indirect et les voix du silence” (1952). For Merleau-Ponty, these prac-
tices are about literature and painting at the same time: “Like a painting, a novel
expresses tacitly,” Revel quotes Merleau-Ponty. But in both, the question is how,
from the very interior of history, a possibility to create arises (43).
In Merleau-Ponty, this novelty is located not from the side of extraordi-
narily innovative elements, but from the side of “experimentation of new struc-
tures of relation” (Revel, “The invention and the déjà-là of the world”, 48), the
production of the new through new relations between what is already there.
Here Revel establishes the immediate antecedent of the construction of life
18 2 Towards a Politics of Literature in Foucault
itself as a work of art, as a radicalization of the forces within the history of the
present.
This insertion of the world into the literary work is a development of the
political capacity of literature, which introduces the change towards what
Foucault called “bad literature” in the mid-seventies and eighties. If literature
is no longer an outside – in the more Adornian sense – if its autonomy is am-
biguous, it is because literature is capable of doing things in the world. This
identification between the outside and the extralinguistic revives the most po-
litical view of the Blanchodian Outside, as Foucault himself recognizes: “It is
the presence of this extralinguistic inside language that Blanchot constantly in-
vokes; it is to the absence of this presence that he has lent his voice”; and it is,
at the same time, the inseparable outside of the work (228).
In Ećrits politiques: Guerre d’Algeŕie, Mai 68, etc. 1958–1993, we find refer-
ences to this political character of the outside and the need for the ambiguity of
literature in Maurice Blanchot. In “Refusing the established order”, a response
to a questionnaire on politically committed literature, Blanchot states that the
political vocation of a work must always be ambiguous, otherwise “it always
runs the risk, should it lose this ambiguity, of putting itself at the service of an-
other power that subjugates it”. For Blanchot, writing is what “cannot be ef-
fected, thus always in search of a nonpower, refusing mastery, order, and the
established order above all, preferring silence to the speech of absolute truth,
thereby contesting things and contesting them incessantly” (Écrits politiques,
117). And he concludes that the political commitment of the author with the
work is the commitment of the work with the other:
maintain the immemorial memory that reminds us that we were slaves, that even liber-
ated we remain and will remain slaves as long as others remain so, that there is thus no
freedom (to put it too simply) except for others and through others: certainly, an infinite
task that risks condemning the writer to a didactic, pedagogic role and in so doing, of
excluding the demand he carries within him and that constrains him to lack a place, a
name, a role, and an identity, that is, never yet to be a writer.
(118)
This postponement of the truth of the text is, therefore, the extralinguistic other
that is made manifest in the work in every historical present. The extralinguistic
outside is thus what takes place in the work itself: “It’s a matter of the setting
up, or better still, the instauration, by discourse alone, of the extralinguistic
upon what any statement articulates” (Folie, langage, literature, 229). In “Literature
and Language” (1964), Foucault confirmed that the polysemous nature of literature
depends on its historical and political nature:
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In reality, literature is polysemantic, which means that, when saying one thing alone or
maybe when saying nothing at all – for there is no proof that literature has to say some-
thing – in any case, whether it says something or nothing, literature is always obligated
to traverse a number of semiological layers (at a minimum, the four layers I spoke of),
and, in those four layers, it identifies what it needs to constitute a figure, a figure whose
property is self-signification. This means that literature is nothing other than the recon-
figuration in vertical form, of the signs present in society and culture in separate layers.
Literature cannot be based on silence. It is not the ineffability of silence, literature is
not the effusion of that which cannot and will never be said.
(Language, Madness, and Desire, 80–81)
In short, it is due to the formal finitude of the work (not being able to say ev-
erything) and to the autonomy gained at the beginning of modernity (being
able to say everything), that the extralinguistic – as a fold of the historical
outside that dwells in the work itself – constitutes the work’s radical historic-
ity. This ambiguous character of literature, between autonomy (that which it
acquires in modernity thanks to its relation with madness as mechanism of
partition) and dependence on the history wherein it is read (due to the neces-
sity that its limitation, as a book of a certain number of pages, makes of the
extralinguistic outside for its reading), allows literature to speak a contingent
truth: that of the possibilities of being from a given historical moment. It is
here, therefore, that truth and literature’s capacity for resistance lie.
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3 Literature, Subject and Veridiction
3.1 Raymond Roussel: The Political Subject of Literature
The critical consciousness of literature has become infinitely close to the consciousness
of the lyrical madman.
Folie, langage, littérature, 122
As we have seen, the relationship between literature and the extralinguistic passes
through the “situation” and the “subject that speaks” inside the act of writing. The
latter is the core of the relationship: “the position of the subject that speaks is the
core of uncertainty around which the whole discourse vibrates” (Foucault, Folie,
langage, littérature, 227). To the extent that the position of the subject that speaks
is the extralinguistic that is most immediate, closest to the language, but the most
irreducible, this presence of the subject that speaks inside the discourse is crucial –
it makes manifest the irreducibility of literature to the structures of language. The
position of the subject that speaks, their location, the displacements they consti-
tute, as opposed to what is said (lekton), the lexicon of the work. It should immedi-
ately be evident that this lexicon – as with fiction – is not so much an element of
the work or discourse as ways via which literature and the extralinguistic are
connected:
Just as between the universe of the discourse and the fable a certain level has been dis-
covered that did not belong under linguistics or the study of folklore or myths, but under
literature alone (this is what was called fiction), in the same way, between the field of the
word and that of the lekton (the former being the concern of philosophy and the latter
stylistics), there is a strictly literary level that comes under lexis.
Literature is a discourse whose fable is constituted by a fiction: it is a speech act the lekton of
which is determined by a lexis. Lexis and fiction are privileged and singular domains of liter-
ary analysis. They fall under neither a philosophical model nor a linguistic one.
(Folie, langage, littérature, 259)
For this reason, we need to reflect on the relationship between literature and sub-
jectivity. As we have seen in the second chapter, madness, as a mode of social
partition, entails the seclusion of a type of negative, unproductive subjectivity,
which is that of the insane. At the same time, Foucault asserted that in modernity
madness has been associated with literature and, in the 20th century, with men-
tal illness as well, as the two are confused. Therefore, the issue is whether the
question why modern literature is not a viable route toward the question con-
cerning the new humane practices – that is, concerning alternative ways of
being to the concept of the modern man, or in Foucault’s words, the literature of
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Roussel creates “forms without parentage or species” (Foucault, Death and the
Labyrinth, 21). Death and the Labyrinth, the only writing devoted exclusively to
the analysis of a literary work, is presented as a special place for this work: the
madman, the ill person and the writer come together under the same proper
name. His aim, Foucault constantly repeats, is to “show” the reader the thresh-
olds of Roussel’s work. This meticulous commentary on Roussel’s work, which in
turn starts with another commentary (How I Wrote Certain of My Books), repeat-
ing the mise-en-abyme structure that is very common in the writing of the poet
and novelist, is at the basis of Foucault’s thought on literature. In this early
Foucault, the analysis of literature is also the politics of literary form.
As mentioned, in Foucault’s early work there was already an interest in the
politics of literature, in relation to the outside/extralinguistic of the text. As
Foucault’s studies on literature in the 1960s were a kind of laboratory where he
was already posing some of these questions. I have shown how Foucault, in texts
from the latter half of the sixties, sets forth the performative capacity of the liter-
ary text. This performative capacity, which depends on the immanent relation
between literature and the extralinguistic outside, allows literature to state three
types of truth: literature is able to speak of and intervene in the historical reality
in which it takes place and it is also able to make visible what is invisible due to
the social partition between right and wrong and between productivity and un-
productivity. This capacity to say the truth is, in Foucault’s terms, its capacity to
say-everything, because literature, as fiction, is capable of naming the possibili-
ties of every historical moment – heterotopia –, of “heroizing the present”. This
reflection on the politics of form is developed in a joint manner with his revision
of structuralism, as he states in “Interview avec Michel Foucault” in 1968:
In a positive manner, we can say that structuralism investigates above all an unconscious.
It is the unconscious structures of language, of the literary work, and of knowledge that
one is trying at this moment to illuminate. In the second place, I think that one can say that
what one is essentially looking for are the forms, the system, that is to say that one tries to
bring out the logical correlations that can exist among a great number of elements belong-
ing to a language, to an ideology (as in the analyses of Althusser), to a society (as in Lévi-
Strauss), or to different fields of knowledge; which is what I myself have studied.
(Dits et écrits I, 654)
Foucault had found, in his interest for Structuralism and for the unusual linguistic
forms of Raymond Roussel, modes of experimentation in his search for new struc-
tures of relation and novel forms of being as aesthetics of existence. As Judith Revel
has stated, it is the production of the new through new relations between what is
already there. Furthermore, for this rereading, it is necessary to look at two clearly
recognizable traits for literary tradition. First, Foucault paints a kind of “portrait”,
genuinely Mannerist, in the style of the “Self-portrait in a convex mirror” by
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Parmigianino, a tradition in which Roussel could also be included – as John
Ashbery has already considered:
At the moment of his death, in a gesture both cautious and illuminating, Roussel holds
up to his work a mirror possessed of a bizarre magic: it pushes the central figure into the
background where the lines are blurred, placing the point of revelation at the farthest dis-
tance, while bringing forward, as if for extreme myopia, whatever is farthest from the mo-
ment of its utterance. Yet as the subject approaches, the mirror deepens in secrecy.
(Death and the Labyrinth, 4)
And, on top of this, another story, that of the death of Roussel, and that locked
door that sets in motion the How I Wrote Certain of My Books, and which refers
to the hermeneutic tradition, distancing himself from it, because it transforms
into an enigma the process that he clarifies: “This door, which had been open
at all times, was locked from the inside. The death, the lock, and this closed
door formed, at that moment and for all time, an enigmatic triangle where
Roussel’s work is both offered to and withdrawn from us […] a simple key
which is marvellously ambiguous, ready in one turn either to lock in or to open
up” (6). Origen, in Philokalia, tells this parable on the interpretation of the sa-
cred Scriptures, referring to the origin of hermeneutics:
Inspired Scripture taken as a whole was on account of its obscurity like many locked-up
rooms in one house: Before each room he supposed a key to be placed, but not the one
belonging to it; and that the keys were so dispersed all round the rooms, not fitting the
locks of the several rooms before which they were placed.
(Origen, The Philocalia, 32)
This presentation introduces the work in the Mannerist tradition and distances it
from the tradition of classical hermeneutics. Death and the Labyrinth is not a work
on how to interpret its true meaning. On the contrary, the comment that ought to
clarify, “opens a space of infinite uncertainty” (Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth,
11). Therefore, what is the truth of which Roussel speaks as a discovery of the for-
mal procedures with which he writes his book? This truth is not an unveiling, his
“truth” is other, that of the mechanisms of self-representation of language, typical
of the Mannerist tradition. Recall Deleuze’s definition of Mannerism in his lecture
series on the Baroque, delivered at Vincennes in 1987, as the evental logic of sub-
stance – the predicate is always event, says Deleuze. In other words, Mannerism
refers to the definition of the subject by his/her ways, by which logic the being
ceases to be attributive, and comes to be predicative:
It will have to be said that Leibniz breaks with the scheme of attribution, and at the same
time breaks with the essentialism of substance, of the substance constituted by an es-
sence. To attribution it replaces predication, the predicate always being relation or event,
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and to essentialism it will substitute what? So here we can be all happy to have found a
word, I say it very quickly, let's call it mannerism.
(Deleuze, Sur Leibniz)
The evental logic of literature and its relation with the unknown processes of sub-
jectification was fully developed by Foucault in his lectures on Sade, but in my
opinion it is in Death and the Labyrinth that Foucault lays out an early version of
evental subjectivity. The forms of being, their ways, such as event, are described
through two principal processes: paradoxical statements, which the very subhead-
ings of Foucault’s book indicate (“the threshold and the key”, “rhyme and reason”,
“the metamorphosis and the labyrinth”, “the empty lens”, “the enclosed sun”)
and the constant use of polysemic terms or phrases, which show the introduction
of difference in identity and, at the same time, the same impossibility of the clo-
sure of meaning. These formal processes show us the impossibility of attributively
confirming subjectivity. Good meaning, such as closed and certain meaning, is im-
possible. Paradox and polysemy are the affirmation of two meanings at the same
time, and they affect both language and the impossibility of defining a subjectivity
as fixed identity. At the same time, the extralinguistic – as the capacity of literary
language to name the invisible material – also forms part of the study, as it does in
all literature. In this regard, Foucault on Roussel’s La Vue: “everything can be seen
from afar, but with a stare that is so penetrating, so supreme and so neutral that
even the invisible rises to the surface under a unique, immobile and even light”
(Foucault, Folie, langage, literature, 279). Moreover, the descriptions of Roussel’s
works reveal the formal and untamed gaps of resistance to the discursive mecha-
nisms of power. Roussel’s literature, above all thanks to the reduplication of his
How I wrote certain of my books, is an act of making see the possible non-existent.
Modern literature, as opposed to what Aristotle expounded in his Poetics, utilizes
its own negativity to “make see”: “The Nouvelles Impressions can only be described
by what they are not” (Folie, langage, literature, 123).
Finally, Death and the Labyrinth is an exercise in criticism, literary criticism
but above all criticism of the social partition, aiming there where the identity
of reason is placed face to face with the identity of Unreason. The procedures of
Roussel’s writing show that language and identity cross where the partition of
the social mixes, indifferently, madness and literature. And this is so because
Roussel’s work is “one of those rare cases in which the work, the experience of
madness and mental illnesses are precisely superimposed to form a single figure”
(Folie, langage, literature, 116).
While, as Foucault declares, “we could say that there is not one single society
in which it is permitted to say everything”, literature – as writing of madness – is
the discourse of excess that speaks beyond what a society allows in a given histori-
cal moment. A political study of form allows Foucault to show how literature thus
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coincides with madness, insofar as it is a category of social organization, through
fiction. In modernity, literature succeeds in making see: a part of reality that stays
hidden (the necessary as the excluded), the processes by which literature creates
(being of language: mechanism of self-representation of language) and the possi-
ble forms of subjectification that the fiction of every episteme allows (and the con-
tingent as the historical possible non-existent). Thus, literature has a paradoxical
nature for Foucault: the extralinguistic, as the limit of the autonomy of literature,
is inserted like a fold in literature. This is why literature can also affect the histori-
cal extralinguistic.
I consider that this performative intervention of literature on the extralin-
guistic, as criticism of the partitions between reasonable-productive subjects and
unreasonable-unproductive subjects, is an early development of some aspects of
the critical discourse of parrhesia that Foucault elaborated in the 1980s. It estab-
lishes an underground link between madness, literature and parrhesia, in short,
between literature and the political history of truth, which is of great interest
both for the political studies of current literature and for the necessary revision
of the Foucauldian oeuvre in the light of the unseen writings that are to be pub-
lished in the coming years.
3.2 Sade: Irregular Subjects and the Politics of Desire
Daniele Lorenzini states in “Le désir comme ‘transcendantal historique’ de
l’histoire de la sexualité” that although desire did not receive systematic atten-
tion in Foucault’s work, it undoubtedly played a crucial strategic role in his
oeuvre. But it is from 1981, as per Lorenzini, when the fundamental problem of
the history of sexuality becomes: “quelle expérience pouvons-nous faire de
nous-mêmes, quel type de subjectivité est lié au fait que nous sommes toujours
en possibilité et en droit de dire: ‘Oui, c’est vrai, je désire?’” (139).
For Foucault, the history of desire is interwoven with the history of the
Western subject, since, as he states in the Subjectivité et vérité lecture series,
the discourse on the truth of sexuality, in our Western societies, is organized
around the practice of confession, that is to say, as obligatory discourse of the
subject on themselves and their desire. This takes place from the profound
transformation that the Greek practice of aphrodisia suffered in the Roman era,
when sexual ethics became more and more centred on the conjugal relation.
According to Foucault, in the imperial Roman period, the principle of socio-
sexual isomorphism is radically called into question by an overvaluation of
marriage. It is then, Foucault states, that a permanent relation is established
between the subject and their own sex, under the form of their desire; and it is
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because of this that the control, domination and knowledge of their desire will
determine the subject that is in genesis of the modern subject. Thus the “sub-
ject of desire” is born, in which desire is in no way identified with pleasure, in
the same way that interiority is not identified with intensity either (Lorenzini,
“The Emergence of Desire”, 460).
This subject of desire will be determined, between the first century BCE and
the first century CE, in its access to the truth about itself, through sexual activ-
ity. This will be the reason for which this truth cannot be attained, and why its
purification will be needed:
Bref, c’est le christianisme (et notamment le monachisme) qui a noué “ce rapport de la
subjectivité et de la vérité à propos du désir, qui est si caractéristique non seulement du
christianisme mais de toute notre civilisation et de tout notre mode de pensée”.
(Lorenzini, “Le désir comme ‘transcendantal historique’”, 145)
Therefore, desire and duty coincide in the configuration of a concept of subject
that is both political and ethical. But more decisive is the consideration of the
common good in this truth-telling of a free subject, because this practice is a
critique and, in this sense, the subject that practises it puts his/her own life at
risk. The definition of a free subject cannot, nonetheless, be configured other
than in interrelation with others, and whose desire to live is, at the same time,
a risk and a desire – returning to the concept of life as struggle between Freud’s
drive for death and life. It is central to understanding the scope of Foucault’s
political aesthetics. I will return to this topic in the next chapter. Before then I
will analyze the lectures that Foucault gave on Sade in 1970, at the University
of Buffalo. In these lectures, Foucault focuses his attention on Sade’s state-
ment, “I only tell the truth” as an emancipatory logic of discourse.
There was certainly a great deal published on Sade in the 1970s. But if
there is a key debate for understanding the scope that this text had in the last
phase of Foucault’s oeuvre, it is the one Foucault’s text held with Dialectic of
Enlightenment, by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, published in 1944. We
can find the clues to understanding particularly in the chapter that Adorno and
Horkheimer devote to “Juliette, or Enlightenment and Morality” (Dialectic of
Enlightenment, 63–93), in which they analyze how Sade’s literature aims to un-
block the incapacity of Kantian thinking to undermine the order that had been
made repressive, insofar as it is linked, ultimately, to the mode of dominant pro-
duction (73). According to their perspective, the work of Sade, along with that of
Nietzsche, was an intransigent critique of practical reason, which exposes a dis-
turbing truth: “the indissoluble alliance of reason and atrocity” (92). Adorno
and Horkheimer conclude that Sade’s work elevated the scientific principle to
the destructive principle, or what they called the amor intellectualis diaboli, the
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joy of defeating civilization with its own weapons. For the authors, and particu-
larly for the Adorno of Negative Dialectics (1970), the anti-Hegelian logic of
Sade’s writings produces a truth: “the identity of power and reason” (93).
Foucault, for his part, who also begins with the critique and revision of Kant’s
proposal of Enlightenment, adds to the consequences of this anti-philosophy of
the Enlightenment, to the power of the negativity of Sade’s logic described by the
Frankfurt theorists, the analysis of the performative powers of identity that are
also found in this logic. Foucault analyzes how the modes of veridiction of Sade’s
characters not only embody the powers of science but also, in their “truth-telling”,
put forward modes of emancipation from the subjectivities in what we can call a
performative negativity or material negativity.6 In other words, it would now not
only be a thought of enlightened negativity but also of the performativity of the
truth-telling of irregular subjects, crucial in Foucauldian thought of the 1970s and
1980s (infamous subjects). This concept of performative negativity, that which
evolves out of the non-attributive logic of Sade, supposes an overcoming of the op-
position between truth and desire, as will be seen.
In the second of the two lectures that he gave in Buffalo, Foucault tackles
the subject matter of the character of the libertine as irregular form of being, as
“irregular existence”. Unlike in the first lecture, in which the texts that form its
basis are predominantly literary, in the second he undertakes a fundamental
shift towards Sade’s theoretical discourse with Idées sur le roman, in his global
proposal to analyze the ten volumes of Justine and Juliette. Here Foucault states
that Sade’s procedure for writing does not entail a transgression of rational
thought (law of alternation of discourses). On the contrary, for Foucault Sade’s
discourse proposes an alternative to rational thought but from within the same
rational logic, in accordance with the reading already made by Adorno and
Horkheimer. However, the works of Sade were not, for Foucault, the negative
development of the other of reason. For him, we find a kind of resistance in
these irregular characters – characters that represent a logic of thought that is
also a model of resistance, just as he describes it in the second lecture.
Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation, Dialectic of Enlightenment, had al-
ready stressed that the objective of the “Enlightenment” in a broad sense, com-
mon to Sade and Nietzsche, was to take away the fear of men, a liberation that,
however, “copes with fear by defecting to the agencies that inspire it […]. What is
infernal about wrong laughter is that it compellingly parodies what is best, rec-
onciliation” (112). In contrast, for Foucault, Sade’s work, as deconstructor of
6 For a development of this question, see Section 2 of Chapter 5, “Donner à voir: politics of
form and the Marxist tradition of literature”.
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instrumental reason through the reversal of its effects in his novels, showed, in
this ironic reversal, the possibility of emancipation of the subject faced with the
imposed modes of “normalization”. Foucault therefore argues against Adorno
and Horkheimer and attributes to Sade’s discourse a radically historical emancipa-
tory force that was not contemplated in the rational reversal of Dialectic of
Enlightenment. Foucault maintains that the non-existence of God is not a theoreti-
cal thesis, confirmed once and for all as a truth that could be deduced from reason-
ing. The inexistence of God is anything that is carried out at each moment as evil of
God, as “evil of God in action”, within the person and the conduct of the libertine.
It could be said that Sade’s logic carries out a similar function in Foucault’s work
as the logic of Leibniz in Gilles Deleuze’s The Fold. Both non-attributive logics for-
mulate a subjectivity at every moment, as historical radical of Da-sein.
In its working, Sade’s logic is anti-Russellian: if the logic of Russell bases
the existence of the subject independently to its relation with the predicate, the
logic of Sade is the inverse: the judgement of the inexistence of the attribution
is supported upon the subject of the attribution. It is a logic that is equally for-
eign to Cartesian logic. In effect, Descartes’s logic is made using an attributive
judgement and reaches an existential judgement. Conversely, Sade begins with
an attributive judgement of attribution not to reach an existential judgement
but rather one of nonexistence. With Foucault, one can say that Sade’s logic is
rigorously monstrous, since between the “intuitionist” logic of Descartes, that
necessarily rests on the idea of the existence of the idea and, therefore, on a
possibility, and the formalist logic of Russell, Sade has come to construct a
form of logic that is absolutely nonviable in terms of logic and from a judge-
ment of attribution, “he reaches a judgement of the nonexistence of the very
thing about which the attribution is made” (Language, Madness, and Desire,
134). Therefore, this logic is a logic of the emancipation of the subject that is
supported upon the subject of desire. Knowing and desiring coincide in Sade’s
proposal, overcoming the classical dialectic between the two.
As Judith Butler explains in Subjects of Desire (1987),
when philosophers have not dismissed or subdued human desire in their effort to become
philosophical, they have tended to discover philosophical truth as the very essence of de-
sire. […] To desire the world and to know its meaning and structure have seemed con-
flicting enterprises, for desire has signified an engagement of limited vision, an
appropriation for use, while philosophy in its theoretical purity has presented itself as
not needing the world it seeks to know.
(1)
In the lecture that Foucault gives on Sade, the relation between desire and
truth is neither a rational desire nor does it establish a causal relation between
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the two. It enables the subject to act in relation to the truth of the desire itself, a
real “art of living”, as he shows in The History of Sexuality. For example, in the
statement “God does not exist”, truth and desire are united in a complex rela-
tion: it is because God is evil that libertines exist and the crueller the desires of
the libertines, the truer it is that God does not exist. The truth of the non-
existence of God and the multiplication of signs are thus connected to each
other in a kind of unending process. The libertine annuls the laws of logic and of
modern thought through desire. This is the desire of Sade’s texts, desire as libera-
tion-domination, desire as force that opposes, denies and destroys, in a system of
power relations equally introduced in itself, folded upon itself: “God’s nonexis-
tence is fulfilled at every moment in Sadean discourse and desire” (Language,
Madness, and Desire, 136).
Power and desire are the two faces of this tension of forces. As Walter
Privitera states in Problems of Style: Michel Foucault’s Epistemology (1995),
“Foucault distinguishes between the ‘will to knowledge’, which characterizes
the dominant form of power since Plato, and ‘power’ or ‘desire’ which can be
dated back to time in ancient Greek history when the truth of a discourse coin-
cided with the power of whoever uttered it” (Privitera, Problems of style, 67).
Nevertheless, these non-existent monstrosities that are God, others, crimes,
laws, nature, etcetera, are not illusions in the understanding of the eighteenth cen-
tury. That is to say, they are not illusions that once discovered we will feel free of.
In response, Sade makes them “chimeras”. The chimera is defined by Foucault not
as something that does not exist but as something that possesses another type of
existence. That is to say, it is the mode in which “performative negativity” acts as
a way of overcoming the “desire/truth” dialectic. The chimera moves thus to
Sade’s logic that removes that barrier of time and establishes a repetitive world.
Sade’s logic guarantees that desire will always be true and nothing can ever invali-
date it. It can be said that Sade’s discourse does not suppose, as might be believed,
the object of desire, but that desire and discourse are effectively the same object.
Sade’s writing introduces desire in the order of veridiction. The chimera sheds
light on the same order of action in that which Foucault’s definition of fiction
made it. They show that the time of the fiction is historical but not teleological or
progressive. And it is in this order that veridiction acts equally.
Foucault observes that these discourses vary according to different factors
and depending on the situations. That is, there is no general system, there is no
philosophy of Sade. Instead, there is a plurality of systems that are juxtaposed
and that do not communicate with the others except through the network of the
four fundamental theses (God, the soul, nature, law). Consequently, this dis-
course will have another function that consists of distinguishing in the very inte-
rior of the libertines that “the individuals cannot be reduced to one another”, as
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the systems vary from individual to individual. There is thus no general system,
as I have said, but one for each libertine, and this defines their singularity, what
Sade calls “the irregularity of individuals”. Every individual is irregular and their
own irregularity is manifested, is symbolized, in their system, in what we can
call their style or their manner, as defined by Marielle Macé (Styles: critique de
nos formes de vie, 2016) and Giorgio Agamben (The Fire and the Tale, 2017),
respectively.
Because of this, the true interlocutors to whom Sade’s discourse is directed
cannot be the victims. The true interlocutor, Foucault says, is the libertine
other, is the one who is already emancipated by the work carried out on him-
self/herself. The discourse is directed from libertine to libertine, it does not aim
to seduce. Therefore, the truth of Sade’s text fulfils another of the key traits of
parrhesia: it confronts persuasive rhetoric. In its repetitive telling it is capable
of negating the existence – through the force of its writing – of God, the soul,
nature or law. His writing is a “desire-passion” for writing, a writing that is ca-
pable of affirming other modes of being such that the libertine-subject is consti-
tuted as self-affirmation (when the libertine affirms herself, God is negated).
In this way, Sade frees the desire within the great Platonic edifice, where desire
is adapted to the sovereignty of truth. In fact, more than freeing, for Sade, Foucault
says, “desire and truth were neither subordinate to each other nor separable from
each other. […] ‘Desire is unlimited only in truth, and truth is active only in desire’,”
and this does not at all mean that, in the form of now recovered happiness or peace,
“desire and truth will merge into an authoritative figure in the form of happiness or
a newly rediscovered peace. Rather, desire and truth are endlessly multiplied in the
unfolding, the scintillation, the infinite continuation of desire” (Language, Madness,
and Desire, 146). Ultimately, we can answer that the truth imperative that Sade
attributes to his work, “I only tell the truth,” coincides with the other “I desire”.
The truth of writing is desire as performative force that transgresses the order of dis-
courses, on the one hand, and the opening of subjectivity to new forms of being as
irregular forms that had not formed part of political positivity or presence.
Foucault’s analysis of Sade in these lectures thus completes the brief atten-
tion he gives to him in The Will to Know. In the first volume of The History of
Sexuality, Foucault presents Sade as a transgression while also a continuation
of the Christian confessional practice of “telling all”. Although, in these Buffalo
lectures, his work entails, on the one hand, an advance of what in the last
years of his research, particularly after 1981 as Daniele Lorenzini (2016) has
shown, was the crucial problem of the Foucauldian history of sexuality, to
tackle those experiences that might make us and that enable us to say, “yes,
it’s true, I desire”. And, on the other hand, the literary experience of Sade is
analyzed here as an example of the negative modern experience of aphrodisia,
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as a set of actions that mark relations with oneself and with others. It may be
said that, in the same way that criticism lingers “darkly” in Sade’s madness,
classical aphrodisia – that is, desire as principle of action – is taken up anew in
the marquis’s writing. In this way Sade gives fiction, in terms of desire, a criti-
cal and emancipatory capacity of the subject as creative subject of self.
One should make note here of a correlation not mentioned by Foucault, but
which is fundamental: the similarity between Sade’s logic of desire, Foucault’s
ethic of care for oneself, and Spinoza’s ethic of desire, because in all of them,
freedom is connected with desire. That is to say, there is not a determination
through action but a transformation of subjectivity through desire itself. For
Spinoza, desire is the essence of man – a desire that compels Spinoza’s conatus
to be dynamic, as the maintenance of being requires a force/strength, “a striv-
ing for perseverance”. Furthermore, in his definition of freedom at the begin-
ning of the Ethics, Spinoza had already related truth with emancipation when
he considered that the true idea is so because of its independence (Spinoza:
Practical Philosophy, 1981). In Spinoza, freedom is not tied to will but to desire.
The ethics of will to be is likewise problematized by Spinoza. As opposed to the
dominion of the passions by the conscience, Spinoza’s philosophy ceases to be
a must-be and the soul is necessarily conscious of itself by means of the ideas
of the affections of the body and is, therefore, conscious of its effort (conatus).
However, Foucault’s study of Sade’s work, as well as his examinations of other
irregular or other infamous subjectivities, enables him to analyze the experience of
the negativity of “mal faire”, in contrast to the aesthetic of the “cura sui” typical of
the classical era and Christian pastoral. This experience of infamous subjects, there-
fore, shows the other expelled from enlightened discourse. Desire and truth are not
opposed in Sade’s logic, in the same way that they are not in the classical concept of
parrhesia as expounded by Foucault. Nevertheless, the status of literature, particu-
larly of what Foucault calls “bad literature”, that which compressed the definition of
the literary institution, is capable of saying what does not want to be seen or heard
and puts its epistemological status at risk. In short, literature, in its historical dimen-
sion, is capable of creating spaces of resistance through the introduction of excessive
discursive practices that interrupt the normativity of a particular historical moment
(or episteme). And they do so from the very interior of this system.
Literature, therefore, places at its centre the current debate for the search
for alternative forms of narration in the crisis of the end of History. These narra-
tive forms would belong to History itself and not to an outside: they are, using
Giorgio Agamben’s expression, “close at hand” (The Fire and the Tale, 22).
Ultimately, as a result, we can draw consequences in two directions. Firstly,
revising the place that literature occupies in Foucault’s work gives it a political
force that enables the development of a fictional capacity as alternative narrative
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and a critical capacity as “making see/revealing”, in his particular revision of the
concept of the gaze in Western thought. Secondly, Sade’s logic gives Foucault an
alternative to the attributive logic that restrict the forms of being and that would
be fundamental in the last stage of his philosophical production. And he advances,
therefore, the link between truth and desire as performative truth in the subject,
that subsequently develops in the concept of parrhesia in the lectures of the 1980s.
It is from this perspective that the consequences that the concept of fiction
has in Foucault’s work can be understood. Fiction, like desire, would function as
a force that is no longer the power of the negative but the revealing of being at
every instant as subject of self. Foucault’s aesthetics are thus an ethics and a
tekné of self. Hence, politics and ethics are at the basis of this concept. But more
decisive is the consideration of the common good in this truth-telling of a free
subject (parrhesia), because this practice is a critique and, in this sense, the sub-
ject that practises it puts his/her own life at risk. The definition of a free subject
who cannot, as I have said, be configured other than in interrelation with others,
and whose desire to live is a risk and a desire at the same time, is one of the core
elements to understanding the scope of the political aesthetics of Foucault.
3.3 Aesthetics of Existence: Technologies of Emancipation
in Later Foucault
As I have stated, Foucault’s subject of desire traces its genealogy through the
era of ancient Rome and up until our time. If Sade shows us the inverse way of
the rational logic of “speaking truth” that ties our desire, in this section I wish
to examine more deeply the “technologies of the self” as emancipation/subjec-
tion of the subject. The analysis of these technologies is directly related to the
aesthetic of existence that Foucault worked on in the last years of his life.
To this end, I will focus on analysing Foucault’s 1982 Vermont lectures. The
intermediate position of these lectures in Foucault’s philosophical trajectory
enables us to see how he links the question of the care of self, belonging to her-
meneutics, to the concept of speaking-truth from his later texts.
From the analysis of this genealogy of the care of self that Foucault traces,
I will put forward some questions on the definition of a subject that, in their
subjective care, is at the same time undertaking a care for the community.
Foucault thus responded to his own critique on the concept of man that he
made in the 1960s, proposing a concept of subject in constant process, a subject
as action. Lastly, I will conclude with how these technologies allow the subject
not to free but to resist the processes of domination.
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The later Foucault’s proposal enables us to confront the challenge of an ethi-
cal subject who finds their model in Graeco-Roman technologies, wherein they
care for the self in their retreat, whether through self writing, through meditation
as recollection of self or of the subsequent technologies that Foucault describes
in these lectures. This would enable us to consider retreat and its treatment in art
and literature, not only from a modernist perspective (the ivory tower of the
poet) or that of a community of recluses as a desire to flee (as Pascal Quignard
shows in Sur l’idée d’une communauté de solitaires). In Foucault, solitude and the
contemplation of death are the way to understanding a subject whose negativity
is radically productive, because desire is traversed with this negativity.
Foucault bases the ethical and political origin of communities in the care and
process of subjectivation. We should remember that it is the care of self that is at
the basis of Greek democracy, in the figure of the parrhesiast. Two years later,
Foucault would find the legacy of this subject in the ironic hero of Baudelaire:
Cette héroïsation ironique du présent, ce jeu de la liberté avec le réel pour sa transfigura-
tion, cette élaboration ascétique de soi, Baudelaire ne conçoit pas qu’ils puissent avoir
leur lieu dans la société elle-même ou dans le corps politique. Ils ne peuvent se produire
que dans un lieu autre que Baudelaire appelle l’art.
(Dits et écrits I, 1390)
There the technologies of the self are in conjunction with lifestyle and the art of
living – art in the sense of technique – of which Foucault would go on to speak
in other lectures, those he gave at Berkeley in 1984. In this chapter, we will not
get as far as the twentieth century, so as to concentrate on the origins of the
technologies of the self, but this will help us to understand the framework of
thought of the later Foucault in which these proposals are developed.
Regarding this genealogy of the technologies of the subject, Foucault is re-
considering his question concerning the possible emancipation of the subject.
In his historical ontology of ourselves, Foucault says: “the aim is: the creation
of freedom”. And he adds:
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are. We
have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "dou-
ble bind", which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power
structures. The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical prob-
lem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the state's
institutions but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization
which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the
refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.
(Technologies of the Self, 785)
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3.3.1 Technologies of the Self. Introduction
The Vermont lectures took place in 1982. In other words, between the Collège de
France lectures on The Hermeneutics of the Subject (that concluded in March 1982)
and his lecture series on The Government of Self and Others (which began
in January 1983). Therefore, Foucault is focused on the study of the classical texts
(from the period of Classical Greece until early Christianity) that go from the care
of the subject by the subject up to reflecting upon the relations between subjectiv-
ity and government of the community, which led into his work on parrhesia in
1984 (his lecture series The Courage of Truth and the Berkeley lectures collected in
Discourse and Truth). Thus ended the path that Foucault had set forth upon with
the publication of the first volume of the History of Sexuality – in 1976 –, the fourth
volume of which, The History of Sexuality: 4: Confessions of the Flesh, was only
published in French in 2018.
Foucault differentiates between the hermeneutics of the self and the theologies
of the soul. And he points out the difficulty of this study because these technolo-
gies are integrated into our culture in various types of activities and experiences
(“Technologies of the Self”, 47). The analysis of these technologies and their rela-
tion with the truth, as “games of truth”, are the methodologies that men utilize in
order to understand themselves (“Technologies of the Self”, 48). Foucault thus de-
fines the technologies of the self: they consist of a “number of operations on their
own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfec-
tion, or immortality” (48). Shortly I will look at the different methodologies en-
tailed by the proposal of a genealogy that helps to answer the Foucauldian
question, “how have we become what we are?” The question that Foucault keeps
on the horizon is a question for the present (“What is Enlightenment?”).
According to Foucault, the development of the technologies of the self had
two phases: 1) Graeco-Roman philosophy in the first two centuries C.E. of the
early Roman Empire; and 2) Christian spirituality and the monastic principles
developed in the fourth and fifth centuries of the late Roman Empire. He dis-
cerns a notable difference between the technologies employed in the two peri-
ods. The main difference is based on the consequences that these technologies
have in the shaping of the subject. In the Greek and Roman classics, subjectiv-
ity is a process, a continual dynamics of the soul; whereas the technologies of
early Christianity consititute extreme attention to contemplation and obedience
to the master. The subject is then constituted as passivity and vigilance over
what might waken desire. Therefore, desire, as force of action in the former
technologies – that “concern for self” – is set aside and placed under vigilance
as the secret that must be shown and punished.
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Foucault describes in his lectures four types of technologies that participate
in what he calls governability: technologies of production, technologies of sign
systems, technologies of power and technologies of the self. For Foucault, the
technologies of subjectivation and those of governability of others are closely
related. He explains in this way the relations between the process of subjectiva-
tion and subjection – a concept of the contradictory subject that Judith Butler
has developed extensively in her work –, and between power and resistance in
the configuration of subjectivity.
3.3.2 Technologies of the Self in Graeco-Roman Culture
“The precept ‘to be concerned with oneself’ was, for the Greeks, one of the
main principles of cities, one of the main rules for social and personal conduct
and for the art of life” (50) and more so than the Delphic principle “know your-
self”. As Foucault said of Socrates: “in teaching people to occupy themselves
with themselves, he teaches them to occupy themselves with the city” (52).
Which is why Foucault revises the origin of ethics as technology and not as
epistemology – which completely modifies the modern perspective of the predi-
cative subject as opposed to the dynamic concept that Foucault presents here.
The subject is continual movement, a dynamic concept. I quote: “As there are
different forms of care, there are different forms of self” (53).
In Alcibiades we find the first appearance of the phrase, epimelesthai sau-
tou. Epimelesthai is more than paying attention: it is a real activity, not just an
attitude. In the Alcibiades, two questions are raised: “What is this self of which
one has to take care, and of what does that care consist?” (58). The pseudo-
Platonic dialogue once more places a dynamic and political approach in the
centre: “What is the plateau on which I shall find my identity?” Alcibiades tries
to find this self in a dialectical movement and decides that care of the self is the
care for the soul. But what matters is not the soul as substance but the care of
the activity. The soul is also defined as an activity, therefore. And for this work,
the soul can only know itself by contemplating itself in a similar element, a mir-
ror. Thus it must contemplate the divine element:
In 127d of the Alcibiades we find the first appearance of the phrase, epimelesthai sautou.
Concern for the self always refers to an active political and erotic state.
(58)
In this divine contemplation, the soul will be able to discover rules serve as a basis for
behavior and political action. The effort of the soul to know itself is the principle on
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which just political action can be founded, and Alcibiades will be a good politician inso-
far as he contemplates his soul in the divine element.
(59)
Therefore, in the origin of the technologies of the self, occupation with oneself
(the examination of one’s soul) and political activities are mutually involved:
The care of self poses four main problems that have endured throughout history: its rela-
tionship with political activity, its relationship with teaching (an obligation that lasts
throughout life), its relationship with knowing yourself (which characterizes all Platonists),
and its relationship with philosophical love or the relation to a master.
(60–1)
The Stoics declared: “retire into the self and stay there,” and it is still a central theme
in philosophy. It was an active leisure: meditation and preparation. In this exercise,
writing played an important role. Seneca’s letters are an example of this exercise of
self. The self is something that must be written about, it becomes the object of literary
activity. The new concern with self entailed a new experience of self, in the first
and second centuries, when introspection became more and more detailed (62). Thus
a relationship between self, writing and vigilance was developed. Writing and care of
the self opened up a new field of experience that had been absent until then: the
subject is then configurated as liberation and repression, at the same time.
Moreover, this first self-writing was also occupied with the body. By way of
example, Foucault quotes the letter that Marcus Aurelius wrote to his tutor
Fronto, in which Marcus Aurelius describes his day in detail, with references to
his health and body, and the theme of which is ars erotica.7 Furthermore, this
letter alludes to the examination of conscience at day’s end, which is prefigured
in this letter writing, as well as in the Christian confession, and later in diary
writing – although, Foucault explains, the diary more strictly originates in the
Christian era and is focused on the notion of the struggle of the soul (66).
Further on, an extension of the care of the self comes about that is no longer
only associated with political activity, but as a permanent activity that enables
the subject “to get prepared for a certain complete achievement of life. This
achievement is complete at the moment just prior to death – of old age as com-
pletion – is an inversion of the traditional Greek values on youth.” Foucault thus
associates an activity of political preparation with the realization of life up until
the moment of death. This combination of ethics, aesthetics and politics is un-
doubtedly one of the distinguishing features of this later Foucault.
7 Homosexual love, which, according to Foucault, is behind the origin of Christian
monasticism.
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Cura sui is, at its origin, a verbal and dialectical activity, in which the sub-
ject is shaped through norms learned by memory. In Alcibiades, the soul
maintains a dialogue with itself through memory as a method for discovering
the truth in the soul. This relationship with memory and truth, however, would
vary later. Firstly, the dialogue as pedagogical method disappears, and silence
becomes more and more important (Foucault says that, in Pythagoran culture,
the disciples had to stay silent for five years, as a pedagogical rule). From dia-
lectic culture we move on to the culture of silence and the art of listening at-
tains greater importance. It is the change between the Platonic dialogues and
the imperial period: in the latter the dialectical structure disappears.
3.3.3 Technologies of the Self in the Stoics
In this transformation, the Stoics were responsible for some of the fundamental
changes of direction of these techniques of training politicians in techniques of
self-care in order to attain the happiness of everyone in all areas of life. The
writings of the Stoic, Seneca, introduce a further change in the figurative use of
language,8 which seems to situate the care of the self alongside administrative
practices, as “self-examination is taking stock” (71). Seneca is a stock-taking ad-
ministrator, not a judge of his past. For Seneca, the technologies of self do not
try to discover truth in the subject, but to remember the truth, to recover a truth
that has been forgotten (what he should have done). Moreover, Foucault says,
the recalling of mistakes made during the day makes it possible to measure the
distinction between what has been done and what ought to have been done:
the subject is not the operating ground for the process of deciphering but is the point where
rules of conduct come together in memory. The subject constitutes the intersection between
acts which have to be regulated and rules for what ought to be done. This is quite different
from the Platonic conception and from the Christian conception of conscience.
(72)
Similarly, the Stoics spiritualized the notion of anachoresis as retreat. The ori-
gin of the term had a broader meaning as the retreat of an army, the hiding of a
slave who escapes from his master, or withdrawal into the country to escape
the city. With the Stoics, the retreat into the country becomes a spiritual retreat
into oneself (a mnemotechnical formula) (72).
8 He seems to use juridical language, and it appears that the self is judge and accused at the
same time. Seneca is the judge and prosecutes the self in such a way that the examination is a
kind of trial. But in reality it is closer to administrative practices.
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As well as the letters to friends as revelation of the self, the examination of
self and conscience, including a recollection of what has been done, of what
ought to have been done and of the comparison between the two, Foucault also
points out another technique of self in the Stoics: askēsis. Yet askesis does not
have a revelation of the secret of the self in its origin either, but a remembering.
The Stoics founded their technologies of the self in remembrance, in the re-
counting of experiences as a taking stock (alluding to Seneca’s administrative
language). For Plato, one should discover truth within oneself. For the Stoics,
the truth is not in oneself but in the logoi, in the rules, in the teaching of the
masters. One memorizes what one has listened to, converting the statements
one has heard into rules of conduct. The Stoics recollect in order to review what
they have done and what they should have done, with regard to the rule.
3.3.4 Technologies of the Self in Early Christianity
In early Christianity,9 ascetism refers to a certain renunciation of the self and of real-
ity because most of the time your self is a part of that reality you have to renounce
in order to get access to another level of reality. This desire to attain the renunciation
of the self distinguishes Christian asceticism (73). While in the tradition inherited
from Stoicism, askesis does not mean renunciation, but the progressive consider-
ation of self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of real-
ity but through the acquisition and assimilation of truth, its goal is access to the
reality of this world. The Greek term is paraskeuazõ (to get prepared), and it refers to
a set of practices through which one can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth
into a permanent principle of action. It is a process toward a greater degree of sub-
jectivity. Thus, aletheia becomes ethos (or acts of truth as alethurgia).
The main characteristics of Greek askesis include two types of exercises that
test preparedness for the event itself:melete and gymnasia.Meletemeans medita-
tion (it has the same root as epimelesthai), and consists of practicing a series of
memorized responses and reactivating those responses, by placing oneself in
a situation where one can imagine how one would react (“suppose that …”):
“imagining the articulation of possible events to test how you would react –
that’s meditation” (75). At the other extreme is gymnasia (to train oneself): while
meditatio is an experience of imagination, gymnasia is training in a real situation,
even though it may have been artificially induced (sexual abstinence, physical
9 Foucault finds the the origin of biopolitics and of our governability in early Christianity. Our
government is based on an intrinsic relation between government and truth.
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privation, as well as other rituals of purification). In the culture of the Stoics, it
comprises carrying out an examination of the independence of the individual
with respect to the external world (very tough sports activities, mortification of
the flesh to convince oneself that poverty is not an evil, and so on). Between the
two extremes, melete and gymnasia, there is a whole series of intermediate possi-
bilities, the purpose of which is the “control of representations, not the decipher-
ing of truth” (78). Foucault find examples of these exercises in authors such
as Epictetus and Cassian, for whom meditation is a type of permanent self-
examination, in which everyone must be their own censor. Here, “the medita-
tion on death is the culmination of all these exercises” (78).
To letters, the examination of conscience and askesis, Foucault added the in-
terpretation of dreams.10 But of all the technologies of the self that Christianity
adapts from the Graeco-Roman era, the principal one is a type of game of truth.
These techniques come about in the transition from pagan to Christian culture,
in order to understand the continuities and discontinuities.
Christianity is a religion of salvation, which should lead the individual from
one reality to another, for which a transformation of the self should occur in order
to access the truth. And this access to the truth cannot be conceived of without
self-knowledge. For Christianity, this entails the need to accept another form of
truth different from that of faith: each person must know who they are – to try to
know what is happening inside themselves, and to allow private or public witness
against themselves. The relation between the obligations of faith and with oneself
enable the purification of the soul. I quote: “Purity of the soul is the consequence
of self-knowledge and a condition for understanding the text; in Augustine: Quis
facit vertatem (to make truth in oneself, to get access to the light)” (80).
The early Christians had other technologies to discover and decipher the
truth about the self, before penitence and confession. The modes of recognizing
the truth about oneself were exomologesis and exagoreusis.
On the one hand, “recognition of fact”, exomologesis, for Christians meant to
publicly recognize their Christian faith was a ritual of recognition of themselves
10 It was a very popular practice, but the only surviving texts are The Interpretation of Dreams
by Artidemidorus (2nd century C.E.) and two other documents: that by Synesius of Cyrene,
from the fourth century, who believed that everyone should interpret their own dreams, for
which “one had to record what happened every day, both the life of the day and the life of the
night” (79); and the Sacred Discourses by Aelius Aristides, written in the second century, who
believed that in the interpretation of dreams we receive advice from the gods about remedies
for illness: the care of the body (79). The matrix of these discourses is the ritual inscription of
praises to the gods that have healed one.
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as sinner and penitent. The individual was thus marked forever and could nei-
ther marry nor be ordained as a priest. Exomologesis is not a verbal behavior but
the “dramatic recognition of one’s status as a penitent”. Quote: “To prove suffer-
ing, to show shame, to make visible humility and exhibit modesty – these are the
main features of punishment” (84). Thus a shift is produced from the forms of ver-
balization to the forms of dramatization of the self, it is the beginning of what
Foucault called “the theatre of truth”.11 Furthermore, this dramatization, which
lasted until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, means a transformation of the
nominal relation with the truth to one that was dramatic and public; whereas for
the Stoics, as we have seen with Seneca, this whole process was private.12
Their function was a form of erasing the sin and restoring the purity acquired
by baptism. This was the paradox: it erases the sin and it reveals the sinner.
Exposé is the heart of exomologesis. Three models were used in order to explain
the paradox of erasing and disclosing: the medical model (one must show one’s
wounds in order to be cured); the tribunal model of judgement (confession will
help in the penance); but the most used was the model of death, martyrdom and
torture. The theories and practices of penance were elaborated around the prob-
lem of the person who prefers to die rather than to compromise or abandon the
faith: the martyr is the penitent (85). And penitence is precisely the consequence
of the change, of the break with oneself, with the past and the world:
It’s a way to show that you are able to renounce life and self, to show that you can face
and accept death. Penitence of sin doesn’t have as its target the establishing of an identity
but serves instead to mark the refusal of the self, the breaking away from self: Ego non
sum, ego. This formula is at the heart of publicatio sui. It represents a break with one’s
past identity. […] Self-revelation is at the same time self-destruction.
(43)
As early as the fourth century we find a very different technology for discovering
the self: exagoreusis, reminiscent of the verbalizing exercises related to a teacher/
master of the pagan philosophical schools. Here Foucault points out how various
Stoic technologies of the self have been transferred to Christian spiritual techniques.
In John Chrysostom, we find an example of self-examination with the same
form and the same administrative nature as that described by Seneca in De Ira.
11 “The subject is not the operating ground for the process of deciphering but is the point
where rules of conduct come together in memory. The subject constitutes the intersection be-
tween acts which have to be regulated and rules for what ought to be done. This is quite differ-
ent from the Platonic conception and from the Christian conception of conscience” (72).
12 The relation with disciplinary power is evident, and its theatrical nature recalls even the
panopticon.
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But this self-examination with administrative language is scarce in Christian lit-
erature. The practice of self-examination in Seneca is based on the capacity of
the master to guide the disciple toward a happy and autonomous life through
good advice, and it was carried out for a limited period. But Christian obedience
differs from Graeco-Roman obedience: it is total and permanent obedience.
John Cassian wrote: “Everything the monk does without the permission of his
master constitutes a theft.” The master’s control is an end in itself and not a
final state of autonomy. “It is a sacrifice of the self, of the subject’s own will.
This is the new technology of the self” (88). The monk must have the permis-
sion of his master to do anything, even to die. There is not a single moment
when the monk can be autonomous. The self must construct itself through obe-
dience. This technology is not based on the remembrance of the past but on the
continuous vigilance of the present. This examination of the present is based
on contemplation as opposed to mobility of spirit, a mobility that is considered
as weakness: “The scrutiny of conscience consists of trying to immobilize con-
sciousness, to eliminate movements of the spirit that divert one from God”, and
passes through the suppression of desire, which distances from God. “The scru-
tiny is based on the idea of a secret concupiscence” (90). That desire that must
be controlled is action itself as double force, which interrelates life drive and
death drive. Here, however, a strict death drive is developed.13
Exagoreusis was practised until the seventeenth century and the inauguration
of penance in the thirteenth century was an important step in its rise. According to
Foucault, the latter becomes more important. From the eighteenth century to the
present, the techniques of verbalization have been reinserted without renunciation
of the self but to constitute, positively, a new self. To use these techniques without
renouncing oneself constitutes, for Foucault, a decisive break (94).
13 There are, therefore, three principal types of self-examination: that which refers to thoughts
(Cartesian), that which deals with the relation between thoughts and rules (Senecan), and that
which establishes a relation between the hidden thought and interior impurity. At this moment
hermeneutical Christianity of the self begins, with its deciphering of hidden thoughts and the
establishment of confession: we can only discriminate between good and evil thoughts through
the confession, giving ourselves over to being counselled by the master. However, the evil is hid-
den and unstated, which is why its verbalization will not be easy: confession is a mark of truth,
even though the price of verbal expression was to turn everything that could not be expressed
into a sin (93). The first is exomologesis, or dramatic expression of the situation of the penitent
as sinner (martyrdom, “In the Penal Colony”). Second is what has been called exagoreusis, an
analytical and continual verbalization of the thoughts carried out in the relation of complete
and utter obedience to another. “This relation is modelled on the renunciation of one’s own will
and of one’s own self” (93).
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Lastly, we can reach the following conclusions. First, the foremost Greek tech-
nologies of self did not entail a rejection of subjectivity itself but, rather, the care
of self had political ends, more specifically democratic, for the training of young
politicians who needed to care for themselves in order to be capable, subse-
quently, of the care of others. The government of self and the government of others
went hand in hand. Those first technologies of cura sui took on a care for the soul
and the body, proof of which are the letters that the disciples addressed to their
masters.
On the other hand, the care of self showed subjectivity as a dynamic process
and not as a hermeneutics of the hidden, as would later occur in early Christianity.
The relation between subject and truth is constituted in opposite ways in Graeco-
Roman culture and in early Christianity: I have not been able to develop here the
relations between truth as concealment/disclosure in Christianity and truth as ac-
tion, as parrhesia. But it is undoubtedly one of the fundamental areas on which
Foucault worked a few months after the Vermont lectures. Yet the continuity be-
tween parrhesia and Greek cura sui is evident, both being at the basis of the devel-
opment of Athenian democracy, and upon which Foucault elaborated on numerous
occasions.
Regarding the relation between desire and the death drive, one of the most
important features of the definition of the subject in Foucault, as Judith Butler
has so convincingly shown in her recent work, is that the subject cannot be rad-
ically freed from the mechanisms of power. The subject is constituted as subjec-
tion and liberation, at the same time. There is an active negativity at the basis
of Foucauldian ethics: it is due to the death drive of the parrhesiast that he/she
is capable of truth-telling, of confronting power. Like Freud, Foucault thinks of
desire traversed by the death drive. But Foucault’s most interesting contribu-
tion is that, precisely through action, the subject takes on the death drive as
ethical and communal production (from negativity to virtuality). The most evi-
dent model, which Foucault turned to many times, is that of Socrates, who, as
parrhesiast, produces a verbal truth (truth-telling) that combines criticism and
construction for the government of others. Let us remember that criticism is, in
itself, described by Foucault as a secondary and negative activity that is applied
upon other discourse, whether political, literary, philosophical, etcetera (“What
is Critique?”). The will in Foucault combines desire and the negativity of par-
rhesia. The action of speaking the truth concerns an awareness of putting one-
self in danger, like running the risk of getting lost. But this is, at the same time,
the only option that the ethical subject has of recognizing himself/herself as a
political being: action as criticism (the logic of Sade).
Conversely, in his last lectures Foucault examines the figure of the parrhesiast
who manages, in his/her subjective decision-making, in his/her ethical action, to
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make the death drive the production of a communal, ethical and political event. It
is, indubitably, the basis of the concept of resistance that Foucault formulated in
the 1970s. We witness the opposition between a “fascination for the death drive”
that the reciprocal tangle of Law and desire entails in early Christianity. In the
words of Žižek, “in which the ‘dead’ letter of the Law perverts my very life-
enjoyment, turning it into a fascination with death; […] is what [Saint] Paul consid-
ers ‘the way of the flesh’ (as opposed to ‘the way of the Spirit’). ‘Flesh’ includes both
what is against the Law and the excessive self-torturing, self-mortifying, morbid fas-
cination with the flesh that is begotten by the Law”14 (Žižek, The Ticklish Subject:
The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, 150).
3.4 Subject to the “intemperie”. Readings of Foucault
in the 21st Century
For Foucault, modernity is associated, on the one hand, with a concept of teleo-
logical history that is detached from the weight of tradition, and, on the other
hand, with a concept of an autonomous and sovereign subject. This is why, if
one wishes to analyze the critique of the concept of the modern subject in
Foucault, one cannot avoid the discourse on history and vice versa. In 1971,
Foucault declared as much in Nietzsche, Genealogy, History:
History becomes "effective" to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being-
as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against
itself. "Effective" history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it
will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending.
(88)
With this, Foucault underlines the dialogue between what were to be two of the
most important issues in his work: the critique of the concept of the modern sub-
ject and his proposal of a genealogy of history as an alternative to teleological
history. Modern subjectivity, which Foucault confronted in his early “death of
man”, stressed the need for a positive deconstruction of the concept of subject.
He proposed thinking of the hidden face of the modern subject as a subject of
desire, for which he traced a genealogy of irregular subjects, namely, of those
subjects who had remained outside modern universality. These subjects, who
make up the outside of the modern subject, are characterized at the same time by
modes of narrating that are very different from those of the story as bios (it “de-
prives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature”). We see the most
14 We can find an example in the torture device in Kafka’s “A Hunger Artist”.
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evident example in the chapter devoted to the “Sade Lectures” that Foucault
gave at the University of Buffalo, in which Foucault sets forth a non-attributive
and discontinuous mode of being that reveals the relationship between the death
of man and the death of God, and that new, non-teleological concept of history.
In recent years, the work of Wendy Brown has continued the critique of mo-
dernity from the Foucauldian perspective. In Politics Out of History (2001), she at-
tempts “an understanding of liberal universalism as not simply containing a
history of excluded others but as having a specific normative content – heterosex-
ual and patriarchal families, capital, and ‘property in whiteness’” (9). According to
Brown, liberalism therefore presupposes sovereign individuals and states to be a
unit of analysis and as subjects of action. Sovereign individuals are considered
based on their autonomy to define and satisfy their needs, and, principally, based
on whether they are capable of taking charge of their acts, so that a “power con-
ceived as generated and directed from within the entity itself” (10) can be ensured.
But Foucauldian analyses of power bring into question whether the conviction
that we are the ones who plan and pursue our ends can be maintained when we
are so clearly, in part, the effects of those powers:
How the disruption of the status of the universal in liberalism undermines the progress
narrative is captured in a general questioning (if not outright rejection) of assimilationist
and integrationist formulations of social change and the adoption of identity-based jus-
tice claims and local nationalisms.
(9)
For Brown, as for Foucault, the nexus between subjectivity and history is narra-
tive, stories. Thus the questioning of this supposed modern universality erodes
the reliability of its classic narrative about what its legitimization is based upon.
This tale that liberalism tells defines an “outside”. And this outside, which legiti-
mized liberalism, is represented by opposing social systems such as feudalism –
understood as its past – or Communism in the twentieth century. Yet, Brown ar-
gues, recent years have shown that feudalism remains in the subject: the little
independence between state and market, the disappearance of the Communist
models, but above all, the bourgeois character of the “universals”.
From this perspective, a new story of subjectivity has become necessary, one
that overcomes the narrative limits of modernity – a narrative model that over-
comes the limits of the bios: those of the life of nature (birth) and death as end.
Apparently, this story of a subject that spreads out from before their very birth
and beyond their very death, that breaks the attribution of a body, a life and a
story, would lack verisimilitude. This is because, from Aristotle on, the story that
was told had to be a living organism. Similarly, the work of Jacques Rancière has
come to show the importance that the studies on fiction have for the analysis of
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contemporary societies. Rancière’s thought complements Foucault’s on fiction
where it positions itself facing the challenge of thinking fiction as opposed to the
“real”, because, since Guy Debord by way of Althusser, “ideology has spread its
dominion massively over all the real. The real is largely confused with ideology”
(Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, 17). Fiction is defined by both thinkers not in
terms of invention but as a material negativity that makes it possible to see/hear
a virtual being there, as an opening to a past that extends its consequences onto
the present and a future that likewise entails its demands. Fiction, thus defined,
is the model of resistance that Brown appeals to for the new narrativity.
In order to consider the proposal of a story of self that shifts the limits of mod-
ern rationality, I will analyze two models passed down from the Foucauldian proj-
ect: the impossible models of Judith Butler in Senses of the Subject (2015) and
Giorgio Agamben in Language and Death (2006 [1982]) and The Fire and the Tale
(2017 [2014]). These propositions are a break from the classical organic model, as
both challenge the limits of the story as bios and question the principle of the
tale’s rationality, from a hermeneutics of the subject that is enunciated to itself
and to others.
In the basis of the hermeneutics of the subject that Butler propounds in Senses
of the Subject, we can find a retroactive hermeneutics of the literary text. Butler
states that the comprehension of the subject (subjected subjectivity) is based on
the literary models that present their characters telling of their own birth, such
as the “I Am Born” of David Copperfield. This is an “impossible” perspective, alien
to the discourse that is governed by the cause-effect dialectic. The other impossible
literary perspective is that of a subject of enunciation who speaks from death itself,
such as in Julio Cortázar’s “Las babas del diablo”. This is the process of composi-
tion of a subject not “for-death” but that takes an undefined plural voice.
For this deconstruction of the liberal subject and its story, it is necessary to
begin with Foucault’s concept of fiction. As has already been seen, in “L’Arrière-
Fable” (1966), Foucault gives fiction a fundamental character as the mode of articu-
lation of all discourse, the nature of which is historical, which I have referred to as
the “social-fictional pact”. The concept of truth-telling, therefore, shifted to being
historical and cultural, as that which a society is willing to accept as credible and
not structural. And the modes of truth-telling, or veridiction, in this early text al-
ready had a historical and fictional nature. He would develop this approach in the
later years of his research. In the Louvain lectures, “Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling”
(1981), he fully confronts the question of how a mode of veridiction (Wahrsagen)
could come about in history, and under what conditions. It is a question of defin-
ing the modes of veridiction in their plurality, exploring the forms of obligation by
which each one of these modes links to the subject of truthful speech, specifying
the areas they are applied to and the domains of objects that they reveal, and,
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lastly, the relations, connections and interferences that are established between
them. In short, it is a historical politics of truth or a political history of veridictions.
3.4.1 Before their Own Birth: The Hermeneutics of the Subject
In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler reinterpreted Foucault’s processes of subjecti-
vation with regard to power and resistance through a subject that is constituted
in origin as a fold, a turning on itself. Here Butler defined the subject as a con-
sciousness that is determined by a relation of power, dependence, or subjuga-
tion. But, according to the author, this origin is supressed. Thus subjectivity is
defined as a process in which otherness affects and precedes the enunciation of
the “self”. Therefore, in the definition of subject that she makes in this work, oth-
erness, as the drive of the power that subjects, forms the origin itself of subjectiv-
ity as psychic reality. Hence the self is already, as of always, also the other of the
community that founds it, in its ethical dimension: the subject is constituted,
therefore, as a fold, and its nature is relational:
The form this power takes is relentlessly marked by a figure of turning, a turning back
upon oneself or even a turning on oneself. (…) The turn appears to function as a tropo-
logical inauguration of the subject, a founding moment whose ontological status remains
permanently uncertain.
(Butler, The psychic life of power, 4)
According to Butler, this tropological dilemma of the subject is that of the trope
as a fold, in its original Greek definition.15 Continuing with the question of the
forming of the subject, this relation of the subject with its foundational depen-
dence would be thoroughly repressed – that is, the subject emerges at the same
time as the unconscious. This would mean that the subordination and formation
of the subject in Foucault would take on psychoanalytic value in Butler’s read-
ing: in order for the subject to emerge, the primary forms of this bond must arise
and at the same time be denied. In other words, “the ‘I’ as predicated upon that
15 There is not enough space here to go into detail on this subject, but it is worth noting about
this tropological configuration of the subject the paradox or turn that lies at the very origin of
the modern novel. Several authors have highlighted this relation, including Julia Kristeva,
who considers it a diagnostic trait of the modern novel that was already evident in Bakhtinian
dialogism. More recently, we can find it in Jacques Rancière’s definition of the politics of litera-
ture as contradiction (The Politics of Literature, 2011). Similarly, in Poéticas de la enfermedad
en la novela moderna [Poetics of Illness in the Modern Novel] (2015), María Victoria Utrera anal-
yses and gives many examples of the key role that the turn/fold occupies in the modern novel,
including Dostoevsky, Maupassant, Poe and Hoffman.
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foreclosure, grounded in” the love-subordination that founded it.16 Therefore,
both for Foucault and for Butler, an analysis of power is inseparable from a his-
tory of subjectivities as resistance,17 and this through the discursive constitution of
subjectivity. For Butler,18 whether through interpellation in Althusser’s sense,
or through discursive productivity, as per Foucault, “‘subjection’ signifies the
process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becom-
ing a subject” (2). So according to Butler, the production of the discursive sub-
ject of Foucault has as a precedent Althusser’s theory of interpellation.
Foucault’s last lectures and seminars were published from 2004 to 2015.
Following the new ideas from this previously unpublished work, Butler, in Giving
an Account of Oneself, corrects the rigidity of the Nietzschean model of the con-
figuration of the subject by power. The “rigidity” refers to what Butler calls the
“punitive scene of inauguration for the subject” (Giving an Account of Oneself,
15), which Foucault had stated in the first volume of History of Sexuality but
which he himself had corrected in his later lectures. Fundamentally, however, he
returns to an issue that he had discussed there, of knowing whether we are some-
how determined before being born by that other that precedes us and which is
precisely what makes our configuration as subjects possible – and tying it in
with Brown’s concern in Politcs Out of History: how do we talk about ethical re-
sponsibility? That is to say, referring to Butler’s book title, how can a subject give
an account of oneself? For Butler, the subject is not constructed ex nihilo but nei-
ther does the dispossession of the self mean that the subjective foundation of
ethics has been lost. On the contrary, “it may well be the condition for moral in-
quiry, the condition under which morality itself emerges” (8). Therefore, ethics
will be inseparably bound up with the subject and the social configuration that
precedes it and constitutes it at the same time.
The concept of ethics upon which she bases her argument also follows
Adorno and other recent authors such as Rancière, for whom the collective
ethos cannot be homogeneous and unitary. When the collective ethos is not
shared by the whole and yet is shown under the appearance of a false unity, it
instrumentalizes violence to maintain the appearance of its collective nature.
The ethos is violent when it becomes an anachronism and denies the rights of
the individual (Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 5). At the same time, ethics
16 What Butler calls passionate attachments (6), and which owes a debt to amor fati as
Nietzsche defined it in Aphorism 276 of The Gay Science: simultaneously subjection and desire.
17 Thinking of the lives of infamous men as modes of dissident forms of being.
18 Butler’s concept also functions with a similar logic as the Freudian concept of Umheimlich:
that of the disturbing that has been repressed which coexists with the familiar. Because it is
the repression that enables the superposition of opposites, and their coexistence.
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cannot be so for the individual external to the collective. Ultimately, for Butler,
the very constitution of the subject is social, dialogic and ethical:
Yet there is no ‘‘I’’ that can fully stand apart from the social conditions of its emergence,
no ‘‘I’’ that is not implicated in a set of conditioning moral norms, which, being norms,
have a social character that exceeds a purely personal or idiosyncratic meaning.
The ‘‘I’’ does not stand apart from the prevailing matrix of ethical norms and conflicting
moral frameworks. In an important sense, this matrix is also the condition for the emer-
gence of the ‘‘I,’’ even though the ‘‘I’’ is not causally induced by those norms.
(Giving an Account of Oneself, 7)
According to Butler, Foucault distances himself from his view in the first vol-
ume of The History of Sexuality and alters his theory of discursive construction.
The subject is no simple effect or function of a prior form of rationality, but neither does
reflexivity assume a single structure. Moreover, when the subject becomes an object for
itself, it also misses something of itself; this occlusion is constitutive of the process of re-
flexivity. […] Something is sacrificed, lost, or at least spent or given up at the moment in
which the subject makes himself into an object of possible knowledge.
(Giving an Account of Oneself, 120)
For this reason, Foucault asks the question: “How much does it cost the subject
to be able to tell the truth about itself?” When the human subject applies forms
of rationality to itself, this self-application is costly. To which Butler adds a new
problem: how can the subject overcome this vicious circle between power and
subordination?
For Butler it is the story that enables us to overcome this impasse. She con-
siders that the subject always gives an account of itself insofar as it is interpel-
lated by another to do so. Every one of us gives an account of ourselves when
interpellated and interrogated about our actions. The giving an account then ac-
quires narrative form. Hence, the mode by which it is established whether the
self was or not the cause of the suffering of another has a dialogic narrative struc-
ture. The story provides a persuasive medium by virtue of which the causal
agency of the self can be understood. In this sense, writes Butler, “narrative ca-
pacity constitutes a precondition for giving an account of oneself and assuming
responsibility for one’s actions through that means” (12). But what would the
story be like of a subject that has to take on what has formed it but in which it
has not participated voluntarily?
The ethical subject that tries to give an account of itself is therefore faced
with two limits. On one hand, it cannot give an account of what precedes it and
what, nevertheless, forms it, because “this self is already implicated in a social
temporality that exceeds its own capacities for narration” (8). And, on the other
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hand, the modes in which the subject gives an account of itself have a cost, in-
sofar as the narrative is subjected to some forms of historical rationality:19
There will be a reflexive action of a subject, and this action will be occasioned by the very
rationality to which it attempts to conform or, at least, with which it negotiates. This form
of rationality will foreclose others, so that one will become knowable to oneself only within
the terms of a given rationality, historically conditioned, leaving open and unaddressed
what other ways there may have been, or may well yet be, in the course of history.
(120)
Both limits, thus stated, would come imposed by a narrativity determined by a
temporality, which is a rationality, in which the subject is formed and gives an ac-
count of itself. They would appear, therefore, as structural limits or a priori the dis-
cursive nature that would determine not only the subject in its daily events, but
also in its ethical dimension. Butler thus proposes confronting the forms of histori-
cal rationality that have conditioned and subjected the narrative of the self since
Aristotle (because, as I have explained, to tell the story of the self is at the same
time making history itself). For this, Butler applies the Foucauldian concept of fic-
tion and fable to the configuration of the story of the self – which is, remember,
the ethical subject’s mode of giving an account of itself. Butler shows that both
limits depend on the same classical causal logic. Faced with the temporal limit, as
an impasse between the story of the self and the formation of the subject, she now
proposes not succumbing to silence but to “accept this belatedness and proceed in
a narrative fashion that marks the paradoxical condition of trying to relate some-
thing about my formation that is prior to my own narrative capacity and that, in
fact, brings that narrative capacity about” (Giving an Account of Oneself, 2). In
other words, Butler proposes accepting a narrative model that enables us to tell
and take authorship of the story that precedes us, before our own birth: the retro-
spective story.
3.4.2 The Retroactive Hermeneutics of the Subject that Narrates Itself
In Senses of the Subject, published in 2015, ten years after Giving an Account of
Oneself, Butler’s aim was to expand her work on the formation process of the
19 It could be said, following Judith Revel’s hermeneutics of discontinuity (2014), that
Foucault had already answered this question in the 1970s, particularly in his 1973 study, I,
Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother: A Case of Parricide in
the 19th Century, which involves an “impossible”mode of narration, one that resists the frame-
work of modern rationality.
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subject and its capacity to give an account of itself. The great novelty of this
book, however, is the text that precedes it, Foucault’s only unpublished work,
and which would have been Butler’s motivation in her new study. Here, she
herself gives an account of a constant concern in her work: that which deals
with the formation of the subject. But this same text introduces something new
in that it aims to reformulate the two limits of the narrativity of the ethical sub-
ject that are not found in her earlier texts: the temporal limit and that of the
discursive modes of rationality.
Butler states that both limits, however, depend on the same classical causal
logic. Concerning the temporal limit, an impasse between the story of self and the
formation of the subject, she now proposes that we do not succumb to the silence
but “accept this belatedness and proceed in a narrative fashion that marks the para-
doxical condition of trying to relate something about my formation that is prior to
my own narrative capacity and that, in fact, brings that narrative capacity about”
(Senses of the subject, 2). In other words, Butler proposes accepting a narrative model
that enables us to narrate ourselves before our own emergence. For a subject to give
an account of itself, it needs to position itself retrospectively, but this “casts doubt on
whether or not I can describe this situation at all, since strictly speaking I was not
present for the process, and I myself seem to be one of its various effects” (2).
This belatedness in the story of oneself is, according to Butler, what Freud
calls Nachträglichkeit (deferred action or retroaction). In “Inhibitions, Symptoms
and Anxiety” (1926), Freud defines it as those mnemic impressions or traces that
might not acquire all their meaning, all their effect, until a time subsequent to
their initial recording. This is therefore a concept of retrospective temporality,
which combines the narration with historical perspective. The Freudian deferred
action also has a fundamental hermeneutic value that Butler uses for her critique
of this temporal limit of discourse, insofar as rereading and the capacity of
reading as resignification and appropriation of the past.20 As Eickhoff (“On
Nachträglichkeit”, 2006) explains, Nachträglichkeit is a circular hermeneutic con-
cept that makes it possible to make complementary readings in both directions:
from the present to the past and vice versa. So an event in the present would
have an influence on certain contents of the memory, modifying them and giving
them new significance. These contents of the memory would at the same time
become newly activated and have new repercussions on the present and the fu-
ture. The reading model that Butler puts forward also keeps a close relation with
the modes of Foucault’s archival reading (1970) and with what Judith Revel
20 Butler removes the concept of traumatic content that Freud gives this belated and trau-
matic understanding.
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(2010) has called “discontinuity”. These models of reading put an emphasis on a
discursivity that is neither linear nor causal. These authors defend a model of
discontinuous discourse that escapes the principle of causality21 and whose read-
ing can be, as Judith Revel puts it, “reversible”.22
The discursive model that allows Butler to think against this belatedness is
literature, because, as Foucault states in “Literature and Language” (1966), litera-
ture is founded on an excess of language, not on silence or the ineffable. Butler
reflects on that narrative sequence of an “I” that emerges at the time that it is
enunciated, starting with a literary model that gives an account of that scenario
that she notes as impossible. This is the opening of Dickens’s David Copperfield,
a novel in which the narrator speaks with extraordinary precision about the de-
tails of the ordinary life that preceded and included his own birth. Although the
story begins by mentioning that the history has been told to him and that he be-
lieves it to have been thus, the way in which the story continues, it seems that he
himself is the only one who has the authority to tell of his own birth. Moreover, it
is as if he had been present in this “impossible scene”. Butler warns that narra-
tive authority does not need to be at the scene. It only requires one to be able to
reconstruct the scene from a position of non-presence in a believable way, or that
an unbelievable narration be convincing for its own reasons.
With this statement, Butler alludes directly to the Aristotelian concepts of
verisimilitude, mimesis and fable, because they are at the basis of the limits of
the narration of a subject who has to give an account of itself as an ethical and
responsible subject. The limits of giving an account of oneself are limits of a
specific type of narration, as defined Aristotle. That Aristotle admitted the ca-
pacity of knowledge to the Poetics meant placing limits on it that were those of
metaphysics. Therefore, the concepts that he defines in Poetics, and also in part
in Rhetoric, are founded on the principles of this metaphysics, insofar as mime-
sis is of reality and for the comprehension of reality it is necessary, according to
Aristotle, to obey the laws of causality. And this, in turn, determines what is
admitted as true. In the literary text, this causal organization defines the fable,
which determines what is truthful in the text. But remember that what is truth-
ful was identified with what is probable, due to that status of poiesis being
closer to the philosophy that speaks of what might happen than to history,
which speaks of what has happened. Therefore, Aristotle concluded, poiesis,
like philosophy, was more universal. In this way, the limits of narration were
21 As in Nietzsche’s discontinuous chain: discourses are susceptible to changing their mean-
ings and can take on others for which they were not at first thought.
22 Revel bases her reading of the revolutionary possibility of history on this.
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determined by a progressive temporality that established a structure deter-
mined by a causal logic of events (beginning, middle, end).
Having called into question the limits of classical narration, Butler con-
fronts progressive temporality, the retroactive temporality of Freud, and causal
logic, the belatedness between the formation process of the subject and their
enunciation as “I speak”. This narrativity from an impossible position, says
Butler, helps us to understand the theory of subject formation:
Could it be that the narrative dimension of the theory of subject formation is impossible,
yet necessary, inevitably belated, especially when the task is to discern how the subject is
initially animated by what affects it and how these transitive processes are reiterated in
the animated life that follows? If we want to talk about these matters, we have to agree to
occupy an impossible position, one that, perhaps, repeats the impossibility of the condi-
tion we seek to describe.
(Senses of the subject, 4)
Thus, the author takes Aristotle’s concept of verisimilitude one step further, to
the concept of virtuality, which combines in itself what is real and what is pos-
sible. For Butler, as also for Foucault and Deleuze, a narration contains a series
of virtuals or possibles, which are updated following each historical moment
(Foucault) or each plane of the particular reality (Deleuze). The virtual is real-
ized in a state of things and of what is lived that makes it possible. This means,
according to Butler, that these impossible models of narration offer the possibil-
ity for the subject to take control of his story, even of the part that preceded
their linguistic consciousness:
What he relates may or may not be true, but it hardly matters, once we understand that
the story he reaches for says something about his authorial ambitions and desires, clearly
meant to counter and displace the infant’s passivity and the lack of motor control, a resis-
tance perhaps to needing to be in the hands of those he never chose.
(4)
Butler interprets this scene of extraordinary self-understanding in terms of a
narrative resistance: the subject resists the power relations that formed him
through an unbelievable but verisimilar narration. Beyond the logic of the
Aristotelian fable, Deleuzian virtuality (2007) and Butler’s analysis, they are an-
chored in the logic of the event.
One of the fundamental aspects of this theory is that Butler does not assert
that what happens in literary works such as these has a parallel in the theory of
subject formation. Rather, she says that narrative gestures such as these find their
place close to any theory of subject formation (5). This narrative dimension of
Butler’s theory of subject formation is based on a hermeneutics of the subject that
is a hermeneutics of narration, inextricably tied to literature. This hermeneutics of
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the virtual and belatedness is necessary, above all when the task is to discern,
Butler says, how the subject is initially animated by what affects it and how “the
contours of an ethical relationship emerge from this ongoing paradox of subject
formation” (6). If we wish to talk about it, Butler says, we must accept occupying
the impossible position. To say that this is impossible does not mean that it cannot
be done, only that we cannot find a way back from the constraints of adult life,
except by asking how those incipient passages remain with us, recurring again
and again. To say that I am affected before even becoming “I”means confounding
both temporalities through language. And Dickens’s impossible model allows
Butler to enunciate an affective resistance that the literary text realizes in its letting
see what had habitually belonged to the unconscious.
3.4.3 An Aesthetics of Existence as Ethics of the Understanding of Self
We return to the question that Butler asked in Giving an Account of Oneself:
how can a subject that has already been conditioned before its own birth make
itself responsible for its own acts? Ten years later, she has placed at the centre
of the debate the role that literature occupies in the narration the subject itself
gives. As we have seen, in Senses of the Subject Butler proposes a retroactive
hermeneutics of the subject that narrates to the self. When the omniscient nar-
rator of David Copperfield recounts his own birth, he “takes authorship” of
what had preceded him and formed him. The opening chapter of Dickens’s
novel, under the title “I Am Born”, uses a narrative strategy that Butler inter-
prets as a double irony (“will this narrator be authored, or will he author him-
self?”), for the narrator is a construction of the author and so counts on his
authorship even as he poses that question, “suggesting that he might be able to
leap out of the text that supports his fictional existence” (3).
The narrator, from a position of non-presence in a verisimilar way, “takes au-
thorship” of their own story, giving it a significance in that they recount their par-
ticular understanding of themselves (3). In this “taking authorship” of their own
story, the narrator intervenes, takes on and transforms the passivity of their story,
which could not be deleted but could be retroactively reinterpreted. The subject
thus assumes what forms it collectively and affectively, which is ultimately the eth-
ical configuration that gives birth to it as a subject. But this “taking authorship”
does not entail a determinism of the subject but rather that, as Butler says, the ca-
pacity of transformation of the subject – the creation of oneself (poiesis) – cannot
be undertaken outside of a mode of subjectivation or subjection (assujettissement).
Consequently, self-realization cannot take place in the absence of the norms that
configure the possible forms a subject can adopt (Giving an account of oneself, 17).
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For this reason, Butler explains, the shift from a hermeneutics of the subject,
which is given in the context of a set of norms that precede and exceed the sub-
ject, to an aesthetics of subjectivity must be made through critique. Following
the arguments that Foucault made in his lecture, “What is Critique?”, Butler
states that the practice of critique would thus “expose the limits of the historical
scheme of things, the epistemological and ontological horizon within which sub-
jects come to be at all. To make oneself in such a way that one exposes those
limits is precisely to engage in an aesthetics of the self that maintains a critical
relation to existing norms” (17). This critique, she says, would provide the desub-
jugation of the subject within what Foucault called a “politics of truth”.
Undoubtedly, the literary modes through which a subject can give an ac-
count of itself and include this tradition of a “politics of truth” are those that are
formulated in the first person as omniscient narrator, as a confession, narrating
their memories, in a diary, in letters, and so on. Such discursive strategies form
part of the technologies of self, as technē of oneself or poiesis. But the truth of
these texts, as Butler reminds us in Senses of the Subject, concerns less the refer-
ence than the use of discursive strategies that enable us to give an account of
what forms us and precedes us, that is, of our birth as ethical and social beings.
These are narrative strategies that, as has been explained, enable the subject to
overcome the impasse between their conscious and discursive birth, and in
which subjectivity was formed in a receptive way. It is therefore through the her-
meneutics of the literary text that Butler definitively overcomes the discursive
limits of the hermeneutics of the subject, which she had described in The Psychic
Life of Power, and which impeded the subject from giving an account of itself
and taking authorship of its own story: “Subjection consists precisely in this fun-
damental dependency on a discourse we never chose but that, paradoxically, ini-
tiates and sustains our agency” (The psychic life of power, 2).
As Butler explained, one gives an account of oneself insofar as one is inter-
pellated and, in one’s story, adopts the gesture that precedes and founds it.
With this gesture, Butler assumes Walter Benjamin’s thesis by which the sub-
ject makes an experience with the past that is unique. One takes responsibility
for oneself when assuming and taking authorship of one’s story in the narration
of the self. Ultimately, these necessary narrative modes, although fantastical,
make it possible to alter the status of truth of literature, which is not with a
causal mimesis but with an ethical truth.
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3.4.4 From the Outside to the Post-mortem Virtual Subject
a. The fold and the vortex: the relational subject
The legacy of the hermeneutics of the subject and its relation with literature in
later Foucault finds one of its most productive readings of the 21st century in
Butler, and entails an overhaul of the interpretation made by Gilles Deleuze in his
1986 lectures on Foucault. In turn, the reading Deleuze made of Foucault’s concept
of subject finds another fundamental echo that is simultaneously conflicting and
complementary, in Giorgio Agamben.
It is worth noting that Deleuze, Butler and Agamben all choose literary
models to address the hermeneutics of the subject inherited from Foucault. It is
precisely using Foucault’s readings of literary texts that Butler’s impossible lit-
erary model contrasts with Deleuze’s oceanic literary model, given in his lec-
tures on subjectivity in Foucault (La subjetivación. Curso sobre Foucault, 2015),
out of which Agamben would develop his metaphorical concept of the subject
as “vortex” (The fire and the tale, 2017). All three also make use of the concept
of the subject as a fold, but taking different directions. If for Butler subjectivity
is a fold of the other understood as the social (Levinas, Laplanche), in Deleuze,
subjectivity is a fold of an impersonal exteriority, while in the case of Agamben,
closer to the Deleuzian reading, it is an aquatic fold of the linguistic being, in
the modes (mannerism) in which the substance relates with the modes in the
historical future of language (The fire and the tale, 53).
In order to understand the different directions these readings take, we need
to look at the contrast between the spatiality in which Deleuze’s concept is devel-
oped, whereas in Butler it is developed around two temporalities: the belated,
Nachträglichkeit-retroactive temporality, and another in which the subject distan-
ces itself, denies its attachment and projects itself in an autopoiesis. In Deleuze,
the line23 of subjectivity breaks with the line of power toward the absolute out-
side as deterritorialized geography. The unconscious is similarly defined in both
authors in a contrary way: for Butler, in the formation of subjectivity, the uncon-
scious is formed out of an affective otherness, which is, at the same time, the ori-
gin of an ethics; in Deleuze’s reading of Foucault, the unconscious is neutral
because it only knows impersonals, indefinite articles, third persons, in other
23 Deleuze distinguishes three lines in Foucault: knowledge, power and subjectivity. Deleuze
says that we must understand line of flight understood as an attempt to free and deterritorial-
ize thought, but like all lines of flight it can be revolutionary or generate oppressive thought;
the line of flight can produce insane, schizophrenic or paranoid geniuses. Thus the need for
prudence, in order to avoid as much as possible setbacks and destruction (Deleuze,
Subjetividad, 28).
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words, non-persons (Deleuze, Subjetividad, 11) and would be heir to Blanchot’s
idea of the impersonal. In Blanchot, furthermore, this third line would be the
“one dies” which must be passed through, although the movement that pulls it
from death is produced:
But that moment through which it has passed is not deleted, that moment remains. The
line of the outside will always be marked by this deadly nature: the only way of escaping
power is to cross the shallow stream… the shallow stream of death.
(28)
But what is this death that one can return from? Death in Blanchot is something
very dangerous, it is to confront the void, “there, reason is lost” (29). That radical
outside, the third line, as Deleuze calls it, is thus Unreason. The outside that
forms the interiority (subjectivity as fold of the outside) confronts, according to
Deleuze, a break line that is the radical outside – that is, death, madness,
Unreason. Thus, Deleuze argues, the fold is necessary; otherwise one cannot live
(29). In contrast, for Butler this confrontation is already there in the moment
prior to the formation of all subjects, one step before (no more) the subject’s be-
ginning. Thus Butler overcomes Blanchot’s Heideggerianism, which is the prece-
dent to this concept (the outside as the neutral). It is not being for death, but the
Freudian configuration of the subject as a deferral of understanding.
The literary model that Deleuze uses of the fold as a condition for life break-
ing with death is the oceanographic model: Moby Dick. Captain Ahab confronts
the line of the outside, he passes from the other side, Deleuze says, but he has
not made a fold, his vessel is broken. On all levels this, says Deleuze, concerns
the river, the ship, the sea, and so on. Nevertheless, we find another literary text
where the formation of the fold of the outside reaches a good harbour. This is the
novel by Blanchot, Thomas the Obscure (1941), which shows this question in an
almost explanatory way. I am particularly referring to the first chapter, where the
process of the formation of the fold of the outside is described step by step.
1. The opening paragraph of the novel describes the formation of the line of
the outside:
Thomas sat down and looked at the sea. He remained motionless for a time, as if he had
come there to follow the movements of the other swimmers and, although the fog pre-
vented him from seeing very far, he stayed there, obstinately, his eyes fixed on the bodies
floating with difficulty. […] The conviction that there was, in fact, no water at all made
even his effort to swim into a frivolous exercise from which he drew nothing but discour-
agement. Perhaps he should only have had to get control of himself to drive away such
thoughts, but his eye found nothing to cling to, and it seemed to him that he was staring
into the void with the intention of finding help there.
(Blanchot, Thomas the Obscure, 7)
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2. The exit to the impersonal outside, or what Deleuze calls “confronting the
one dies”:
[…] As he swam, he pursued a sort of revery in which he confused himself with the sea.
The intoxication of leaving himself, of slipping into the void, of dispersing himself in the
thought of water, made him forget every discomfort.
(8)
3. The fold as the interiority of the outside:
[…] The illusion did not last. He was forced to roll from one side to the other, like a boat
adrift, in the water which gave him a body to swim […] he went on swimming as if,
deep within the restored core of his being, he had discovered a new possibility […] it
was like an imaginary hollow which he entered because, before he was there, his imprint
was there already. And so he made a last effort to fit completely inside. It was easy; he
encountered no obstacles; he rejoined himself; he blended with himself, entering into
this place which no one else could penetrate.
(8–9)
As has been seen, both in Deleuze and Butler the interpretation of Foucault’s leg-
acy of the process of subjectivation as a fold of the outside is undertaken through
literary models. But although Deleuze explains that line of the outside as the “one
dies” or the threat of Unreason, through what he comes to call “literary experien-
ces” such as those of Hölderlin or Artaud, Butler meanwhile proposes a literary
model that belongs to an ethics of discourses that precede and form ethical subjec-
tivity. Agamben’s reading, also formulated on the line of “one dies”, is in dialogue
with the concerns of Butler and Deleuze that I have expressed here. But I will par-
ticularly look at the reconfiguration of the relations between subjectivity and his-
torical time, which could be seen as a mode of complementing that of Butler’s.
b. The “in-temperie” virtual subject
Giorgio Agamben describes a subjectivity marked by the margin of the outside that
forms the fold as “one dies”, also concerned by the modes of legibility in the face
of a lost origin, that is, in the face of the irremediable loss of an original meaning
that could be re-established. Thus it can be argued that in the subject formation
process not only does the story that precedes its own birth have an effect, deter-
mining in the subject a dialogic structure, but also as a subject conditioned by that
other fictitious story that is the anticipation of death itself. Therefore, the process
of subjectivation is supported on a double fictional base that enables it to give an
account of itself insofar as the process of subjectivation is configured as trans-
subjective plurality in both directions. In other words, for Agamben the fold of the
outside that frames the subject is neither the death nor the disappearance of the
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subject but rather its potentiality, since the inoperative time of certain death intro-
duces a hiatus in the present as negativity and possibility.
Let us say, moreover, that both form part of the same hermeneutic gesture.
As Eickhoff explains, Nachträglichkeit is a circular hermeneutic concept that
makes it possible to make complementary readings in both directions: from the
present to the past and vice versa. So a reading from the present would have an
effect on certain contents of the memory, altering them and giving them new
significance. These memory contents, in turn, would be newly activated and
would have new repercussions in the present and the future.
But how can the relationship of literature with death be constituent action of
the subject? To answer this question, let us look at two texts by Agamben:
Language and Death. The Place of Negativity (2006 [1982]) and the more recent The
Fire and the Tale (2017 [2014]). In the former, the Italian author tackles the relation
that Western thought establishes between the subject, death and language from
an ethical perspective but still immersed in a metaphysical discourse:
Both the “faculty” for language and the “faculty” for death, inasmuch as they open for
humanity the most proper dwelling place, reveal and disclose this same dwelling place as
always already permeated by and founded in negativity. Inasmuch as he is speaking and
mortal, man is, in Hegel's words, the negative being who “is that which he is not and not
that which he is” or, according to Heidegger, the “placeholder (platzhalter) of nothing-
ness”. (Agamben, Language and death, xii)
The negativity of the subject, what it is and is not, proceeds from the fictitious ex-
perience of death as anticipation of its possibility: “This negativity is the basis for
the possibility of the negativity of inauthentic Dasein in its falling (Verfallen); and
as falling, every inauthentic Dasein factically is. Care itself, in its very essence, is
permeated with negativity through and through [durch und liurch von Nichtigkeit
durchsetzt]” (Language and death, 2). Let us consider, therefore, the political ca-
pacity of negativity that Agamben shows in Language and Death. In order to do so,
we must turn to The Fire and the Tale. More than thirty years separate the two
works (1982–2014), and Agamben’s thinking on negativity acquires the political di-
mension I have referred to with Rancière and Foucault, which Agamben calls a
“poetics – or politics – of inoperativity” (The Fire and the Tale, 50).
Agamben’s question revolves around negativity as a “forgetting” of mean-
ing, and as inoperativity of the work – always in potentiality as potentiality of
no, Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” – the time of which is that of virtuality.
This time is what permits the work to speak and be silent at the same time:
The genuinely philosophical element contained by a work – be it an artistic, scientific, or
theoretical work – is its capacity to be developed; something that has remained – or has
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willingly been left – unspoken and that needs to be found and seized.
(The Fire and the Tale, 34)
As in Deleuze and Blanchot, this development of potentiality, Agamben writes, en-
ables attaining an “impersonal zone of indifference”. However, this impersonal
and neutral zone has a genuinely political nature, insofar as in it “every proper
name, every copyright, and every claim to originality fades away” (34). In this
way, the pre-individual conditions that form subjectivity formed the interrelational
and ethical nature of the subject; this negativity is, at the same time, the opening
to the possibility of the subject and of a democracy of reading founded on a herme-
neutics of the unfinished text.24 It is here that Agamben positions the Foucauldian
project of the care of the self as “the way in which the individual constitutes him-
self as the moral subject of his own actions” (130), or “aesthetics of existence”.
Following Foucault, the subject is that ethical relation in itself and the creation of
the self. Because the subject is by nature unfinished, only its total absence of sub-
stance enables the subject to be the object of its own work, in the same way that
only the pre-individual determination of the subject makes it susceptible to modifi-
cation by itself and by others, through an activity and a technē. This is the true
sense of the aesthetics of existence in Foucault, Agamben says: “Happiness – the
ethical task par excellence, at which every work on oneself aims – is ‘attached’ to
writing, that is, becomes possible only through a creative practice. The care of the
self necessarily passes through an opus” (134). Thus the art of the self, the work on
life itself, becomes the most removed from a superficial dandyism and goes on to
be the necessary condition for the subject’s resistance to the pre-subjective forces
of domination. This is how we should understand the epitaph on the gravestone of
the painter Paul Klee that Agamben quotes: “a being whose abode is ‘just as much
with the dead as with the unborn’ and who is, for this, ‘closer than usual to crea-
tion’” (135). And literature becomes, insofar as it is the work of the care of the self,
a supplement sine qua non for the ethical configuration of the subject. Or, equally,
the ethical subject is, simultaneously and inseparably, an aesthetic subject and a
historical subject.
Lastly, we can conclude that between the two fictional times – retrospective
and anticipatory – the decentred life is developed as virtual story of the subject
that becomes a work of the self. This is because its time is the time of the virtual-
ity that comes from the negative potentiality, that is, from the unfinished nature
of the subject. The subject is, therefore, indefinitely open to the outside: the
others of the community but also those that have remained outside of history.
24 Agamben again here turns to the mannerist onto-aesthetics of Deleuze in The Fold, already
mentioned in the chapter on Sade’s irregular subjects.
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The unfinished, open nature of the subject means that, for Agamben, litera-
ture is a supplement of being as technology of the work of the self. Literature,
as language from death, has the capacity to speak for those that cannot because
they have no access. Literature is an opening to the outside, whose time is al-
ways deferred by the hermeneutic circle of Nachträglichkeit.
3.4.5 Subject and History to the “In-temperie”
Returning to the question left open at the start of this chapter, how does the
study of the concept of the subject make it possible to rethink a concept of his-
tory, both in crisis? Foucault’s proposal of introducing the discontinuity of his-
tory in the subject (“History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces
discontinuity into our very being”) can equally be read in reverse: thinking his-
tory from its concept of subject, which would decentre the temporal limits of its
own story: telling our story is to make history.
And, in line with Brown, the critique of the modern subject is also a critique of
the liberalism that presupposes sovereign individuals and states as units of analy-
sis and as subjects of action. On the contrary, the subjects we have defined are
neither autonomous nor supported upon their autonomy, but are clearly interrela-
tional and only capable of assuming their acts through their non-autonomy.
As Foucault stated in “Utopian Body”, the body is presented as a place that
roots us in history “now” through death (the corpse) and love. The arguments of
Butler and Agamben, based on Foucault, break from the classic concept of a teleo-
logical history and make “time now” lead in two contrary directions: the past that
precedes and forms us (archaeology) and the future as unfinished potentiality of
subjects (care of the self). Two temporalities converge, therefore, in the instant
now and make it susceptible to a resignification as resistance to disciplinary
powers. In the time of Nachträglichkeit (retroactivity), we are able to rewrite our
story contained up until that instant; while in the unfinished moment, we are able
to introduce an interruption to the present time, since the mannerist subject or un-
finished subject is made responsible for its actions in every moment.
Undoubtedly, this temporality entails a critique of Heidegger’s concept of
man as “thrown to time”, and positions itself closer to Walter Benjamin’s con-
sciousness of time, which also introduces discontinuity in the concept of “now”
or “now-time” (Jetztzeit).
As Habermas explains in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, this dis-
continuous temporality establishes the possibility of an eruption, an “authentic
instant”, of an innovative present-day that interrupts the continuum of history
and eludes a homogeneous history. And, as for Benjamin, this reading enables
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us to direct the time of modernity, traditionally joined to the future, toward the
past. Hence, only if the subject attends to its past, to memory, can it attend to its
present and its future. In this way, an overcoming of the hiatus between experi-
ence and expectations of the future is proposed, which, as Reinhart Koselleck
showed, in modernity, modern consciousness of time is characterized by the
growing distance between “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation”,
“a permanent global quality of utopian tone” that is, precisely, the breakdown
that we currently find ourselves facing. For the first time, principally as a result
of studies of ecology and environment, we are confronting a time that does not
envisage a better future. The future is once again a source of unease that the
time of modernity had neutralized. The subject is faced with a classical time,
time as inclemency, time as climatic threat, which brings back the tradition of
older times that was characteristic of peasant and artisanal life. However, only if
the subject looks to its unfinished nature can it project itself into an open future
as a “revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past” (Benjamin, On the
Concept of History, Thesis 17). The time of the subject now is not teleological, be-
cause, paradoxically, this time as progress had eliminated any possibility of in-
terruption of events, that is, of time as transit. Taking charge of the past is,
therefore, for the here-subject, the opening that permits the lack of definition of
the time of the subject that dies. The subject that takes charge of its own past
thus assumes its ethical responsibility and its freedom. The time of the subject,
returned toward its past and projecting toward an unfinished future, creates the
possibility of freedom and, at the same time, danger.
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4 Tragedy and Historical Event
4.1 Literature as Historical Event
Literature occupies a variable place in its relation to history and reality, and to
its own autonomy. On the one hand, the concept of literature has been defined,
in the tradition that originates in Benjamin, as historical event. And, on the
other hand, as Derek Attridge explains in The Singularity of Literature (2004),
today we also “still talk about ‘structure’ and ‘meaning’, and ask what a work
is ‘about’, in a manner that suggests a static object, transcending time, perma-
nently available for our inspection” (Attridge, The Singularity of Literature, 59).
As I have shown, Foucault attributes the evental capacity of literature pre-
cisely to its formal and material character – we could say, indeed to the very
traits that had declared its autonomy. As we have seen, literature refers to real-
ity through a formal incapacity: it is not capable of speaking of everything, and
this shows that we can no longer declare that literature is a self-referential and
ahistorical activity. This shift in Foucault’s literary thought towards a politics of
literature has its most visible consequences in his later years. Therefore, the liter-
ary thought of the later Foucault lies closer to the Benjaminian tradition, which
he had begun to develop in his work, “L’extralinguistique et la littérature”, dat-
ing from 1967 and 1968. We thus accentuate two conditions of literature: first, as
per T.S. Eliot, that the corpus of literature is historical and variable; and second,
with Terry Eagleton, that in the course of history, works can go from being seen
as fiction to non-fiction, and vice versa.
Along these same lines, Attridge asserts that literature refers “potential pos-
sessed by a body of texts for a certain effectivity, a potential realized differ-
ently – or not at all – in different times and places. (Since the literariness of
any given text may always emerge in the future if it has not done so in the past,
this is a body with no determined limits)” (59). However, for Attridge, literature
seems to be outside of history, in a paradoxical way, since it awards all its ca-
pacity for effectivity to its reading. Therefore, we cannot think the event of liter-
ature, its literariness, as being on the margin of reading and all reading is
historical. The potentiality of literature is, for Attridge, therefore, ahistorical,
whereas its realization in reading is historical.
Foucault, however, considers that the marginality of literary discourse is
what allows it to echo events not assimilated by the discourses of power.
So Foucault stops considering literature as a transgression of limit, and considers
it the place where certain epistemic transformations of the history of thought take
place. According to Foucault, all discourses cohabit in history, there is never an
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“outside of history”, because these margins of discourse cohabit and define the
history of what does not want to be seen. But he grants literature, moreover, an-
other capacity: that of participating itself as discursive event, being the place that
gives an account, for the first time, of certain historical events.
In this chapter, I will focus on three moments in which literature is discur-
sive event, all related to classical tragedy, in Foucault’s analyses of the 1970s
and 1980s. These are found in his different analyses of Oedipus Rex25 and atten-
tion to the tragedies of Euripides in his genealogy of the concept of parrhesia in
the classical era, mainly in Discourse and Truth (1983).
4.2 Parrhesia: Between Emancipation and Danger
Foucault devoted his last three lecture series at the Collège de France to the
study of the interweaving of life and truth through parrhesia: Subjectivité et
vérité [Subjectivity and Truth] (1980–1981, published 2014 in French), Le gou-
vernement de soi et des autres [The Government of Self and Others] (1982–1983,
here quoted from the 2010 English edition) and Le courage de la vérité
[The Courage of the Truth] (1983–1984, here quoted from the 2011 English edition).
In the first of these, Foucault focuses on the study of the relations between truth,
subjectivity and others, giving particular attention to questions related to desire
(aphrodisia) and the law. This work is in constant dialogue with the History of
Sexuality (I–IV). However, the last two lecture series evolve toward an aesthetics
of existence in which the care of the self has direct consequences in the care of
others. We could say that Foucault shifts from an ethical concern, the care of the
self (epimeleia heautou), toward a political question, “the government of others”.
The most immediate consequence of this shift is that Foucault considers that the
path toward politics should always be guided by a concern of the citizen as sub-
ject of self, along similar lines as the ethical and political thought of Hannah
Arendt in The Human Condition (1958). The subject, therefore, must attain their
emancipation in order to freely exercise the use of their word as citizen in dia-
logue, and always mediated by the other. In fact, Foucault states in The Courage
of the Truth, “in ancient culture, and therefore well before Christianity, telling the
truth about oneself was an activity involving several people, an activity with
25 These analyses are carried out in the second of the Río de Janeiro lectures collected in “The
truth and the Juridical Forms”, in “The Knowledge of Oedipus”, the lecture delivered in
Buffalo in 1972, in the lesson of 28 April given in Brussels and collected in Wrong-Doing, Truth-
Telling (1981), and finally in the lessons of the 1982–1983 course in the Collège de France titled
The Government of Self and Others, particularly in the lesson from 19 January 1983.
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other people, and even more precisely an activity with one other person, a prac-
tice for two” (5).
In this way, Foucault responds to his own concern for the problem of the
social subject’s freedom conditioned by the relations of power, with an opening
from ethics and the emancipation of the care of oneself. This is to say, it will no
longer be a figure of authority who determines the emancipation of subject citi-
zens, but the subject in the framework of a relation of trust who will make their
emancipation possible.
This shift and the affirmation that it is the ethics of the care of self which
makes the subject a free and emancipated citizen are to be found in the path
that Foucault traces from his works on Oedipus to the tragedies of Euripides, as
will be seen. Thus the classical tragedies are not only the stage on which he
gives an account of a series of new ideas regarding classical judicial systems
and their transformation in the texts of Sophocles and Euripides along the lines
of the politics of literature that we have been defining; they are also the stage
where Foucault formulates the traits of a political subject.
In the framework of his work, Foucault locates his writing on the genealogy
of parrhesia as part of his concern for the coercive modes of truth-telling of the
modern subject in his same work, as it derives through the concern that the
coercive obligation of the subject’s speaking truth through institutions had
marked in modernity. And he also shows the political origin of the term. Thus
parrhesia is a vehicle for articulating his concerns about the dominated subject
in modernity and, in turn, a mode of analysing modes of interpellation, of pro-
duction of subjectivities, through the emancipation of the subject. It is not for
nothing that the concept of parrhesia is translated to Latin, not without prob-
lems, as “libertas”.
In my study, it is particularly relevant that this concept appears for the
first time in the Greek literature of Euripides, proceeding to spread throughout
the Greek literary world of antiquity from the end of the fifth century BCE.
Etymologically, parrhesia means “to say everything” (pan-rhema), and it re-
ferred to the capacity to speak frankly and freely. This speech-oriented concept
emerged in association with Athenian democracy and links truth with belief or
trust.26 Foucault’s works follow the historical development of parrhesia from its
first usages in Athenian democracy through its transformation under autarchy,
its use in the classical philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and the Cynics, up to its
26 Consider here the difference between the parrhesia that emerges linking the concept of citi-
zen and the concept of subject, regarding the subject of modernity, for which, as per Descartes,
knowledge is a mental activity which is accessed through evidentiary doubt.
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use in primitive Christianity and Christian pastorals. This word runs through
the foundations of Western civilization. Foucault summarizes the characteris-
tics of parrhesia thus:
parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth
through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of
relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other
people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely,
parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to
truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help
other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death
instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-
interest and moral apathy.
(Fearless speech, 19)
Parrhesia is thus for Foucault the expression of the potentiality of language
and, therefore, it creates an effect that relates it to performative utterances and
moves it closer to criticism – or what, in Michael Hardt’s interpretation of par-
rhesia, is militancy (“The Militancy of Theory”) – insofar as it has effects outside
of language itself.
What makes a statement characteristic of parrhesia is precisely that it opens itself to risk.
Similarly, in the performative utterance, the subject of enunciation is important. Status is
indispensable for the execution of a performative utterance, although it might matter little
whether there is any personal relationship between the speaker and the utterance itself,
that is, a relation of sincerity between the performative utterance and the one who utters it.
In parrhesia, by contrast, and in what it does, not only is such indifference not possible,
but there is always a formulation of the truth occurring on two levels. A first level is that of
the statement of the truth itself (at this point, as in the performative, one says the thing,
and that’s that). The second level of the parrhesiastic act, the parrhesiastic enunciation is
the affirmation that in fact one genuinely thinks, judges and considers the truth one is say-
ing to be genuinely true (parrhesiastic act, affirmation of the affirmation).
(Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 64)
However, as Foucault explains, the discourse of parrhesia, unlike performative
utterances, takes place outside of a context that guarantees that the saying ef-
fectuates what is said, and carries with it a risk and an opening of the situation
that has nothing to do with the institutionalization of performative utterances.
Thus, while in the performative utterance the status of the person speaking is
important, in the parrhesiastic act, what endorses the utterance is that the per-
son speaking asserts their own freedom as a linguistic-political individual (65).
Foucault says, “it is not the subject’s social, institutional status that we find at
the heart of parrhesia; it is his courage” (66). The effects of the potentiality of
language that democratic parrhesia represents have a political function that for
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Foucault entails a transformation of the social-political order in a given com-
munity: Veridiction that produces a hiatus, an interruption and a transforma-
tion. And this use of the action of language, of a language that is the language
of everyone, is a political practice that also causes an unknown and dangerous
reaction for the person who utters it.
Yet the description of the historical uses of parrhesia enables us to trace
two lines of continuity: one that is introduced through parrhesia as a political
concept tied to the citizen-subject who utters it; and the second that follows the
“other parrhesia”, which refers to a bad use of the freedom to say everything
and that, for us, will trace the status of a series of discourses in modernity, which
is where literature and madness coincide.
According to Foucault, the term parrhesia can also be used in a pejorative
sense. It is the comic playwright Aristophanes, who had ridiculed Euridipes in
The Frogs, that makes us aware of this: “we find it used in a pejorative sense,
first in Aristophanes, and afterwards very commonly, even in Christian litera-
ture” (Foucault, The Courage of the Truth, 9). It is important to consider that
this pejorative use is precisely saying everything, but as “saying anything (any-
thing that comes to mind)”. Hence the other possible face of the parrhesiast ap-
pears, that of the “impenitent chatterbox, someone who cannot restrain himself
or, at any rate, someone who cannot index-link his discourse to a principle of
rationality and truth” (10). In texts from the 4th century BCE, says Foucault, the
place of parrhesia as free and excessive saying with ambiguous effects seems to
be reversed, and democracy comes to present itself as the place where parrhe-
sia (truth-telling, the right to express one’s opinion, and the courage to go
against the opinions of others) will become increasingly impossible and in any
case dangerous (35–36). Thus distrust is created around parrhesia.
Foucault finds one of the key examples of this distrust of parrhesia in
Isocrates, at the beginning of the speech On the Peace (355 BCE, paragraph 13).
Here he alludes to orators and poets who say everything about the gods, and
whom the Athenians listen to with complacency. But, according to Isocrates,
those who stand up to speak are in reality nothing more than drunks, people
who act without reason, fools, in short. In this free speech of democracy, there
are true discourses, false discourses, useful opinions and pernicious, harmful
opinions; men dedicated to the city, foolish men, the good and the bad, all jux-
taposed and intermingled in the game of democracy. And this is, he warns,
when parrhesia is a danger for the city (36). True discourse does not overcome
false discourse in democracy. What Isocrates is indicating is the principle of
quantitative opposition or principle of scansion of the unity of the city, upon
which moral, ontological and political inequality is founded.
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In order to exemplify this lack of separation and confusion that parrhesia
causes in democracy, Foucault takes up the text that is falsely attributed to
Xenophon:27 Constitution of the Athenians, a parody of the democracy that has
descended from aristocracy. This text is a defence of the principle of political
inequality (against Isegoria), namely, as Aristotle argues in his Politics: that by
nature there are slaves for whom being governed by an authority is an advan-
tage, given that not all people share of reason in the same way (principle of
cognitive inequality) and, in the case of Pseudo-Xenophon, this lack of reason
coincides with wickedness.28 The Pseudo-Xenophon distinguishes two types of
government: on the one hand, the government of the most sensible and honest,
in which the madmen (those who lack sense) are not allowed to speak, partici-
pate in the assembly or give their opinion, and what reigns in the cities is euno-
mia (good constitution, good governance). On the other hand, the great merit
of Athens, says Pseudo-Xenophon with irony, is precisely that they have not
given themselves the luxury of eunomia and have not prevented the madmen
from entering the assembly. The merit of democracy is not having accepted such
restrictions. The problem is that if the best citizens make the decisions, then they
will only serve their own interests, whereas in democracy, those who make the
decisions are the more numerous, not the best. And therefore they want what is
bad, for them and for the city (Foucault, The Courage of the Truth, 42).
It is not only in Aristophanes and Isocrates that bad parrhesia and its rela-
tion with literature appears; we also find a discussion of bad democracy in
Book VIII of the Republic. As Foucault explains, Plato describes this bad democ-
racy as “all motley, fragmented, and dispersed between different interests, pas-
sions, and individuals who do not agree with each other. This bad democratic
city practices parrhesia: anyone can say anything” (The Courage of the Truth, 10).
We can find this same Platonic criticism in the famous dialogue, Ion.29 Recall that
Ion was a rhapsodist committed precisely to being able to talk on any subject. Ion
represents the midpoint between oral culture and the arrival of written culture.
27 Attributed to Xenophon, “Minor texts”.
28 On the later relation between unreason and depravity, we find other texts by the author
that abound in what would be the “dangerous subject”. See The Lives of Infamous Men, among
others.
29 One of Plato’s first dialogues, it is dated to around 401 BCE, separated by only a few years
from Aristophanes’ The Frogs, which is dated to around 405 BCE. The two works coincide with
a historical moment in which the confidence in democracy that was enjoyed in previous years
was lacking. Plato cites Euripides as inventor of the adjective “magnetic”, which would have
appeared in the tragedy Oeneus, of which only fragments have been preserved. Some years
before, Euripides created the homonymous tragedy Ion (413–412 BCE), a work that Foucault
recognized as being entirely dedicated to the problem of parrhesia.
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The themes of Plato’s dialogue, one of the founding texts of Western literary
thought, mark the difference between good and bad literature, between inspired
literature and doxa, but above all between rational knowledge, the knowledge
of philosophers, and irrational knowledge, enthusiasm or rapture, which corre-
sponds with inspired poetry. From this is derived the hermeneutic incapacity of
the rhapsodists, because they were mere transmitters of a knowledge that they
themselves did not understand.30 But there is another striking trait of this truth
that is transmitted, which is not a technique (technē) but rather corresponds to
a “divine force” (533d-c) and is incorporated into a metaphor by Plato. This is
the metaphor of the “magnetic stone”, in the explanation of which Plato cites
Euripides himself:
[…] a divine power which moves you like the stone which Euripides called Magnet, but
most people call Heraclean. In fact, this stone not only attracts iron rings but also puts
power in the rings so that they also have power to do the same thing the stone does and
attract other rings. Sometimes quite a long chain of iron rings hangs suspended one from
another; but they’re all suspended by the power derived from that stone. So too the Muse
herself causes men to be inspired, and through these inspired men a chain of others are
possessed and suspended. For all our good epic poets […] are inspired and possessed, and so
similarly our good lyric poets too. […] [they] do not dance in their right minds. […] And
they tell the truth. For a poet is […] unable to create until he becomes inspired and
frenzied, his mind no longer in him.
(Ion, 534 a-b)
The traits of this poetic truth are, on the one hand, unreason, as has been made
evident; but in a less evident way this truth is necessarily the truth of the many
that make up the “chain” of all those rings. The metaphor of the magnetic
stone is also the metaphor of a democratic community. The Platonic metaphor
therefore succeeds in unifying the features of a truth that, from this point for-
ward, will be separated from the capacity of all citizens to speak freely without
social division between reason and unreason, remaining linked first to poetics
and then, in modernity, to literature, as one of the founding works of modern
literature, Don Quixote, demonstrates. Modern literature thus carries forward a
part of the parrhesia that had been expelled from the political space in general
and from democracy in particular. This parrhesia is that which permits one to
speak to everyone about everything, upon which the democratic principle of
equality of the word is thus founded.
30 In Phaedrus, Plato directs this same hermeneutic critique at writing itself, which lacks a
“father” which would establish its proper sense.
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4.3 Tragedy and Democracy: Oedipus, Ion and Cassandra
There are those who have read in Foucault’s recourse to the tragedy of Sophocles
an outline of the changes that Foucault’s own work underwent during this time.
One such is José L. Moreno Pestaña, who, in Retorno a Atenas [Return to Athens]
(2019), argues that although Foucault makes use of Oedipus Rex at both the start
and the close of the sixties, his different interpretations are symptoms of his ideo-
logical shift (56). Sforzini, however, considers that, although we can observe a
change in the points of interest in Foucault’s reading of Oedipus, the interpreta-
tive outline remains the same. According to Sforzini, “Oedipus Rex is the ex-
pression of a symbolic process of revealing the truth, sealing both the
assertion of a new ‘human’, secular knowledge (the investigation) and the elimi-
nation of tyrannical excess (the utopia of unity in the exercise of power and
knowledge) of the political and cultural space of the fifth-century Athenian
polis” (Scènes de la vérité, 223).
My objective here is to demonstrate, on the one hand, the evental capacity
of tragedy, as I stated at the start of this chapter. On the other hand, I aim to
show how the different readings of Oedipus Rex are in dialogue with and stand
in opposition to those that Foucault provides of the tragedies of Euripides –
who, remember, was defined as one of the most “progressive” figures of the so-
called Athenian Enlightenment. From Sophocles to Euripides, Foucault man-
ages to show the different accounts that are given of Athenian democracy and
the evolution of some of its fundamental values, principally that which con-
sisted of being able to speak freely, or parrhesia. Lastly, I aim to establish a
continuity between the veridiction of classical tragedy and modern literature
through the principle of parrhesia as a veridiction of literature at the margin of
reason.
As Foucault explains in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, literature is event not
because it is mimesis of a real action but because it represents the practice of
truth-telling:
So this is how Oedipus Rex may serve not, once again, as a direct testimony of Athenian
judicial procedure, nor as a direct testimony of its true history, but rather as the first dra-
matic representation of this relatively new judicial practice (relatively new at the time)
that made avowal and all other regular procedures of avowal an essential piece of the
judicial system.
(Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 81)
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4.3.1 Oedipus and Symbol
Oedipus has become a great social and historical myth thanks to the impact of
Freudian theory. Oedipus is, for Freudian psychoanalysis, the basis for explaining
the structure of the subject. The updated reading of Lacan, and even Passolini’s
homonymous film from 1967, confirmed this reading of the Western subject. Hence
the Foucauldian reading of Oedipus was simultaneously a critique of a way of in-
terpreting the tragedy of Sophocles and a critique of the concept of the subject in
psychoanalysis.
In 1972, the work of Sophocles had already attained new prominence fol-
lowing the publication of Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, in which
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari show that Oedipus is not the secret content of
our unconscious but the form of coercion that psychoanalysis attempts to im-
pose in its cure of our unconscious. Oedipus is, therefore, an instrument of
power, a certain mode of psychoanalytical and medical power that is exercized
over desire and the unconscious. This argument is also developed in Foucault’s
work, but his interest in this tragedy has particular characteristics and a conti-
nuity with his work. On the one hand, Foucault focuses on separating desire
from this “bourgeois family drama”, as we have seen in his lectures on Sade
and in The History of Sexuality. On the other hand, Foucault takes apart the
modern myth of Oedipus, returning to the text of the tragedy in order to undertake
a reading, through the text itself, that lifts literature out of its political impasse, as
he himself had advocated, along the lines of his work on “bad literature”.
To do this, Foucault takes up a line of research that reveals the relation be-
tween Greek tragedy and politics, and which had attained renewed prominence
since the 1950s.31 Cornelius Castoriadis also worked extensively on these rela-
tions in his 1982–1983 university seminars, entitled La cité et les lois [“The City
and Laws”], in which he states that the genre of tragedy depicts the ontological
foundations of democracy, given that in democracy “there is no global view of
the reality upon which correct politics can be founded, at best only partial
views”32 (138–147). This definition of democracy can be recognized in the work
of Foucault himself, which enables us to characterize his concept of “politics of
literature”. Arianna Sforzini, who has analyzed in depth all the dramatic forms
that appear in Foucault’s work and their modes of performance in Les scènes de
la vérité: Michel Foucault et le théâtre (2015), states that Foucault “will always
31 See the works of D. M. Carter in this regard: “Society and politics in post-fifth century trag-
edy” (2018) and “Tragic parrhesia” (2018).
32 My translation.
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strive to transform the power of the tragic as a constitutive rending of history in
a modality of historical analysis capable of making a political theatre emerge at
the roots of all forms of truth and existence”33 (47).
The first work in which Foucault focuses on Oedipus Rex is the lecture se-
ries that he gave at the State University of New York in March 1972, two years
on from his lectures on Sade. The 1972 lectures, entitled “The Knowledge of
Oedipus”, are rooted in the relations between knowledge and power. The basis
of the analysis and textual interpretation that he carries out are focused on the
knowledge that converges there: the rhetorical and philosophical mechanism
of the symbol, or “law of two halves”. Foucault carries out a reading of the
dramatic text for the purpose of determining how a discursive strategy gives
an account of the change in the judicial procedure of inquiry, as opposed to
divinatory procedure which was introduced in the sixth and fifth centuries.
Foucault also develops his second work devoted to Oedipus along similar
lines. This work appears in the collection of lectures entitled Truth and Juridical
Forms (1978), in which he studies the emergence of new forms of subjectivity as-
sociated with historical ways of establishing and telling the truth. In one lecture
devoted to the topic of “Oedipus and Truth”, Foucault analyzes tragedy as a dis-
course that is capable of depicting a historical event in all its complexity, both
formally, through its dramatic structuring (“the power relations that perme-
ate the whole fabric (plot) of our existence” [Foucault, Power, 17]), and the-
matically. Foucault is still interested in the relations between power and
knowledge, and wishes to study the tragedy of Sophocles as representative
“and in a sense the founding instance of a definite type of relation between
power and knowledge [savoir], between political power and knowledge [con-
naissance], from which our civilization is not yet emancipated” (17). But he
introduces something new to his interest in literature when he considers it,
as I have mentioned, as a historical event:
The tragedy of Oedipus is, fundamentally, the first testimony that we have of Greek judi-
cial practices. […] The tragedy of Oedipus is therefore the history of an investigation into
truth: it is a procedure of inquiry into truth that exactly obeys the Greek judicial practices
of the period.
(Foucault, “The Stage of Philosophy”)
The psychoanalytical myth of Oedipus, says Foucault, collapses in the face of a
complex that is “collective and not individual”. Oedipus is the route Foucault
takes to attain the analysis of the first forms of democracy in the Athens of
Pericles. And his chosen place for analysing these relations comes from the
33 My translation.
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character of Oedipus, which is the first testimony we have of judicial practices.
He uses a series of techniques which allow for discovery of the truth that ques-
tions the power of the sovereign, or sovereignty. “The tragedy of Oedipus is
therefore the history of an investigation into truth.” We even find in his reading
a philological perfectionism, a returning to the meaning of the text in its historical
context. This is why the nature of Foucault’s work differs from Deleuze’s: one is
historical and the other theoretical.
According to Foucault, the procedure that governs the tragedy “exactly
obeys the Greek judicial practices of the period”. Thus, it needs to be estab-
lished “what the judicial investigation of truth in archaic Greece consisted of”,
and for this reason Foucault also refers to the Iliad as “the first testimony” we
have of the investigation of truth in Greek judicial procedure, both in the lec-
ture “Oedipus and Truth” (Rio de Janeiro, May 1973) and in the Louvain lectures
of 1981, gathered under the title Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling.
In these texts, Foucault focuses on two elements. One is philosophical: an-
agnorisis, or the recognition through which the person who believed that they
were ignorant realizes that they already knew, and the person who is ignorant
becomes someone who knows. According to Foucault, in Oedipus this has two
traits. First, it is a “reflexive” anagnorisis: he who searches is the object of the
search. Second, anagnorisis is attained by confronting different types of knowl-
edge: it goes from the knowledge of hearing to the knowledge of seeing; from the
knowledge that questions the gods to the knowledge that is asked from right here
while hearing what other have also seen (the witnesses); from the knowledge that
proceeds from prediction to knowledge as testimony; from the knowledge that
proceeds from the enigma of the knowledge that the gods conceal to the knowl-
edge that makes appear the person who wants to be hidden. Oedipus is the bearer
of the knowledge of the tyrant and, finally, Oedipus also represents the power-
knowledge transgressor. Already in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, Foucault had re-
vealed the existence of this character. In the Iliad, a character appears whose task
is to ensure that the chariot race between Antilochus and Menelaus is fair. This
individual is called “witness” (ιστορ, root of “history”), which we could translate
as “he who informs”, but which Foucault translates as “one who is there to see”.
Although the existence of the witness is recorded in Homer’s work, he is not made
use of because there is no appeal to testify, only to a test by oath. Thus, if
Antilochus had sworn falsely, it would have been Zeus who, punishing the false
oath, “would have manifested the truth with his thunderbolt”. This test of truth is
a feature of archaic Greek society, Foucault explains, which is prior to the story.
The memories of this procedure also reach Oedipus Rex, and later in the early
Middle Ages. The truth of the oath passes for the truth of the subject, an exterior
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truth and, on occasions, it involves others who make guarantees of the trust in
their word or who involve their adversaries in the challenge.
Along with historical investigations, Foucault adds another element of analy-
sis of a narrative nature, which entails a deconstruction of the traditional concept
of symbol. Thus, in Sophocles’s tragedy, in order to pass from divine to human
knowledge, one must achieve this knowledge through fragmentary reports that
each witness provides and which complete the truth. Foucault’s description and
analysis of the symbol in Greek tragedy convert it into a mechanism of fragmenta-
tion as a tropological mechanism associated with democracy.
Foucault calls the method of investigating truth by way of the symbol in
Oedipus Rex the “Law of Halves”, because “the discovery of the truth is carried out
in Oedipus by halves that fit and link together”. In Apollo’s response to Oedipus’s
consultation, the god only answers half of the question concerning the curse and
its cause, as he tells him that the cause is the murder of Laius, the former king, but
does not say who the murderer is. To discover the name of the murderer, Oedipus
appeals to the human double of Apollo on Earth, the prophet Tiresias, who replies
in the form of a prophecy, “You’re the one who killed Laius”, but the dimension of
the present is absent. In short, Foucault says, the “witness” to what really hap-
pened is missing. This second half of the story in the present is also told in the
form of a game of halves. Jocasta is the first witness when she mentions that Laius
died at the crossing of three roads, to which Oedipus responds with a recognition
of the facts. Thus is the game of the two halves of the truth that almost complete
the story of the murder of Laius. The story is completed when it is discovered that
it was Oedipus who killed his father and married his mother. This second half of
the story is completed by means of the joining together of several different testimo-
nies: those of a slave who reveals to him that Polybus was not his true father, and
a shepherd who tells him that Jocasta is his true mother.
In this way, Foucault undertakes a critique of the concept of symbol that
Walter Benjamin developed in Origin of the German Trauerspiel. We can con-
sider Benjamin’s doctoral thesis to be a precedent of particular interest for
Foucault’s research, especially in these first studies of Greek tragedy.
In 1916, Walter Benjamin had developed the ideas for his work on German
baroque drama, though it would not be published until 1928. In this work, he
establishes the relations between tragedy and the art of governing. For Benjamin,
however, tragedy showed this relation before the start of history and spoke of
myth, whereas the baroque trauerspiel, through a discourse of history, had also
shown the drama of all, not only of kings: “‘whoever wants to write tragedies […]
must understand the art of government as intimately as he does his mother
tongue.’ […] The sovereign represents history. He holds historical happenings in
his hand like a scepter” (Benjamin, Origin of the German Trauerspiel, 46–48). This
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comes from ideas based on constitutional law. That is to say, the content of trauer-
spiel, its true object, is historical life as it was conceived in that period. As per
Benjamin, this would distinguish it from tragedy, as the object of tragedy is not
history but myth, and what gives tragic stature to the dramatis personae is not
their rank (absolute monarchy) but the era, before history, in which their existence
takes place: the heroic past.
Benjamin, with his interest in baroque allegory, was confronting the conceptu-
alization of the symbol that had been developed by Germanists around the begin-
ning of Nazi Germany. In this moment, the symbol represented unity and occupied
a privileged place. For Foucault, on the contrary, modernity sank its roots in Greek
tradition, which was part of history, but without recovering a lost unity. In order to
take apart Benjamin’s reading of the symbol as a mythological element, Foucault
introduces the Greek symbol as emblem of his political reading of the text of
Sophocles. For this he attends to the textuality of the work and its relation with
history following Benjamin’s proposals, but, conversely, he attributes to the symbol
in Oedipus’ tragedy an excess and quality of fragmentation by which it is no longer
possible to attain a unity, as there the voices of all are mixed, not only those of
emperors and heroes but also those of slaves and women. The reading of Oedipus
Rex in these terms enables him to assert, from a narrative, tropological and political
perspective, that literature and politics are interlinked from their origin:
What occurred at the origin of Greek society, at the origin of the Greek age of the fifth
century, at the origin of our civilization, was the dismantling of that great unity of a political
power that was, at the same time, a knowledge […] We witness that long decomposition
during the five or six centuries of archaic Greece. And when classical Greece appeared –
Sophocles represents its starting date, its sunrise – what had to disappear for this society to
exist was the union of power and knowledge.
(Foucault, Power, 31–32)
Therefore, the symbol also represents resistance to divine power, which ac-
cording to Foucault is shown in the distrust of the knowledge of the diviner
both in his formulation of the prophecy and in his attempt to escape fate.
Upon hearing the oracle, Oedipus undertakes an investigation that confirms
that the oracle was correct, and that this truth and the one to which a slave
was witness are the same. The slave is the only one who knows as much as
the god and his seer. For this reason, the proliferation of the tragedy’s voices are
reassembled in an asymmetrical mix in which Foucault considers, “Can we say
that the slave’s silent gaze and the all-seeing sovereign’s word ‘symbolize’ each
other?” (Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know, 238).
As opposed to mythological knowledge, here the oracular truth must be
completed by human truth. Truth is split into two halves that, in turn, fragment
into others. But what makes it possible to unite all the fragments of this truth is
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the coinciding of both truths, the human and the divine, which coincide in a
single, same truth, whether formulated as an enigma by the gods and seers, or
as the testimony of a slave. There is a hierarchy among those that speak, but
there is also a shift in the modes of knowledge: from the ear of the gods and the
seer to the eyes of the witnesses, and in the middle, Jocasta, who tells what she
heard from what the messenger had seen. Oedipus himself is a symbol, made
up of “excessive” halves (the son is also the murderer of the father, he is the
son of Laius and also of Polybus, both husband and son, and so on). But he
also reveals duplications in his speech, as when he says two things at the same
time. He is the figure of the double.34
The story responds to a fragmentation of halves, in terms of form and plot,
as a puzzle of halves that have to be put back together in order to “form the
whole pattern of the story” (Foucault, Power, 22). Thus the technique of the
Greek symbol is redefined by Foucault:
an instrument of power and its exercise whereby a person who holds some secret or
power breaks some ceramic object in half, keeping one part and entrusting the other to
an individual who is to carry the message or certify its authenticity. By fitting these two
parts together it is possible to verify the authenticity of the message, that the continuity
of the power exercised. Power manifests itself, completes its cycle, maintains its unity by
means of this little game of separate fragments of the same whole, a unique object whose
overall configuration is the manifest form of power. The Oedipus story is the fragmenta-
tion of that token, the possession of which, complete and reunified, authenticates the
holding of power and the orders given by it.
(22)
Sophocles’s tragedy is, therefore, a rhetorical instrument as well as a political
and religious one. And the achievement of this triple structure is that it func-
tions, in turn, as a strategy for the formation of power. This structure entails,
moreover, a series of consequences in its functioning: the shift in the assem-
bling of the halves, first the level of the god and his representative, the seer,
then leaving in the centre the testimonies of Oedipus and Jocasta, and, lastly,
the testimonies of the slave and the shepherd are, however, those responsible
for “pronouncing the final truth and providing the final piece of evidence” (23).
34 Foucault has paid special attention to the double in his pieces on literary thought in the
1960s. The double is a verbal form that acts as a figure of thought and as a political figure at
the same time, which opposes dialectical synthesis as unity. In the book that Deleuze devotes
to Foucault, he echoes this figure of thought that, according to Deleuze, obsessed Foucault.
For a deeper examination of the literary thought of early Foucault, see Azucena G. Blanco El
logos doble [The Double Logos, 2006].
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In this analysis, Foucault also examines the different “mechanisms of
truth-telling and the form in which truth is told” depending on who does it.
Thus, when the truth is stated by the god and the seer, it is done in a time be-
longing to prophecy and a magical religious gaze, “the eternal and omnipotent
gaze of the sun god and the gaze of the soothsayer who, though blind, sees
past, present, and future” (23). But the gaze is also possible at a lower level;
since the two slaves testify to what “they have seen”, it is the “gaze of the wit-
ness”. This gaze, which was ignored in the Iliad, here takes centre stage, history
and gaze coming together as in the etymological meaning of istor (history, and
he who sees, the witness). Thus we move from the future discourse of the
prophecy to the retrospective discourse of history: “we can say that the entire
Oedipus play is a way of shifting the enunciation of the truth from a prophetic
and prescriptive type of discourse to a retrospective one that is no longer char-
acterized by prophecy but, rather, by evidence” (23).
4.3.2 Alethurgy and Parrhesia: From Oedipus to Ion
In the 1980s, Foucault develops his work on truth-telling, or veridiction. The rela-
tion between tragedy and law was, at this point, a common place, as Foucault
himself states (“everyone knows that in Greek tragedy, the theme of representing
law – of the foundational representation of law – is essential” (Foucault, Wrong-
Doing, Truth-Telling, 58)); and theatre itself, says Foucault, from its origin until
the eighteenth century, also had the function of giving space to the debate on
law. Thus all of his work of the period on theatre deals directly with this relation,
but added to his previous interest in what he called “theatre of truth”. Remember
that in “The Stage of Philosophy” (1972), the author had already spoken of his
interest in “describing the way in which Western men have seen things without
ever considering the question of whether it was true or not; trying to describe the
way in which they themselves have organized, through the game of their gaze,
the spectacle of the world” (150). Therefore, it is evident that his interest in the
vagueness of the “gaze” of theatre directly concerns his critique of phenomenol-
ogy, but years later, his words acquire another added meaning, which involves
the theatre and its forms directly in his philosophical project on truth-telling and
classical parrhesia. Hence in these years the shift takes place from his interest in
knowledge-power relations to the forms of veridiction. This change is similarly
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evident in his lectures on Oedipus, and which in the 1980s was in contrast to the
lectures he gave on the tragedies of Euripides in the last years of his life.35
In 1981, Foucault gave the lecture series at the Catholic University of Louvain
that has been published under the title Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. In these
lectures Foucault proposes analysing the relations and the mutual implica-
tion between the true word and the just word. Foucault shows how the forms
of expression of truth or of access to truth are transformed into three histori-
cal moments: in the Greek prelaw, in which the archaic forms are estab-
lished, a mode of relation between the true (alethes) and the just (dikaion)
based on the oath, going as far as the confession. He takes up the reading of
the stage of the Iliad and Oedipus Rex to show the problem that encloses the
title of the lectures, namely: that the accused is, at the same time, the guilty
and the bearer of truth who has to confess in a liturgy of truth or alethurgy –
the confession. Oedipus, Foucault says, is also a scene of judicial confession
of agonistic structure, in which there is an accused and that accused is the
bearer of the truth, the same truth that will end up condemning him and
freeing him at the same time.
Thus are the instruments themselves of inquiry organized. And this inquiry
is also carried out in a way that is juridically very recognizable. In Oedipus Rex,
the chorus is the jury. After Tiresias, who appears as a witness, Creon makes a
declaration. Creon is not a witness, but rather comes to complain because
Oedipus has accused him slanderously. Oedipus then accuses him of “witness
bribery”, and in effect it is this that Oedipus reproaches him for. He reproaches
him for having bribed the witness who should be the oracle and whose meaning
he has falsified in transmitting it. The last scene, in which the truth emerges, is a
scene of judicial testimony, of inquiry: questioning, obtaining confession through
threat, with the threat of torture until it is achieved. The general framework of the
play is, therefore, a perfectly recognizable procedural framework.
The importance of Oedipus is underlined again in its nature as historical
event, insofar as Oedipus is the first foundational representation of law that di-
rectly shows the issue of the truth-telling of the accused, of this contradiction that
means that the accused must at the same time be the bearer of the truth of his own
crime. In the tragedy, this aspect appears represented by the fact that Oedipus is
the judge and the accused at the same time. Foucault shifts his interest in the rela-
tion between law and the Oedipal tragedy from the fragmentary symbol – not
35 In particular, in lectures he gave at Grenoble (1982) and Berkeley (1983), collected in
Discourse and Truth, and in the Collège de France lecture series (1982–1983), The Goverment of
Self and Others.
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unitary as it had been read traditionally – that represented Athenian democracy as
voices that converge on a truth enunciated by many, to a concept of archaic power
that would be the same that explains the double function that the enunciation of
truth fulfils in our culture. Furthermore, Foucault says, the reading of Oedipus
Rex is the opportunity to analyze a crime under its double aspect of “infraction
of fundamental law and a religious sullying – two aspects that are inseparable
in ancient Greek thought and culture” (Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling,
59). A problem of how to give room to family law within the law of the city,
how one confronts the other and how to coordinate them.
Hence Foucault analyzes the tragedy using elements from Aristotle’s Poetics.
Recall that, as we have already seen, Foucault had made a critique of the con-
cept of classical fable and verisimilitude in “L’arrière-fable” [1966, “Behind
the Fable”]. He concluded that the relation between the fable and verisimili-
tude is determined by the “mythical possibilities” of culture – that is, that the
verisimilitude of a narrative depends on what a society is prepared to accept
as credible, and therefore this relation is historical and does not belong to the
structure of the narrative. It thus opens the way to a relation of literature with
the world, and completes its interrelational character with history, through its
defect or finitude, and its need to refer to the world to be completed. Literature
thus developed its extralinguistic nature, given its verbal limitation and a cul-
tural definition of the concept of verisimilitude. Foucault also responds to the,
once again, Aristotelian distinction between poetry and history.
Here Foucault examines two other concepts that structure the tragic fable,
both elements directed at achieving catharsis. These are peripeteia and recogni-
tion or agnition, which, according to Aristotle, “should grow naturally out of
the plot of the story, so that they come about, with necessity or probability,
from the preceding events. There is a great difference between something hap-
pening after certain events and happening because of those events” (1452a 20).
Two of the elements on which, as per Aristotle, tragedy is based, are peripeteia
and recognition. Peripeteia is the narrative strategy that inverts the fortune of
the characters and changes happiness into unhappiness, or luck into misfortune;
and recognition consists of the revelation of the real identity of a character previ-
ously unknown or ignored, which is the change from ignorance to knowledge.
Aristotle explains the concepts of peripeteia (reversal), agnition (discovery)
and pathos (suffering) with the example of Oedipus: “in Oedipus, a messenger
comes to bring Oedipus good news and rid him of his fears about his mother;
but by revealing his true identity he produces the opposite effect” (1452a 25),
and “discovery [agnition] takes its finest form when it coincides with reversal
[peripeteia], as in the Oedipus” (1452a 30).
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These processes structure the “fate” of Oedipus, which he himself confronts
with the instruments of inquiry. This inquiry is juridically recognizable as part
of a trial in which the chorus is the jury while the different characters make
their declarations. And the last scene is, then, that of the appearance of the
truth – anagnorisis – a scene of a real interrogation, in which a confession is
obtained through the threat of torture.
However, according to Foucault, in Oedipus Rex, there were two types of
anagnorisis, two recognitions. There is an individual anagnorisis, through which
Oedipus learns his own truth, and the other axis, the establishing of the truth,
before the eyes of the chorus, which acts as jury. Although the two are related, if
Oedipus seeks the truth it is so the chorus may recognize it: that is to say, so that
the citizens, the assembly of the people who constitute themselves as the judicial
authority, may discover and establish the truth and, ultimately, validate it
(Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 63).
This manifestation of the truth, or alethurgy, is spoken through the dialogue
of the characters. According to Foucault, this truth, so difficult to learn for
Oedipus, is nevertheless said fully at least three times. The first time it is spoken
by two characters who, when speaking together, produce the truth, namely Apollo
and Tiresias. Apollo states why there is a plague and Tiresias says who is guilty.
This is the first manifestation of the truth, the first veridiction, which is neither ac-
cepted nor legitimized. The second production of the truth is also the work of two
characters who make the truth complete between them: Jocasta and Oedipus, who
between each other name the totality of things that make it possible to recognize
the latter as the husband of his mother and the murderer of his father. This second
alethurgy is also left pending resolution and is not accepted, because an element
of uncertainty remains. Finally it is the third time the truth is spoken, with a new
pair of characters, that it is accepted at last, is validated and brings about the judi-
cial and dramatic effects that are expected of it. This third pair to produce ale-
thurgy are the messenger from Corinth and a slave, the shepherd from Cithaeron.
They too will produce the truth through the combination of elements in their
knowledge. Hence we have: Apollo and Tiresias at the divine level; Oedipus and
Jocasta at the level of kings and chiefs; and the messenger and the shepherd at the
level of slaves and servants. And it is this last pair who produce the alethurgy that
neither the kings nor the gods had been able to produce because they had not
been recognized by the judicial institution. First, the truth of Apollo and Tiresias is
not accepted, because both are independent of the judicial order and their knowl-
edge comes from vision (Apollo sees all, and the seer has timeless vision), it would
not have been possible to obtain a confession or testimony, and so the judicial ma-
chinery does not work. Their knowledge is outside of the law, it cannot provide
proof and is outside of history.
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The second alethurgy is produced between Jocasta and Oedipus but also lacks
judicial validity. Because Jocasta does not know truthful testimonies, she only
knows public rumours, she is made to think that several people killed Laius, and
for this reason Oedipus believes that he has been able to escape the fate of the
gods (Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 70). Foucault finds the key to under-
standing why Oedipus did not understand the truth that was shown to him in the
chorus, which gives a warning on tyranny. The chorus begins in a fairly strange
way with a curse against tyranny and excess, the arrogance of tyrants who play at
the height of their fortune and subsequently fall to the lowest depths (71). The
problem is that the truth and the knowledge of Oedipus come from the tyrannical
powers that he possesses: power, sovereignty, and the crown. The negative
criticisms of Oedipus from the mouths of other characters outline the traits of tyr-
anny: “You’re wrong; you identify with this city where you were not born, you
imagine that you belong to this city and that it belongs to you; I belong to this city
as well, it’s not yours alone” (Foucault, Power, 28). Oedipus shows some of the
traits of historical tyrants, such as Cypselus of Corinth, who also considered him-
self owner of the city and used to say that Zeus had awarded it to him. And like
Cypselus, Oedipus did not attribute importance to the laws either and replaced
them with his orders, with his will. When Oedipus substitutes the law for his
will, his fall from power begins. Oedipus, says Foucault, is “a figure that is
clearly defined, highlighted, catalogued, characterized by Greek thought of the
fifth century – the tyrant” (28). This tyrant is characterized, moreover, by a type
of knowledge because his power is associated with a superior knowledge:
Oedipus is sophos, and he is also heuriskein, he who finds. He also uses the verb
oida, which means both to know and to see. Oedipus is the man of the gaze until
the end, he is the man who wants to see with his own eyes, by himself, without
depending on anyone: it is the autocratic knowledge of the tyrant who by himself
can and is able to govern the city. Oedipus is the man of excess, who knows too
much and is too able. “He is the man of excess”, he is the tyrant. Oedipus has
accumulated too much power and knowledge, it is an excess in the form of
authoritarianism and reaches the sexual sphere as excess too. His excess is, fi-
nally, an atrocity, a monstrousness of power-knowledge.
Besides, this techne technes, supreme art and supreme knowledge, is ac-
cording to Foucault a question concerning power as technical knowledge, a
crucial question in the debates of the Sophists, Socrates and Plato. The ques-
tion is whether the knowledge of power is learned or not. The expression is also
used in Christian pastoral to designate the way – the art, the technique – that
makes it possible to govern souls and lead them to salvation. In tragedy, power
appears represented in its two facets: dynasteia, which is the capacity to exer-
cise power, and tyrannis, tyranny, as the personal exercise of power. Oedipus
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represents this exercise of power, and his technē is inquiry,36 the art of discovery
that makes it possible to go from the past to the present. And this art of govern-
ing in the tragedy of Sophocles is associated with tyranny, in its ambiguous
meaning of the era: tyranny is in part the exercise of personal power by someone
who has the status of hero, someone who, moreover, has a privileged relation-
ship with the gods that enables him to give his laws to the city; but the tyrant is
also the man of excess, the man of abuse, someone whose use of power goes be-
yond moderation and rule.
The third alethurgy, Foucault explains, is what makes it possible for everyone
to learn the truth, and it is the representation of a “true judicial interrogation ac-
cording to the rules”. Two characters come face to face: the messenger, who ap-
pears spontaneously to announce the death of Polybus, and the shepherd from
Cithaeron, who had been summoned by Oedipus. And from this confrontation the
truth will emerge. This interrogation makes it possible to confirm identity (first an-
agnorisis), by which the shepherd who took the child recognizes Oedipus
(Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 77). He is then interrogated about what he
did with the child and what happened. And although he is reluctant to answer,
the servant is compelled to speak (unlike the god and the seer). Oedipus even goes
as far as to threaten torture. The answer of the servant is marked, from the gram-
matical point of view, by acceptance through the autos: it is no longer second-
hand testimony (second alethurgy). And it is uttered with oneself speaking truth:
“Yes, I am the one, autos …”. And the confession: it was I who did not kill him –
autos (79). This is where the juridical acceptance of the confession is produced,
when the chorus accepts it as indisputable truth. And it is an indisputable truth
because it is pronounced with the autos (I say, I saw, I did) (79). Only then does
Oedipus know and recognise himself as the one he did these things. Although
the truth had been said before, he only recognizes it when a confession, an
avowal, is made, and someone utters “I” in relation to all his crimes (79–80).
Thus we find, at the origin of democracy and Western law, the connection
of the truth with the subject. And it arises as a critique of a truth that remains
at the margin of the community (represented by divine truth) and of an impre-
cise truth. The truth of the person that speaks must be implicated in the enunci-
ation of the truth of the facts. It is the precedent of the “I confess”. The Greek
judicial system only admits a truth formulated by a citizen, free or slave, who
36 According to Foucault, this technique is related, in turn, with two others: medicine and the
art of navigation. This trilogy: the art of ruling, the art of healing, and the art of navigating,
will be fundamental in all thought, all the subject matter of political thought, practically until
the 17th and 18th centuries in the West (75).
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keeps within the limits of justice and law. For this reason, a sophron power is
also necessary, a wise power that is capable of listening to one’s people.
Foucault interprets the figure of Oedipus in this way. Oedipus is the tyrant
who investigates to find a truth in a narrative (fable) and judicial (representation
of a trial) structure, based on the two techniques that Aristotle describes in his
Poetics: recognition and change of fate. The first technique corresponds to ale-
thurgy, which, as Foucault explains, manifests in three instances, but the only one
that is valid is that which makes use of the testimony of a witness in first person.
The manifestation of the truth of the gods and what was not founded on reliable
testimony are left aside. But Oedipus is also the representation of an excessive
power that is incompatible with democracy; he is the tyrant. Oedipus believes that
he will be able to escape human law and the decrees of the gods, and it is there, in
that excess, that his government presents itself as an abuse of tyrannical power.
The confession is therefore established as judicial practice in classical Athens: “it
seems to me that it is interesting to see how avowal introduced itself with such
solemnity into something as culturally and politically important as this ritual re-
presentation of law that the city of Athens gave itself” (Foucault, Wrong-Doing,
Truth-Telling, 80). It is the legitimate production of truth that is juridically accept-
able and that is accepted by the chorus, not as prophecy nor as deduction from
circumstantial evidence, but truth constructed in the form of the interrogation of
eyewitnesses who end up compelled to testify what they themselves saw, said and
did. But as Foucault had previously explained regarding the tragedy of Sophocles,
in accordance with the theory of the symbol, there is still a correspondence be-
tween divine and human knowledge, between the truth of the god and the truth of
the shepherd. “They say the same thing, they see the same thing, but not with
same language or with the same eyes” (Foucault, Power, 24). This correspondence
is what defines the tragedy and establishes “a symbolic world in which the mem-
ory and the discourse of men are like an empirical margin around the great proph-
ecy of the gods” (24).
Foucault had already argued, in the Brazil lectures, “Truth and Juridical
Forms”, with the theory of the correspondence of halves and symbol, that
Oedipus is the man of knowledge who has seen and not the man of the uncon-
scious who does not know (oida means knowing and having seen at the same
time) and who is concerned with power. For Oedipus, says Foucault, power is
what is important, he fears losing his own power. However, Oedipus will repre-
sent the figure of the good tyrant because, even though he wanted to run from
his fate – and thus to achieve nothing except to condemn himself – he rejects the
prophetic and oracular form of alethurgy. And it is even thanks to him that the
city will be able to save itself in an auto-immune act. In this sense, Oedipus was
necessary for the truth to appear, for the regular form of the judicial machinery
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that is capable of producing truth to be established. But now the judicial machin-
ery that he himself has introduced eliminates him as though he were superflu-
ous – as would be done to the Officer of the machine in Kafka’s story, “In the
Penal Colony”, which carved the law into the skin of the condemned, and, fi-
nally, into the Officer’s own. And that truth that saves the city is the same that
condemns Oedipus. In one single speech, Oedipus saves and condemns, and
lays the base upon which Christian alethurgy would be developed.
Lastly, we will look at the last analysis of the tragedy of Sophocles, which
appeared once more in his Collège de France lecture, The Government of Self
and Others.37 However, here it appears in contrast to another group of trage-
dies, by Euripides, particularly Ion. Euripides is the great tragedian of Athenian
democracy, and in his writing we can see the evolution of the concept of parrhe-
sia, from its positive meaning tied to the birth of democracy, to the criticisms it
received in democracy’s crisis.38 In The Courage of Truth, the last lecture series
he gave at the Collège de France, in the lecture of 19th January 1983, Foucault
made a structural comparison between Oedipus Rex and Ion. The contrast be-
tween the two tragedies was important for Foucault to make a wide representa-
tion of the ethical development of a concept of political origin, as parrhesia is,
and its relation with the different stages of Athenian democracy.
We have seen that Oedipus represents the figure of the good tyrant be-
cause, in some way, he is capable of sacrificing himself for the common good
in an exercise that I have considered autoimmunity. Foucault analyzed Oedipus
Rex in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling and showed the result of the confession of
the truth that was a forced truth – because the slaves who declare in the trial
are compelled to confess, even under threat of torture.
Foucault returns to the question of the tyrant in the 1982–1983 Collège de
France lecture series. But this time he does so to demonstrate the other side of
Greek veridiction, parrhesia. The tragedy of Oedipus Rex showed a judicial pro-
cess in which alethurgy was the result of a human and testimonial truth, which
did not contradict the oracular truth but was independent of it. However, there
is a moment in which the use of another veridiction, parrhesia, is necessary.
Foucault refers, in the Lecture of 12th January 1983, to the scene in which
Creon, Oedipus’s brother-in-law, wants to tell him the truth, but Oedipus the
37 There is one last reference in his Collège de France lectures, 1984, in which he refers to the
criticism that Diogenes makes of Oedipus as one who is not capable of correctly interpreting
the signs because he is not capable of understanding the nature of his acts as something natu-
ral and not reprehensible, in accordance with the principles of nature of the Cynics.
38 I referred to this problematization at the beginning of this chapter. The crisis of democracy
is associated with the problematization of the use of the free word, or parrhesia.
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tyrant does not want to listen to him because he is suspicious of his intentions.
Creon states that he has no intention of taking his throne and that he only wants
to tell him the truth of the oracle. According to Foucault, we will find this scene
repeated – the scene in which the tyrant who exercises power, who is blinded by
the exercise of power, and by whose side there is someone who dares to tell him
the truth. This scene is, therefore, a scene of parrhesia. This first definition of par-
rhesia, along the lines that the other lectures will follow, is defined by textual iden-
tification, through textual examples of classical parrhesia, and differentiation, that
is, comparing parrhesia with those modes of speaking that cannot be identified
with it. Parrhesia, says Foucault, is differentiated from four other modes: demon-
stration, teaching, debating and persuasion (Foucault, The Government of Self, 52).
To elucidate this first approach to parrhesia, Foucault compares this Oedipal scene
with another from the “Life of Dion” in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives. Parrhesia uses re-
sources of these forms of truth-telling but is not the same as them. For example,
Foucault says, it uses aphoristic utterances typical of demonstration, but dispens-
ing with the rational structure that characterizes demonstration (53). It also uses
resources of rhetoric, or in itself is defined as a figure of thought very contradictory
in style because it has an element that is foreign to persuasion, which is condi-
tioned by the purpose of convincing. In contrast, Quintilian would say that parrhe-
sia is “the plainest of all figures of thought” because it is true libertas, he states in
Institutio Oratoria. Foucault qualifies that when it is defined as a figure, “it is like
the most basic form of rhetoric, where the figure of thought consists in not using
any figure” (53). For this reason, parrhesia is not pedagogical either, and is located
at the opposite pole of Platonic irony. “As if it were a veritable anti-irony,” says
Foucault, parrhesia is hurled straight at the interlocutor and thus it is closer to the
methods of debate and argument. But there is a remarkable difference: there is no
possibility for triumph in its structure. Creon does not confront Oedipus, he does
not wish to convince or indoctrinate him. Parrhesia creates an effect in the interloc-
utor, but it can’t be identified with the performative utterance either, as we have
already seen. Therefore, although parrhesia shares enunciative modes that are
typical of other discourses, it cannot be identified with them mainly because par-
rhesia is aimed at uttering a truth. Regarding discourse capable of speaking the
truth, it will also be differentiated from other forms of saying the truth belonging
to the classical period. Foucault again takes up the parallelism between the two
tragedies – Oedipus Rex and Ion, which represent two different moments of the
relation between parrhesia and democracy – in order to differentiate between the
three forms of truth-telling: the oracle, the confession and the political discourse.
Foucault analyzes the structures of both tragedies and finds elements of in-
verted symmetry. To begin with, both characters live in the house of their father
without knowing it. Ion lives in the temple of Apollo, unaware that the god is
4.3 Tragedy and Democracy: Oedipus, Ion and Cassandra 85
his father; and Oedipus lives in the house of his mother without knowing it.
Similarly, Ion tries to kill his mother at a certain moment, without knowing
who she is; while Oedipus commits patricide without knowing it. Furthermore,
there is a more important analogy for Foucault, which concerns the mechanism
of the search for truth. In both tragedies, the truth is tied directly to the question
of who Oedipus is and who Ion is. And in both, the truth advances in halves –
symbol as dramatic construction – until being reconstructed. There is, however,
an opposition between the drama of truth-telling in Oedipus Rex and in Ion: “In
Oedipus, in fact, first of all it is Oedipus himself who brings truth-telling into
play. It is Oedipus who wants to know the truth. As sovereign, and in order to
restore peace and happiness in his town, he needs to know the truth” (Foucault,
The Government of Self, 84); whereas in Ion, it is not he who seeks the truth but
his parents. And both truths are also of a contrary nature: the truth of Oedipus is
that he killed his father, thus leaving a hole in the sovereignty of the city that he
himself has occupied, and it has led him to banishment from the city. In contrast,
the truth of Ion is that he has two fathers: Xuthus and Apollo, and it is precisely
this paternity that guarantees Ion the chance of living in the city as a full citizen
and the free use of speech or parrhesia that it entails.
All in all, the fates of Oedipus and Ion are opposites: Oedipus, who is in
power, had attained it through a series of adventures that converts him from
the most wretched (abandoned child) to the most powerful.39 Oedipus is the
one who, having been a hero becomes a king. He is the one who had healed the
city, who had “raised it up”40 (Foucault, Power, 27). Ion, in contrast, returns to
his city to exercise a power given and legitimized by his revealed birth. Therefore,
these processes of alethurgy in the two tragedies will have obverse consequences.
But not only do we find these obverse parallelisms between these two trag-
edies, to which Foucault devotes the most attention and analysis. According to
Foucault, Ion is the Greek drama of truth-telling based on isegoria.41 This text
39 As Foucault had already explained, “This alternation of destiny is a characteristic trait of
two types of figure: the legendary figure of the epic hero who has lost his citizenship and his
country but who regains his glory after a certain number of trials; and the historical figure of
the Greek tyrant from the end of the sixth to the beginning of the fifth century. The tyrant
being the one who, after having several adventures and having reached the apex of power,
was always under the threat of losing it.” (Foucault, Power, 27).
40 Foucault explains that the expression “heal the city”, associated with tyrants, refers to
“lifting the cities up by means of a just economic distribution” (27).
41 In the Berkeley/Grenoble lectures, Foucault points out the antecedents in other plays by
Euripides, which I can briefly summarize: The Phoenician Women, without parrhesia no power
can be exercised; Hippolytus, without parrhesia there is no freedom (slavery); Bacchae, the
parrhesiastic contract; Electra, the betrayal of the parrhesiastic contract; Ion, the truth is
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maintains a double relation with the truth. On the one hand, the dialogic truth ap-
pears as counterpart to the oracular truth, which was habitually expressed in an
enigmatic language for men, being the language of the gods. Yet in this play, it
stays silent, lies or gives a half-truth. Faced with the enigmatic truth of the oracle,
the dialogic structure proposes a search for the truth through dialogue between
the characters: between Xuthus and Ion, Creusa and the old man, and Creusa and
Ion. This tragedy stages the search for a truth that belongs to men and that is con-
structed in the common dialogue of all the members of a community, even by
those who do not have the right to speak in the assembly, such as the chorus of
female slaves or the old man. Indeed, Ion wants to know who his mother is, but
what we see in the dialogues is a search based on mechanisms of trial and error, a
search for the truth by human means. And the reality of the facts is reached,
namely, that Ion is the son of Creusa, through a composition of the truth that ev-
eryone had possessed a fragment of. What the play depicts is three forms of truth-
telling: the oracle, the confession and the political discourse. The oracle cannot
say what it really wants to keep silent: it is reticence to confess. However, Creusa
confesses, in a clearly parrhesiastic speech, the rape by the god Apollo and the
abandonment of her son in the same place where the facts took place. It is, there-
fore, men who must practise truth-telling.
On the other hand, we find the characteristics of a political truth, parrhesia,
described. It depends on the right of everyone to speak in the assembly (or ise-
goria). Ion attains this political truth by means of that first truth made up of all
the fragments of speech of the community. Only when Ion learns his genealogy
can he claim his right to speak freely in the assembly, since in Athenian democ-
racy this right to parrhesia depended on a right of blood. Thus a direct relation
between the truth of the community and the expression of the truth itself of the
political subjects is established. In parrhesia, as Foucault shows in his last lec-
tures (The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of the Truth), the sub-
ject of the enunciation and the enunciandum concur, which is to say: “I am the
one who thinks this and that” and takes on the risk (41). And, therefore, that
truth-telling takes place in the “game” of life and death (43).
Foucault sums up the characteristics of parrhesia as “a kind of verbal activ-
ity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness …”
(Foucault, Fearless Speech, 19–20).
sought by human means; Orestes, political crisis in Athens. In a pejorative sense: “ignorant
outspokenness/shameless”. Foucault here refers to the criticism of parrhesia as speech that
stirs up the audience (it forms a part of exaltatio in rhetoric, the figure without figures): “put-
ting his confidence in bluster and ignorant outspokenness, and still persuasive enough to lead
his hearers into trouble” (170).
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However, as Foucault explains, the discourse of parrhesia, unlike perfor-
mative utterances, takes place outside of a context that guarantees that the say-
ing effectuates what is said, and carries with it a risk and an opening of the
situation that has nothing to do with the institutionalization of performative ut-
terances. Thus, while in the performative utterance the status of the person
speaking is important, in the parrhesiastic act, what endorses the utterance is
that the person speaking asserts their own freedom as a linguistic-political indi-
vidual (Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 65). Foucault says, “it is
not the subject’s social, institutional status that we find at the heart of parrhe-
sia; it is his courage” (66). The effects of the potentiality of language that demo-
cratic parrhesia represents have a political function that for Foucault entails a
transformation of the social-political order in a given community, very similar
to the proposal that Jacques Rancière makes in The Politics of Aesthetics: The
Distribution of the Sensible. It is veridiction that produces a hiatus, an interrup-
tion and a transformation. And this use of the action of language, of a language
that is the language of everyone, is a political practice that also causes an un-
known and dangerous reaction for the person who utters it. As Foucault states,
rather than performativity, parrhesia stages a “drama” of the discourse, the
analysis of which is the analysis of the discursive facts that show in what way
“the event of the utterance affects the subject’s mode of being” (68).
This double condition, of freedom and the danger of death,42 is represented
in the tragedy of Ion by a classical metaphor: the double power of speech as
poison and cure. Here we read this metaphor following the definition that
Rancière gives inMute Speech, that the metaphor joins and separates contradic-
tory poetics, running a risky path between its own myth (book of hieroglyphs of
spiritual life where the alliterations of things are inscribed) and its literal reality
(Rancière, Mute Speech, 171).
As a free citizen of Athens, Creusa shares with her son Ion the double inher-
itance of parrhesia: Creusa possesses the two drops of blood of the Gorgon that
Athena gave her father. Each of these two drops of blood, Creusa explains, has
a power, one healing and the other deadly (Euripides, Ion, 78). These two drops
42 “In parrhesia, in one way or another both the statement and the act of enunciation affect
the subject’s mode of being and, taking things in their most general and neutral form, quite
simply mean that the person who said something has actually said it, and by a more or less
explicit act binds himself to the fact that he said it” (68). An analysis could be carried out of
the different forms of dramatics of the truthful discourse: the prophet, the seer, the philoso-
pher, the scientist. From the councillor, the minister, the critic and the revolutionary: I speak
the truth in the name of the revolution that I am going to make and that we are going to make
together.
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of blood function in the text as the same inheritance as parrhesia, which, in
turn, remember, is a right of blood. With the poisonous drop, Creusa tries
to murder Ion. But having been discovered in her attempt, it is through the
dialogue caused by this failed attempt that Ion and Creusa learn the truth.
Therefore, the line that develops the critique of parrhesia as dangerous speech
is already in Ion, and it culminates in the separation of parrhesia from politics,
as Foucault shows.
Due to this distrust, parrhesia and politics become separated, and the par-
rhesiastes is transformed in what Jacques Derrida calls the pharmakeus. In the
analysis that Derrida applies to the Platonic dialogue Phaedrus in “Plato’s
Pharmacy”, the pharmakon reconciles two opposing meanings: that of the cure
and the poison at the same time (and no longer separated, as happened in
Euripides’s Ion: where Creusa could choose which word to use, because the
drops were separate and each one had its function, as Creusa explicitly an-
swered the old man’s question).
In this text, Derrida shows that Socrates often takes the role of the pharma-
keus in Plato’s dialogues. In several dialogues, such as in the Symposium, they
talk of power as an enchantment that Socrates wields through words. The
Socratic pharmakon also acts as the most terrible poison, for its footprint invades
the soul, transforming it (performativity). This demonic speech leads to philo-
sophical madness and Dionysian raptures. On other occasions, it causes a kind
of narcosis, as inMeno. Due to this duality contained in opposites, the use of the
pharmakon can even turn against the person who uses it. And Socrates is first
expelled to the limits of the city, and later sacrificed as a form of autoimmune
protection of the city, in an attempt to recover the unity of the political body.
4.3.3 Cassandra and the Herald: From Parrhesiastes to Pharmakeus
In Euripides’s tragedy Ion, we have seen a type of parrhesia that, in Athenian
democracy, was tied to birthright, so the parrhesiastes was a free subject who
was able to make use of his right to speak, equally free. Nevertheless, as we
have seen, Euripides himself echoes the transformations and later criticism of
this form of veridiction that was born with democracy. Thus I have considered
that it is possible to read a sense of the concept of the parrhesiastes in pharma-
keus, which alludes to the power that Socrates exercises through words, in its dan-
gerous similarity to the persuasion of the Sophists and its power of transformation
and performativity, typical of performative parrhesia. This speech is capable of
leading to Dionysian madness, and even turns against the person who uses it. For
those who use it, therefore, it is dangerous speech like parrhesia itself.
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But how is the transformation of parrheisa into pharmakea possible? This
is only possible through the problematization of the concept, as Foucault
shows. This problematization of parrhesia will entail its separation from democ-
racy and, at the same time, its terminological appearance outside of tragedy, as
Foucault shows in the Discourse and Truth lectures: “The word parrhesia is to
be found throughout Greek literature from the end of the fifth century BCE, and
you find it also in the patristic texts from the end of the fourth century, and
from the fifth century CE. The word parrhesia appears for the first time in Greek
literature in Euripides, and you find it still, dozens and dozens of times, in John
Chrysostom, for instance, in the Christian literature at the end of the fourth cen-
tury” (Foucault, Folie, langage, litteŕature, 39).
Ion, which dates from 418 BCE, presented a parrhesia that was tied to the
citizens’ birthright. However, from The Trojans onwards, we find a problemat-
ization of the concept through different means. On the one hand, a contrast is
established between characters who represent the good use of the right to
speak and others who abuse it. This leads to a new structure of dialectic opposi-
tion typical of the antilogy, which represents a criticism of the unitary composi-
tion of the symbol that we have seen in the tragedy of Oedipus Rex. Simon
Critchley, in Tragedy, the Greeks and Us (2019), attributes this to the connection
with Sophistry. And, on the other hand, in Orestes, one of Euripides’s last trage-
dies, the term is used as an adjective and in a pejorative sense.
Regarding this last line of analysis, in the Berkeley lecture of 7th November,
1983, Foucault refers to the pejorative uses of the word parrhesia from Orestes
onwards. This play was written, or at least performed, in 408 BCE, barely two
years before the death of Euripides and in a moment of political crisis in which
the democratic institutions and regime were under debate in Athens. The word
parrhesia goes from usage as a noun to an adjective. The doubts about parrhesia
and its use in democracy coincide with inappropriate uses of it, in particular,
people who use it for persuasive purposes.
However, with regard to the analysis of the characters who make bad use of
parrhesia, the parrhesiastes confronts two character types: the tyrant and the
herald. We have seen that Foucault distinguishes two types of tyranny: the tyrant
who lets himself be counselled, as is the case of Oedipus; and the tyrant who
punishes the parrhesiastes, revealing the danger of this truth-telling. But it is in
Foucault’s last analyses of the tragedies of Euripides, in which this other charac-
ter, who holds no power at all, a character who depends on others – the herald.
The portrait of the herald in Euripides’s Orestes (408 BCE) is clear: the her-
ald makes use of a double discourse that wishes to wrap “malign words in
beautiful phrases”, a dishonest use: elexe dichomytha. The herald is described
in Orestes as a person who uses rhetoric to disguise and who is “always leaping
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over to join those in prosperity”. He is the friend of whoever dominates the city
and is of high rank. The herald is not a slave, but he does not speak with free-
dom, he does not use parrhesia because he is “subservient to whoever is in
power”, he is a servant.
The herald tribe is like that – they’re always jumping over to the side of the successful.
Any man who has ruling power in the city is a friend of theirs. […] a man stood up who
can’t keep his mouth shut, whose strength comes from his boldness – an Argive, but not
from Argos – and forced himself on us, relying on bluster, ignorant free speech, persua-
sive enough to get them involved in some bad scheme or other.
(Euripides, Orestes, lines 884–931)
Foucault analyzes this tragedy, which represents the procedure of the trial for
matricide of Orestes,43 told by the messenger. The figure of the herald is de-
scribed by several characters in the tragedies of Euripides. All these characters
share a common trait: their conditional freedom. They are characterized as sub-
jects who are not completely free: “of course, he is not a slave, but he is not
independent, he is dependent on people more powerful than he is. The Greek
text says he is hupo tois dunamenois ōn (under the power of powerful people)”
(Foucault, Discourse and Truth and Parresia, 101–102). This character is always
in opposition to others who represent traits of a correct use of parrhesia. In
Orestes, the herald opposes the parrhesiastes as a figure who works his own
land with his own hands:
No dainty presence, but a manful man,
In town and market-circle seldom found,
A yeoman [autourgos] – such as are the land’s one stay –
Yet shrewd in grapple of words, when this he would;
A stainless man, who lived a blameless life.
(Foucault, Discourse and Truth and Parrhesia, 101)
Foucault also refers to other tragedies by Euripides, The Suppliants and The
Trojan Women. In the former, the scene contrasts the figure of the herald with
that of the free city, without a tyrant: “‘Who is the king in Athens?’ Theseus
replies, ‘Well, you will not be able to find any king, because there is no turan-
nos in this city, this city is free, that means that in this city, wealthy and poor
people are equal’” (102).
Then begins a digression on the question of which is the best form of gov-
ernment, tyranny or democracy. The herald praises the tyrannical regime or, at
43 As in Oedipus, in Orestes it is a separation between the interests of the city and the right of
family.
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least, makes a very harsh and detailed criticism of the democratic regime.
Theseus’s reply is a eulogy of Athenian democracy, in which he explains first
that the laws are written down, second, that the rich and the poor have equal
rights, and that in the assembly (ekklesia), every man is free to speak if he so
desires. Those who speak in the assembly earn a good reputation and become
the first among the citizens; the rest stay silent. And Theseus concludes: “Is
there anything more egalitarian than that? Can equality go any further?”
(Discourse and Truth and Parrhesia, 103). As can be seen, this democracy is
characterized by equality and by the fact that everyone is able to speak. That is
the objection that Theseus brings against the herald as a representative of ty-
rannical power. Then two other social types appear that correspond with the
previous mythological figures. The first, as Talthybius, represents the bad ora-
tor, described as athuroglōssos, someone whose mouth is always open and who
talks without stopping. As we can see, this is another type that is opposite to
the parrhesiastes. The reply to the critics of parrhesia proceeds through the
comparison of opposites, the didactic use of characters: between a good use of
free speech or parrhesia, and a negative use of freedom of speech in the assem-
bly. The notion of athurostōmia is very close to the notion of parrhesia, but it is
the negative version of this because the athuroglōssoi “cannot make any dis-
tinction between good thoughts and bad thoughts, and […] they indiscreetly
intervene in other people’s lives” (105). But it is Plutarch’s criticism that points
out the real danger of this talking without stopping, incapable of biting their
tongue – to use the metaphor of the mouth that is always open. The problem,
Plutarch says, is that those who are athuroglōssoi do not give any value to logos,
that is “to discourse, to reason, or to the reasonable discourse through which you
can get access to truth” (105). Therefore, Foucault says, the athuroglōssos
is the opposite to parrhesia and, in turn, is very close to it. Because the par-
rhesiastes shows wisdom, his discourse is sophos when he distinguishes
what should be said and what not. The difference between parrhesia and
athuroglōssos comes, moreover, from the content of their discourse. If the
discourse ridicules44 and does not have content of a political or social na-
ture, it is not considered parrhesia.
On the other hand, the direct emotional relations between the voice of the
orator and its effect on the assembly is what is characterized by thorubos.
Thorubos is a discourse that moves emotions and that is opposed to the reason-
able meaning of an articulate discourse. But it is characterized more as an
44 Here we see a precedent of the brazen speech of the buffoon, for example, which is con-
nected with parrhesia but cannot be confused with it.
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inarticulate noise that has a certain emotional effect on the assembly than as a
discourse, strictly speaking. Then there is the last characteristic of this bad ora-
tor: confidence in the shameless freedom of speech, in amathei parrhesia. Here
we find that this expression, which contains parrhesia as an adjective, is a rep-
etition of the expression athuroglōssos. This citizen, this orator, in his role of
assembly participant, “has parrhesia, but he does not use parrhesia as he is
supposed to. His parrhesia is only a formal civic right” but he does not use this
right well and in this case, lacks what is necessary to constitute good parrhesia,
useful, politically positive parrhesia (107).
This figure contrasts with that of the good orator in Orestes. This man is
described as morphē ouk euōpos, which means, as Foucault explains, that he
has no physical presence – in other words, that not only is he distinguished
discursively from the other orator but that even this is reflected in his physical
appearance, because he does not use force to impose himself. But he is an an-
dreios anēr, a courageous man, who is restrained, because he does not live
from politics; he only participates in the assembly at important moments and
for the taking of important decisions.
The fourth characteristic is that he is autourgos, a word that is translated as
“yeoman”, but which means that he is someone who does things by himself, he
works by himself. He is not only a landowner but a landowner who works, not
a poor peasant. The autourgos, Foucault says, appear represented as land-
owners who are concerned about the defence and protection of their country,
but they are also good with the use of speech because they have to manage
their properties and the people who work for them. In a political reading of the
tragedy, Foucault explains that the autourgos would represent the conservative
party, whereas the first represent the interests of the democrats.
For the first time, a matter is introduced that had not appeared before,
which is the matter of mathesis, that is, education and knowledge. Parrhesia
appears here as something that cannot solely be the pure liberty of speech
given to any citizen, but that in order to make good use of this speaking freely
in favour of the city, it is necessary to have a good education, intellectual and
moral instruction, a paideia or a mathēsis, and only by occurring in this way
will he be anything other than mere noise, a thorubos, and be able to have posi-
tive effects for the city. It is interesting to analyze that this need to care for one-
self is represented in the character of the yeoman, the autourgos, who is
characterized as the person who cultivates the land for himself, with his own
hands, and it can be read as the person who cultivates himself.
The principle of inequality is thus introduced. As a consequence, if parrhesia
was the right to speak of any Athenian citizen, and we have already seen that in
the tragedy of Ion the truth of the slave, the chorus and Ion corresponded, this
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truth is remade with fragments of the discourses of all the citizens, regardless of
their social class or access to education. It is a truth that still corresponds to the
symbolic truth, that is, a single truth common to all. However, here a change is
introduced that will dismantle the very concept of parrhesia. Because, as we
have seen, parrhesia emerges associated with isegoria and isonomia through the
person who speaks, through their identity (who is Oedipus, who is Ion). But now
there is a distinction between good and bad parrhesia. The latter corresponds to
formal parrhesia, exercized by those people who make use of this right without a
suitable education (mathēsis). The use of parrhesia therefore introduces disagree-
ment and debate. Parrhesia does not respond to the discursive strategy capable
of reaching one sole truth that is common to everyone, but, quite the opposite, it
seems to introduce disparity and plural fragmentation of a truth that will no lon-
ger be symbolic.
The complexity increases when, moreover, the violence of the discourse
that is exercized through force – defined as an extreme opinion that causes
unanimity – is in contrast to the restraint of the yeoman parrhesiast, who ar-
gues from the conviction of reasoning and yet can be less effective: “you can
see that if the bad parrhesia is associated with violence and passion, then the
good one is linked with mathēsis” (108).
Lastly, this problematization culminates in a difficulty in giving a voice to
all citizens, and the distinction between good and bad parrhesia corresponds
with the social division between those that should govern and those that, not
having the appropriate education, should be governed.
From the point of view of the history of parrhesia, Foucault says, Orestes
represents the shift from the golden age of political parrhesia, that ten years
earlier had been represented in Ion (418 BCE), to the problematization of par-
rhesia. The parrhesia in Ion had a clearly positive value: it was a freedom or
privilege that any citizen who wished could enjoy, and when they needed it. It
was a question of the type of right that some citizens, the first citizens, could
make use of; and when they made use of that parrhesia, they said what they
thought and, at the same time, this was true, because they were well born and
maintained a certain type of relation with the city, the law, and the truth. Thus
there was no problematization of the relation with the truth in this first descrip-
tion of parrhesia, but for the metaphor of the drop of Gorgon blood. But Orestes
represents the problematization of parrhesia, and the question of who is fit for
government due to their status or their personal qualities. The first problem
calls into question the correlation between parrhesia and isegoria:
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There is a discrepancy between an egalitarian system which enables everyone to use parrhe-
sia, and the necessity of choosing among the citizenry those who are able (because of their
social or personal qualities) to use parrhesia in such a way that it truly benefits the city.
(113)
And the second problem is the problem of education, ofmathēsis as education and
knowledge. This means that at the moment in which Orestes is staged, parrhesia
was being questioned as an activity capable of revealing the truth by itself. In
order to exercise parrhesia suitably, some form of education is needed, nor merely
the courage to speak frankly. But, more specifically, it requires personal training.
Therefore, Orestes shows how, at the end of the fifth century BCE, Athens
was undergoing this problematization of parrhesia, that “frank speech” could
no longer be granted to all citizens. We can see that here we find a key moment
in the relations between freedom, power and knowledge/truth in the origin of
democracy, a beginning of social and epistemological separation, which distin-
guishes between those who make good use of speech and those who are not
capable because their discourse is confused with uproar. Therefore, the prob-
lematization refers to two aspects that had formed the first parrhesia in an
undifferentiated way: equality and the relation with the truth.
In the other play that Foucault uses to refer to the heralds, The Trojan
Women, this character is in contrast to another figure of veridiction, the in-
spired and barely believable Cassandra. The tragedy shows us one more trait of
the herald: in their relation with veridiction, the are incapable of distinguishing
what is true. In the scene, Cassandra foresees the death of Agamemnon, and
the herald, Talthybius, does not believe her, and declares that she is mad: “Ouk
artias echeis phrenas (your mind is not in the right place)” (102). Cassandra re-
plies: “Keen-witted varlet this! Why such fair name have heralds, common
loathing of mankind, who are but menials of kings and cities.” She goes on and
explains: “you have said that my mother will become Odysseus’ slave, but in
fact the gods have said that she will die here,” and it is the truth. Thus the her-
ald is someone who cannot know the truth, who is incapable of saying the
truth, of recognizing it, insofar as he is dependent on another, on his master.
As the herald of Agamemnon, Talthybius does not believe in the words of
Cassandra, because he must say what his master has told him to say. This
means that he speaks under a certain coercion: “You see, the herald is one who
cannot know the truth, who is unable to tell the truth, or to recognize the truth,
insofar as he is dependent on someone else, that is, on his master” (102). The
same thing happened in Orestes, in which the yeoman (autourgos), despite
speaking with parrhesia, does not manage to convince the crowd. This is, un-
doubtedly, a critique of the persuasive use of discourse compared to the frank
speech of parrhesia.
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This same game of oppositions can be found in the case of Cassandra in
The Trojan Women, a character who, for Critchley, represents the impossibility
of affective communication: “Cassandra sees the truth clearly and accurately
but cannot persuade anyone to believe her. There seems to be a persistent, per-
formative gap between truth and persuasion” (Critchley, Tragedy, the Greeks,
and Us, 116).
But Euripides’s Cassandra is already a problematic character. The evolution
of Cassandra as a mythological character from Aeschylus to Euripides sets us
on the trail of this problematization and its relation with parrhesia. Because,
although in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon Cassandra is described as a prophet, in
Euripides she represents the loss of communication with the world of the gods.
As Nietzsche warned in The Birth of Tragedy, Euripides brings a distant mytho-
logical world closer to daily reality: “Through him the common man found his
way from the auditorium onto the stage. That mirror, which previously had
shown only the great and bold features, now took on the kind of accuracy that
reflects also the paltry traits of nature […] People themselves learned to speak
from Euripides” (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 211).
Cassandra is a controversial character because in her are brought together
traits of the parrhesiastes and another form of veridiction typical of seers, but
whose relationship with the gods is not direct. On the one hand, Cassandra pos-
sesses traits of “prophetic madness”, as per the classification that Plato makes in
Phaedrus. But Talthybius, Agamemnon’s herald, describes her as a maenad,
priestess of Dionysus, and not as a seer or mantis, as she is called in Aeschylus’s
Agamemnon. Eric Robertson Dodds explains in his classic work, The Greeks and
the Irrational (1951), that the Greeks already distinguished between inspired or
divine madness and madness as illness. Talthybius describes Cassandra as driven
mad, that she is no longer of sane mind. Thus the scene between Cassandra –
parrhesiastic figure who combines inspiration and human veridiction – and
Talthybius, the herald, represents the confusion between divine, inspired
madness and madness as mental illness.
As a parrhesiastic figure, Cassandra shows another trait of classical truth:
the confusion of her truth with mental illness and, in addition, the loss of the
unitary truth of the gods. This is because, remember, the character of Cassandra
tells the truth, but the keys to comprehending her truth-telling have been lost
because she is no longer connected to the divine, insomuch as she has resisted
submitting to the god Apollo. Her continuation to tell the truth is proof, there-
fore, of her resistance. But, in turn, this disconnection from the truth of divine
authority has the consequence that Apollo inflicts the punishment on her of not
being understood, that her truth will no longer be shared among her own people.
Because Cassandra does not speak as a priestess enlightened by a god and,
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therefore, the truth of Cassandra no longer forms part of that magnetic chain de-
scribed by Plato in Ion. She has broken the chain and tells a truth that does not
connect, and the sense that it is not seductive, it does not persuade. And because
of this, she represents a speech that is wholly opposite to the speech of Helen.
Therefore, in Foucault’s focus on the truth pronounced by Cassandra, he again
stresses that the truth is not concerned with persuasion, but with an emancipa-
tory speech with performative consequences.
Furthermore, Foucault again emphasises that parrhesia involves an eman-
cipatory speech that projects its consequences onto specific historical moments.
Parrhesia enables Foucault to move a step ahead of the ethics of the care of self
to the radically political origin of the constitution of subjectivity. It is by going
to the origin of Greek democracy that Foucault finds the story of the self as the
political configuration of the demos. As he stated in 1977 in the Collège de
France lecture, “Security, Territory, Population”, the dimension of what must
be made can only be manifested in a “field of real forces” that “cannot be cre-
ated by a speaking subject alone”.
And Talthybius the herald does not believe Cassandra’s predictions be-
cause “as a herald, [he] must say what his master tells him to say” (Foucault,
Discourse and Truth and Parrhesia, 102). Indeed, the herald is incapable of
speaking and recognizing the truth, insofar as he is not a free person, he is a
citizen chained to his lord and is restricted to repeat what his master has told
him to say. Hence, Foucault explains, he believes that Cassandra is mad. The
herald is an unemancipated character, subjected on a political level to episte-
mological consequences.
After the crisis of parrhesia described through the analysis of these charac-
ters, we see an immediate consequence: equality is conditioned by paideia or
mathēsis, according to the term used in Orestes by Euripides. And, in this way,
a correlation between parrhesia and the care of the self is established, the ethi-
cal foundation of political freedom. In order to develop equality and the govern-
ment of others, one must cultivate oneself, as the road to emancipation and to
the exercise of critical thought necessary for democracy.
Christoph Menke has developed this argument in Force: A Fundamental
Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology. He considers that for the citizen to develop
an equality, which it only is in potential, a paideia is needed, and that this
transformation is possible as an exercise of the aesthetics of self. In Rancière,
however, equality is an a priori in order to think the distribution of the sensible.
And Foucault problematizes the concept of democracy by associating its birth
with the problematization of the very concepts that sustain it: isegoria and
isonomia.
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In the lecture held on 2nd February 1983, of the series The Government of
Self and Others, Foucault stated that parrhesia was born with democracy; but
what he also says is that it is separated from democracy after its historical prob-
lematization. Parrhesia was already a problematic concept from its formation,
due to the contradiction between the elements that form it or the four corners
of a square of parrhesia: democracy as freedom (formal condition), the government
of a few (condition of fact), speaking the rational truth (condition of truth), and
courage, struggle (condition of morality). Therefore, there is already a principle of
division between those who make good use of speech and those who do not. It is
the arduous problem concerning who should govern. And Foucault says that
Euripides (conservative and realist) does not problematize the concept while he
who makes use of it is privileged, like Ion; but Orestes is a different case, which
shows how someone who is not autochthonous and who represents the interests
of the democrats, as opposed to the aristocrats, seems to utter only shouts and not
arguments, parrhesia is not recognized for him. So we see how the use of rhetoric
in Euripides articulates a criticism of parrhesia, and more fundamentally, of isego-
ria. Against the criticism of those who appear to utter only shouts and not argu-
ments, Foucault argues that what he wanted to reply is that nobody, even though
they are athuroglōssos, speaks in order to not say anything. Verbal activity is al-
ways a response to a certain situation. But parrhesia seems to become a double-
edged weapon, given that it can be used as “bad parrhesia” against democracy
itself, because it can be used by dangerous citizens who can lead democracy into
crisis or tyranny: “And, on the other side, since parrēsia is given even to the worst
citizens, isn’t it a fact that this parrhesia becomes a danger for the city and for de-
mocracy itself, since the overwhelming influence of bad orators leads necessarily
to tyranny?” (Foucault, Discourse and Truth and Parrhesia, 124). In this way, the
parrhesiastes is no longer appreciated as a necessary character for democracy and
the assembly government, but rather as a danger or a double truth. It is, in short,
the step from parrhesia to the pharmacy.
Subsequently, parrhesia, as frank speech that determines both the care of
others (government) and the care of oneself, is inserted into the tradition of
Christianity. As Werner Jaeger explains in Early Christianity and Greek Paideia
(1961), “with the Greek language a whole world of concepts, categories of thought,
inherited metaphors, and subtle connotations of meaning enters Christian
thought” (6). Therefore, after the disappearance of the term in tragedy, par-
rhesia reappears in the texts of John Chrysostom.
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4.4 From Ancient Tragedy to Modern Narrative:
Literature as Critique
As we have seen, the problematization of parrhesia entails fundamental conse-
quences. On the one hand, parrhesia ceases to be tied to democracy and under-
goes a broad and varied development in different movements from Greek
thought through to Christianity. On the other hand, the critique of parrhesia at
the heart of democracy leads to the negation of isegoria and isonomia, and to
the resulting social division that is associated, in turn, with the division of ra-
tional discourse – the insane are banned from Assemblies – as well as all those
who make use of discourse lacking in reason because it resembles shouting –
which are, ultimately, those who make it impossible to agree on a truth. And,
lastly, this crisis of democracy demands a replacement: mathēsis or paideia,
which Foucault analyzes through the technologies of the self, which are devel-
oped in the West from the classical era and whose consequences reach the
present day, above all through the legacy of the Cynics.
These three dimensions of the problematization of parrhesia find a clear
echo in the work of Foucault as critique. On the one hand, the studies on mad-
ness are a constant and at the end of his work, they come together in his project
of seeking “potential modes of existence for possible subjects” (Foucault, The
Government of Self and Others, 3). Madness is therefore considered a matrix of
knowledge on the phenomena of deviation within a society. And the social par-
titioning of madness means the introduction of technologies by means of which
it is aimed to drive the behaviour of others (3–4). However, these strategies of
domination of subjectivities emphasize the possibility itself of the transforma-
tion of the subject and, consequently, they in their turn make possible technol-
ogies of resistance and of the constitution of subjects.45
This leads Foucault to recognize in the Kantian Aufklärung the legacy of clas-
sical parrhesia in modernity. Foucault’s interest in Kant’s “Was ist Aufklärung?”
appears repeatedly from 1978 (“What is Critique?”) until the end of his life.46 And
45 Along these lines, we can understand the reading that Diogenes makes of Oedipus Rex.
According to Diogenes, the problem of Oedipus is not that his fate is marked by the gods, but
that he is of human origin: Oedipus errs in the interpretation of the signs of the oracle, just as
his father Laius also does. But in the case of Oedipus, says Diogenes, the gravest error was not
doing things himself but to delegate to others (The Courage of the Truth). The process of eman-
cipation of the subject begins with one’s work on oneself, as had already been represented in
the figure of the yeoman in the Orestes.
46 The same meeting between J. Habermas and M. Foucault in UC Berkeley, that did not hap-
pen due to Foucault’s death in 1984, was due to be a reflection on Kant’s text.
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the ethical-political shift in Foucault’s work can be read in line with Kant’s
proposal. In Kant, we find a new relation between morality and politics,47 be-
tween will and the common state of well-being, which coincides with Foucault’s
approach.
The Aufklärung is defined by Kant as “man’s emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity”, understanding this immaturity as “inability to use one’s
own understanding without the guidance of another” because “its cause is not
lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the
guidance of another”. Therefore, the Sapere aude! describes the parrhesiastic
interpellation of “dare to be wise”, the “courage to use your own understand-
ing”. In short, the distinction between governed and governors is not natural, it
is not attributed to the capacities of citizens and, for this reason, we can con-
clude, every person is responsible for their own emancipation and resistance.
The common forms of resistance belong, therefore, to the experience and
the tradition that begins with the parrhesia of the Cynics, and they are ex-
pressed in the modes of life as resistance, that is, in “the art of life” as “mili-
tantism”. This aesthetics of existence to which Foucault devotes much of his
investigation in History of Sexuality, and his Collège de France lectures, in par-
ticular, The Courage of the Truth. Life is, therefore, a stage for revolutionary ac-
tivity, “or revolutionary activity as life”. Foucault recognizes three forms of
militantism of experience: the secret society, trade unions or political organiza-
tions with revolutionary ends, and, third, which Foucault gives special attention,
“militancy as bearing witness by one’s life”, which should break with the con-
ventions, habits and values of society, which highlights the possibility of living
in another way to the socially admitted as scandalous life, “the scandal of the
revolutionary life” as true life and which, in general terms, Foucault points out
in the mid-nineteenth century (Foucault, The Courage of the Truth, 185–6).
Along with this vehicle of Cynicism or the theme of the mode of life as scan-
dal of the truth, Foucault points out a third way – art. Not only as a form that
gives an account of this aesthetic of life, as is Russian nihilism in the literature
of Dostoyevsky,48 but as Cynical literature, habitual in the satire and comedy of
47 Politics concerns itself in the action of a state, of a group, whereas morality concerns itself
with personal decisions, with free will, to act in a certain way.
48 By way of example, in Dosteyevsky’s The Idiot the relation with parrhesia is established,
firstly, in the character of Prince Myshkin, who is also inserted into the tradition of the parrhe-
siastes: a character with an education between autodidacticism and pedagogical experimenta-
tion, he is catalogued throughout the novel as: ill, artist, philosopher, mad, idiot, and
democrat. Myshkin is the character who is not afraid to say everything and who is identified
with his speech. Secondly, parrhesia is presented in the structure of the novel itself. As
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medieval and Christian Europe and in the carnivalesque literature Bakhtin
mentions:
The fabliaux would no doubt belong to this domain, as well as the literature studied by
Bakhtin, who relates it particularly to the festival and carnival, but which I think also cer-
tainly falls under this manifestation of the Cynic life: the problem of the relations between
the festival and the Cynic life (naked, violent life, the life which scandalously manifests
the truth). We would again come across many of the themes concerning the carnival and
carnivalesque practice.
(Foucault, The Courage of the Truth, 187)
However, the question of Cynicism reaches even modern art, where it is of sin-
gular importance, according to Foucault. This legacy of Cynicism of the aes-
thetic of existence (the bond between life and truth), reaches us in two ways:
its appearance in Europe at the beginning of modernity, of “the life of the art-
ist”, which was not completely new, but that acquires original importance:
the modern idea that the artist’s life, in the very form it takes, should constitute some
kind of testimony of what art is in its truth. The artist’s life must not only be sufficiently
singular for him to be able to create his work, but it must in some way be a manifestation
of art itself in its truth.
(187)
This modern idea of the artist’s life is based on two principles: art is capable of
giving existence to a form that breaks, a breaking as the truth of life; and life is
the guarantee that every work that takes root in this life and begins from it, be-
longs to art. This is to say, it is the life of the artist that makes it possible for the
work itself to be manifested as truth, a truth, as we have said, that is scandalous,
that breaks from the past and is revolutionary. And it is what, as per Foucault,
leads us to the second reason why art is the vehicle of the Cynical aesthetic of
existence. This is the idea that the relation of literature with the real is one of
laying bare, of unmasking. We find this idea, Foucault says, in the literature
of Baudelaire and Flaubert, as the place of the event of what is elemental of life.
This violent gesture that modern literature exercises upon reality is anti-Platonic
and anti-Aristotelian at the same time, because it is “the endless movement by
Bakhtin described in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, it is a polyphonic novel that breaks
from the organic structure of the body of unitary text. Myshkin himself is criticized for his “un-
balanced” dialogue, as critique of the anti-Aristotelian composition of the work: “A plurality
of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid
voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoyevsky’s novels. What unfolds in his works is
not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective world, illuminated by a single au-
thorial consciousness” (6).
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which every rule laid down, deduced, induced, or inferred from preceding ac-
tions is rejected and refused by the following action” (188). Literature has, there-
fore, a function of criticism through its anti-cultural nature, because, faced with
the consensus of culture, art confronts the courage of “its barbaric truth”, which
is, remember, the possibility of dissent. Modern art, Foucault says, above all has
the courage to run the risk of “offending”. And its capacity to criticise is inherited
from Cynicism, which comes to literature via the Sceptic style and nihilism of the
nineteenth century (189). For Foucault, the “question of nihilism is not: if God
does not exist, everything is permitted. Its formula is rather a question: how to
live if I must face up to the fact that ‘nothing is true’?” (190).49
In the Western history of truth, in which there have been different and di-
verse truths, Foucault says:
In this West, which has invented many different truths and fashioned so many arts of exis-
tence, Cynicism constantly reminds us that very little truth is indispensable for whoever
wishes to live truly and that very little life is needed when one truly holds to the truth.
(190)
Lastly, I would like to go back to the question of the legacy of parrhesia in mo-
dern literature. I consider that, as well as the development of the aesthetic of
existence as a central theme of the modern literary opus, parrhesia has reached
modern literature in its status of discourse and in its anti-Aristotelian and anti-
Platonic form. Parrhesia had traced a discontinuous line in relation to unreason,
Euripidean tragedy and modern literature, projecting its political dimension
upon it. Thus this language, as deviation from the language of instrumental rea-
son, is also the language of unreason. It takes up, in a different way, the relation
between literature and madness.
Parrhesia reaches literary forms through the Cynical legacy of the genres of
comedy and carnivalesque literature, until arriving at the modern novel. We
can consider that the relation between parrhesia and the modern polyphonic
novel is a broad one. The basis of this hypothesis lies, on the one hand, in
Menippean satire’s derivation from Socratic dialogue; and, on the other hand,
it is found in the transformation of parrhesia in Cynic philosophy as a way of
life, as I have already described. Bakhtin himself had already highlighted
Menippean satire from among the tragi-comic genres of classical antiquity that
would prepare the way for the carnivalesque view of the world and of the mod-
ern dialogic novel in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. However, the modern
novel had also inherited elements from classical Euripidean tragedy, as
49 Here we can see the work that Foucault did on Sade, to which I have referred in Chapter 3.
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democratic speech.50 If, as Christoph Menke states, the content of experience of
tragedy is “tragic irony”, that is, the tragic experience of action is that in which
an action aimed at achieving an objective fails, then we can declare that,
beyond modern theatre, we find elements inherited from classical tragedy in
the modern polyphonic novel. That configuration using an accumulation of
partial views is, also, one of the fundamental traits described by Bakhtin and
Rancière in their description of the polyphonic novel and democratic novel,
respectively.
As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri remind us in their definition of “multi-
tude”, dialogic novels are presented as democratic models that overcome the
modern alternative between sovereignty and anarchy:
For him [Bakhtin] these limits directly betray the fact that it is impossible to construct a
world in which each subject is not based on its recognition of others. This is where it
becomes clear why Bakhtin conducts this polemic with reference to Dostoyevsky’s nov-
els, because in Dostoyevsky, he explains, narration is always dialogical, even between
the protagonist and his cat. […] Dostoyevsky’s novels are thus great polyphonic appa-
ratuses that create a world in which an open, expansive set of subjects internet and seek
happiness.
(Hardt & Negri,Multitude, 208)
Therefore, the legacy of the tradition of literature and parrhesia, and Bakhtin’s
conception of modern literature, coincide in that they oppose the norms of rep-
resentative poetics, the indifference of form with regard to its content. And they
oppose the idea of fiction-poetry, that of poetry as proper mode of language.
Both principles oppose the mimesis of the word in act, a specific art of writing.
The concept of writing in Foucault is particularly close to Rancière’s. For
Rancière and Foucault, writing and literature share their contradictory charac-
ter, “it can be orphaned speech lacking a body that might accompany it and
attest to it, or, on the contrary, it can be a hieroglyph that bears its idea upon its
body” (Rancière, Mute Speech, 36). To this contradictory character of writing,
Foucault adds a performative dimension that we find in his concept of literature,
and which is another of the fundamental traits of parrhesia.
50 For the development of this issue, I refer to the first part of Nietzsche’s classic text,
“Socrates and Greek Tragedy”. Here, Nietzsche underlined that with Euripides the spectator
attended theatre to see man in the reality of daily life – the spectator saw his own double.
Thus the people learned to speak and language was made understandable and understood by
all. “His heroes really are as they talk. But they also express all that they are, while the
Aeschylean and Sophoclean characters are more profound and complete than their words:
they only babble about themselves.”
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The multitude of democracy, as in its Greek origins, is founded on the lack of
distinction between the masses and the group of the few, in the opening of all
the discourses in the assembly, in the beginning of equality. Literature as the
text of historical becoming, as event, is a truth-telling as excess, as parrhesiastic
speech, which puts the seriousness of the genre itself in danger.51 Literature
dares to “say everything”.
Finally, polyphonic literature, as a form of evental veridiction of a commu-
nity, offers a space of resistance against police power, characterized by determin-
ing the behavior and freedom of other men. Literature inherited from parrhesia
its capacity to say everything, and to resist the forms of political rationalization.
Thus, the modern novel has inherited its political consequences from parrhesia,
from its excessive and undifferentiated speech. Modern literature entails the end
of representative order, not its apex, precisely due to the excessive speech of the
modern novel. The excess in the modern novel’s speech is the opposition of an
everything to another. It marks the ruin of an everything that was in harmony
with the stability of the social body. Because of this, parrhesia is critical dis-
course that is inserted into modern literature. Recalling the text quoted from
Constitution of the Athenians, parrhesia is founded on the lack of distinction be-
tween the masses and the group of the few, in the opening of all the discourses
in the assembly, or the principle of equality.
51 In binary opposition with philosophy, literature traditionally occupies the place of what is
not serious.
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5 Foucault and Literary Theory in the 21st
Century
5.1 How to Read Literature with Foucault?
According to Cristina de Peretti in “Foucault: The Twofold Games of Language”
(1994), “Foucauldian archaeology is resolutely based upon the privilege of reading”
(35). It could be considered that the trait that runs through every one of his
methodologies, both genealogy and archaeology, is based on the act of reading.
But reading, as Foucault explains in L’ordre du discours (1971), is not a mode of
grasping the text in a “true, correct and unique reading”. On the contrary, his
reading care – as he clearly expounds in “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud” (Foucault,
Dits et écrits I, 592–608) – is synonymous of a historically plurisignificant text.
At the same time, like the frame inside the painting, reading in Foucault refers
to the act itself in which the gaze confronts the materiality of the letters of the volu-
me. Hence the characterization of our culture as Library or Foucault’s interest in
the archive. For the author, historiography is not a chapter objective of knowledge,
but in its confrontation with the written word of the texts, with reading, language
surpasses any possibility of transparent representation of the story. This same ma-
teriality is what enables Foucault to reconsider the concept of history in relation to
the concept of writing and, in particular, with the concept of archive – a spatial
model of history in contrast to the temporal, as linear development that allows the
surmounting of layers. In archaeology, therefore, he attends to the materiality of
the story through the materiality of the archive, as Walter Benjamin had already
done in his “archaeology of maternity”,52 for whom there is no future utopia either,
but, rather, every present dissolves the past and, at the same time, is capable of
renewing it. In this putting oneself in front of the writing, the metaphor of the eye
of the reader is essential in Foucault’s thought, which, in his debate with dialectic,
confronts the abstract perception of the mind, supposedly superior to the eye and
the ear, according to Hegel (2018) – and here Hegel uses the eye in a non-
figurative sense – the impossibility of leaping to the very act of reading. And the
development of the hermeneutics is linked to this metaphor of the eye of the reader
in Foucault. A metaphor that, as Martin Jay shows in his book, Downcast Eyes: The
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (1993), has enjoyed a
long tradition and successive transformations. Jay shows the existence of a large
52 The image used by Benjamin is the “ruins of the past” in “The Task of the Translator”
(1923).
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number of metaphors of vision that speak of a profound relation between percep-
tion and language itself: according to him, the epistemology of this metaphor ap-
proaches the “representativity” of language.
This metaphor, recurrent in Foucault’s work, is therefore contextualized in the
panorama of the contemporaneous philosophy but also as critique of the privilege
given the organ of the eye in Phenomenology, principally Merleau-Ponty.53
Foucault condemns this mode of ethnocentrism present in this privilege, which
makes it impossible to think the Other. Cristina Micieli has highlighted it thus in
Foucault y la fenomenología [Foucault and Phenomenology] (2003), on speaking of:
His attempt to escape the monarchy of the empirical-transcendental double, given that
the anthropological paradigm is, in the historical mode of the analysis of thought, the
same form of a type of rationality complicit with ethnocentrism – that is, with the same
impossibility of thinking the Other.54
(29)
As a precedent of this use of the image of the eye, Benjamin had also developed it
in relation with the materiality of historical discourse. As Sagnol shows in
“La méthode archéologique de Walter Benjamin” (1983), Theses on the Philosophy
of History, which represents the theoretical framework of his study on the Arcades,
begins with a series of critiques aimed principally at the ideology of progress. Both
Benjamin and Foucault shared Nietzsche’s legacy that criticized the concept of
teleological history because it forgets small events. Foucault and Benjamin had
taken up the Nietzschean metaphor of the eye – in turn of Leibnizian origin, as
Sarah Kofman shows in Nietzsche et la métaphore – which is that of perspectivism.
And with it they had confronted history as “effective history” and not as contin-
uum. Thus Sagnol states in “La méthode archéologique de Walter Benjamin”:
Il n’est pas certainement pas exagéré de dire que l’archéologie de Foucault est fille du
matérialisme historique et de la généalogie nietzschéenne, et qu’en cela elle n’est pas total-
ement étrangère à l’archéologie de Benjamin, qui, s’il proclame haut et fort le matérialisme
historique, n’est pas moins également influencé par Nietzsche.
(143)
Hence these authors faced up to the classical trend that since Plato has consid-
ered the eye to be the privileged organ for representing spiritual vision (“natu-
ral way to the soul”), the intuition, given its elevated and removed situation
53 Phénomenólogie de la perception, 1945; Le visible et l’invisible, 1964; Le primat de la percep-
tion et ses conséquences philosophiques, 1966.
54 My translation.
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from contact with what is material, as opposed to smell and taste, as Jay explains.
With this, Foucault is making visible/letting see the symbol of the eye by making it
essential in the perception of matter through the act of reading, compared to the
transparency of the image that returns the eye from what it perceives. The eye no
longer looks at an “objective reality”, no longer faithfully perceives what reality is:
they eye is the eye of the reader, the eye that attends to the signs of reading.
However, it must be said that I consider that the gaze acts in this regard not
as a privileged sense in epistemological work as Martin Jay considers in Downcast
Eyes (1993), nor only as mere image-word discontinuity, but that it would be a
technique founded on the event of “making see” as critical exercise. In “Visual
Parrhesia?: Foucault and the Truth of the Gaze” (2009), Jay revises his 1993 study
and states that the gaze in Foucault acquires a deconstructive value of the pure
gaze of the speculative subject and, moreover, of the panoptic gaze, which he
called “the limitless empire of the gaze” (The Birth of the Clinic, 39). However, he
concludes that one could not speak of a visual parrhesia. On the contrary, Shapiro
states in “Shutters and Mirrors: Manet Closes the Panopticon Window”
(Archaeologies of Vision, 2003): “In the Panopticon the gaze is mobilized and fixed
on each individual; it is a floating or functional gaze that need not appear as the
look of anyone in particular. In Manet looks meet no object, no person, even
though we see their source. What we see, then, is an eye disconnected from a con-
tent of vision” (310). Indeed, we cannot really speak of a visual parrhesia, but we
can of the traits that parrhesia, as the verbal technique of telling the truth, shares
with a trying to see what, being in the same present, has not been seen.
In one of Foucault’s last reflections on literature, he describes the moder-
nity of Baudelaire as “an exercise in which the extreme attention placed in the
real (the present) is faced with the practice of a freedom that, simultaneously,
respects and violates the real” (“What is Enlightenment?”, 32–50). Modern liter-
ature is not the mere production of a word outside of the order of the discourse
but is extended as “real” discourse. The modernity of Baudelaire does not lie in
accepting it as an everlasting movement but in being capable of extracting “the
poetical from history” that is defined as “something eternal that is neither be-
yond nor behind the present instant, but in it itself”.
I therefore define the political capacity of literature, the politics of literature
in Foucault, as a making see or revealing modes of speech that, existing, had not
been considered. It is the attitude that enables one to grasp what is “poetic” in
the present moment; it is a will to heroize the present (“De l’héroïsme de la vie
moderne”, Baudelaire). This ironic heroism entails for the modern man an inven-
tion of himself that does not “free man in his own self” but compels him/her to
the constant task of creating himself. Along these lines, Raymond Bellour stated:
“fiction understood in this sense possesses a virtue in comparison with the
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history which it is, without being so. It does not bring to the fore that which is in
the past in order that the effect of it should return to the present. What it brings
to the fore is that which is in the process of happening. Thus it is most true for
the time in which it is practised because it incorporates the shift between times
in the very way in which it is constructed, and converts this into space (which is
both visible and readable)” (“Towards Fiction”, 153).
In Death and the Labyrith, reading opens the possibility of seeing but it is not
what is seen itself, such as the lens of la Vue or the doubles that in the work of
Roussel definitely hide more than they replicate – “a radiance in which nothing
is visible” (Death and the Labyrith, 54) – it is the excess that does not make it
possible to see. Or, as occurs in the work that Foucault devotes to René Magritte,
This is not a pipe (1973), the impossibility of reconciling image and words undoes
the classic illusion of continuity between what is seen and what is said.
However, in the new critique it would be the eye that enables, through ima-
ges, relating thought with what is visible. Foucault puts it in this way in “Le
Mallarmé de Jean-Pierre Richard”55 (Dits et écrits I, 1964), in which he states
that the reading of the literary text lets one see a “poetic thought” in the image
and not a reference point. Yet this metaphor is a clear reference to Georges
Bataille, who in Story of the Eye (1928) breaks down the opposition between the
low and the high upon considering that the eye is always and at the same time
a sex and an eye, without it being possible for these opposites to be brought
together in a third term. Foucault also takes up this metaphor as a metaphor of
transgression. In “Préface à la transgression” (1963), for Foucault the metaphor
of the eye is the transgression of the self, the “eye returned”:
Its globe has the expansive quality of a marvellous seed – like an egg imploding towards
the center of night and extreme light, which it is and which it has just ceased to be. It is
the figure of being in the act of transgressing its own limit.
(45)
The metaphor of the blind, upturned eye, “the most open and the most impenetra-
ble eye”, continues the play of limit and of being in Bataille’s work (46). The up-
turned eye is more than a metaphor in which Bataille brings together what he has
55 A particularly interesting text due to the mise en abyme structure: it is what could be called
a text that is no longer secondary but third language, insofar as it is language (Foucault’s
text), on language (Jean-Pierre Richard’s text) on language (Mallarmé’s text). “Le Mallarmé de
Jean-Pierre Richard” is a review of the book L’Univers imaginaire de Mallarmé by Jean-Pierre
Richard (1961), a review in which Foucault (Dits et écrits I, 455–465) defends the nouvelle cri-
tique and, in particular, the reading made by Richard of Mallarmé’s work, against the readings
that had been made principally from the standpoint of psychoanalysis.
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called inner experience, the extreme limit of the possible, comic operation or simply
meditation (L’Expérience de l’intérieur, 1943); of which Descartes’ clear gaze or that
acuteness of mind that he calls acies mentis is not a metaphor. According to
Foucault, it is precisely this metaphor that marks the limit of Bataille’s thought:
In point of fact, the upturned eye has no meaning in Bataille’s language, can have no mean-
ing since it marks its limit. It indicates the moment when language, arriving at its confines,
overleaps itself […] the overturned eyes of ecstasy, the mute and exorbitated horror of sacri-
fice, and where it remains fixed in this way at the limit of its void, […] The enucleated or
upturned eye marks the zone of Bataille’s philosophical language, the void into which it
pours and loses itself, but in which it never stops talking – somewhat like the interior, diaph-
anous, and illuminated eye of mystics and spiritualists that marks the point at which the se-
cret language of prayer is embedded and choked by a marvellous communication which
silences it. Similarly, but in an inverted manner, the eye in Bataille delineates the zone
shared by language and death, the place where language discovers its being in the crossing
of its limits: the nondialectical form of philosophical language.
(48)
From there is from where the “being of extreme limit” is observed. Foucault de-
velops this image in his own work, bringing in a book by Leiris and that of
Bataille: “In any event, it is on the white beach of an arena (a gigantic eye)
where Bataille experienced the fact […]” (51). According to Arne Klawitter,56 the
function of this metaphor fulfils a fundamental role in the ontological hermeneu-
tics of literature that Foucault propounds. For Klawitter, the upturned eye is a self-
sufficient “linguistic monument”, “a significant (Signifikat) gap” with a double
function: referring to the being of language, at the same time as absolute signifier
for “referring to the empty place of the sovereign subject” (131). In order to indicate
the function of the upturned eye, Foucault differentiated, at least implicitly, be-
tween seeing (Sehen) and looking (Blicken). Klawitter relates this differentiation
to M.H. Abrams’s romantic distinction of the mirror and the lamp. In the former
case, the eye appears either as a mirror or as a lamp. As a mirror, it refers to the
self-reflective function (when one sees oneself coming); as a lamp, the eye appears
as what gathers the light of the world and converts it into an individual and
subjective image. In contrast, on seeing, Foucault characterized – according to
Klawitter – the eye that looks as a lamp as well, albeit as a nightlamp “whose
strange light does not illumine the world but rather demonstrates its own empti-
ness” (Klawitter, 130). The eye of the reader alternately finds the image of the eye
that observes itself reading and the particular reading that it carries out on writing.
56 All references to Arne Klawitter (2003) that appear in this book are my own translations.
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The concept of reading in Foucault is also inseparably connected to an-
other equally decisive concept in his overall project: the concept of experience.
The sense in which Foucault uses the term is clarified when he states on several
occasions that his books must be seen as “experiences that drive change”. It is
experience, therefore, as testing oneself, but also as testing the reader. And it is
also from here whence it is possible to discern a new consideration of the no-
tion of reader, since, as for Blanchot,57 the reader is the one who relates with
the word and is transformed by it without imposing itself. As opposed to the
author, who recognizes and imposes the work’s unity, the figure of the reader
who diversifies and disperses possible readings that are always multiple. And
this is as negation of the beginning, that is, as the impossibility of revealing a
first identity and of reaching that “truth” veiled by time.
Yet this reading is also a mode of approaching texts, of confronting texts di-
rectly, as a “letting see” the text, and has been used frequently by Foucault both
in his critical analyzes of literature and in his archaeological “descriptions”.
This reading would attend to the singularity of events, as an opening of the
possibility and archaeological and erudite treatment of the subject. For this ge-
nealogical hermeneutics is the same for texts and events as archaeology is to
monuments – that is to say, it attends to their materiality as opposed to the
metaphysical approach and, given his work on events, it therefore also sur-
passes Structuralism. This is how Foucault himself explains it in “Nietzsche,
Marx, Freud” (1964). Like the authors of suspicion, Foucault believes that lan-
guage does not say exactly what it says. Language surpasses the use that it has
traditionally been given, “it is no longer the house of the subject”. That is, the
words themselves would but be interpretations. Throughout their history, “they
interpret before being signs, and ultimately they signify only because they are
essentially nothing but interpretations”, such that:
There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all everything is already inter-
pretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to interpretation, but an in-
terpretation of other signs.
(“Nietzsche, Marx, Freud”, 275)
57 In his novel, Thomas l’obscur (Nouvelle Version. Gallimard, Paris, 1950), Blanchot devel-
oped the allegory of the reader as a new type of reader who does not impose his being onto
what is read, who does not set out to expose himself in the reading, but to let himself be trans-
formed by the being of language (Blanco, 2007).
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In this sense, in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, Nietzsche questioned
the concept itself of truth:
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms-
in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embel-
lished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and
obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what
they are.
(46–7)
The idea that interpretation precedes the sign entails that words are already
interpretations; they do not indicate a meaning but impose an interpretation.
For this reason, Foucault says, the decisive value of modern interpretation
consists of revealing this fact. Literary interpretation is marked, in turn, by
the polysemantic nature of literature. Literary hermeneutics would therefore
be the analysis of literature as signifier and signifying itself. And literature
would therefore be
polysemantic, but in a unique way, not in the way that a message is said to have several
meanings or that it’s ambiguous. In reality, literature is polysemantic, which means that,
when saying one thing alone or maybe when saying nothing at all – for there is no proof that
literature has to say something – in any case, whether it says something or nothing, literature
is always obligated to traverse a number a semiological layers […] This means that literature
is nothing other than the reconfiguration, in vertical form, of the signs present in society and
culture in separate layers. Literature cannot be based on silence. It is not the ineffability of
silence, literature is not the effusion of that which cannot and will never be said. [Literature
is incessant murmur.].
(Foucault, “Literature and Language”,58 94)
The literary analyses of Foucault, like his other studies, were developed through
discursive practice, even in his most evidently theoretical texts, such as
“Langage et littérature” (1964). Foucault’s hermeneutics is thus not far from
the immanentism of New Criticism, but with the influence of psychoanalysis,
structuralism and, above all, of his archaeology.
58 The French edition of the lecture, “Littérature et langage” (Facultés universitaires Saint-
Louis, Brussels, 1964) was published in 2013, later than the Spanish translation by Ángel
Gabilondo of 1996. There are some differences between the two editions. In this case, the quo-
tation has been completed with a phrase that only appears in the Spanish edition (it does not
appear in the 2015 English translation either), which I put within brackets.
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As with other contemporaneous theorists and critics, connected to what was
called Nouvelle critique59 and the Structuralist movement,60 Foucault opposes
traditional criticism in this way, although in his case this mode of reading is also
based on his concept of language. For if language is defined in its signifying ca-
pacity not only by its referential nature but above all for its perlocutionary (inso-
far as creative) character and for its capacity to apprehend itself, to signify itself,
in its ontological nature (because ludic), what happens to literary criticism that
had been defined as a secondary language capable of re-establishing the link be-
tween the text and the author, or between the text and the referent? It would
seem obvious that the status and nature of this discourse will be redefined.
In this redefinition of criticism and hermeneutics of the literary text as secon-
dary text, Foucault distances himself from the radical nature of some con-
temporaneous proposals. In the lecture given in 1970 at the Collège de France,
L’ordre du discourse, to mark the elevation of Jean Hippolite to the professor-
ship of history of the systems of thought, Foucault specifies the status that he
gives the secondary text or commentary. Regarding hermeneutics as secondary
text, or “commentary”, which is shown as a discourse control procedure that,
nevertheless, cannot be disregarded, says Foucault:
I suppose, though I am not altogether sure, there is barely a society without its major narra-
tives, told, retold and varied; formulae, texts, ritualised texts to be spoken in well-
defined circumstances; things said once, and conserved because people suspect some
hidden secret or wealth lies buried within. In short, I suspect one could find a kind of
gradation between different types of discourse within most societies: discourse ‘uttered’
in the course of the day and in casual meetings, and which disappears with the very act
which gave rise to it; and those forms of discourse that lie at the origins of a certain num-
ber of new verbal acts, which are reiterated, transformed or discussed; in short, discourse
which is spoken and remains spoken, indefinitely, beyond its formulation, and which re-
mains to be spoken. We know them in our own cultural system: religious or juridical
59 As Manuel Asensi has indicated in Historia de la teoría de la literatura, vol. II, “nouvelle cri-
tique” is a broad and heterogeneous designation which encompasses new theoretical and critical
trends that were developed in France in particular, and in Europe in general, in the 1960s, of
which some had already been emerging since the 1930s: “Movements such as Marxist-leaning
Genetic Structuralism (whose principal representative was Lucien Goldmann), psychocriticism
(Charles Mauron), the later criticism of consciousness (Jean-Pierre Richard, Jean Rousset), and
that of negative consciousness (Maurice Blanchot), form part of the nouvelle critique, a type of
theoretical and critical discourse that carried out a renewal of literary studies in the France and
Europe of those years” (Asensi, 341) [My translation].
60 Foucault defends these “new trends”, a defence that can be found in various texts, of
which the following stand out: “Le Mallarmé de J.P. Richard” (1964), “Langage et littérature”
(1964), “Le Structuralisme et l’analyse littéraire”, and “Proposition de création d’une chaire
intitulée Sémiologie littéraire” for Roland Barthes (1975).
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texts, as well as some curious texts, from the point of view of their status, which we term
‘literary’; to a certain extent, scientific texts also.
(Foucault, L’ordre du discours, 220)
As can be seen, here it is not a question of the radical lack of distinction between
first and secondary discourse that other authors asserted in these years. Among
these authors, in Criticism and Truth (1966) Roland Barthes stated: “the same lan-
guage tends to circulate everywhere in literature and even behind itself […] there
are no longer either poets or novelists: there is no longer anything but writing”
(23). According to Barthes, the definition itself of objectivity that was demanded of
criticism was subjected to a historically variable notion: “exteriority” – defined as
reason, nature, taste, the life of the author, the rules of the genre or the story –
which would equally have altered critical veracity. Likewise, Deconstruction, and
mainly Paul de Man, also denied that there was any radical difference between
first or original language and secondary language.
The difference lies in that, although for Foucault neither category is closed
due to its historicity, there are secondary texts or commentaries that sometimes
occupy the place of the primary texts, and other primary or creative texts that
disappear. Nevertheless, the “radical denial of this gradation can never be any-
thing but play, utopia or anguish”; and he refers to the irony in Borges’s Pierre
Menard and the anguish in Roussel.
Anguish, such as that of Janet when sick, for whom the least utterance sounded as the ‘word
of the Evangelist’, concealing an inexhaustible wealth of meaning, worthy to be broadcast,
rebegun, commented upon indefinitely: ‘When I think’, he said on reading or listening;
‘When I think of this phrase, continuing its journey through eternity, while I, perhaps, have
only incompletely understood it.
(Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 220–221)
Hence, as for Barthes, for Foucault the status of texts varies according to the his-
torical moment. The difference lies in that for Foucault, nonetheless, the distinc-
tion in itself does not disappear. According to Foucault, the first text is repeated
in many ways. “A single work of literature can give rise, simultaneously, to
several distinct types of discourse. The Odyssey, as a primary text, is repeated
in the same epoch, in Berand’s translation, in infinite textual explanations
and in Joyce’s Ulysses” (Death and the Labyrinth, 221). The relation between
these two types of text is therefore open and ‘solidary’:
in what we generally refer to as commentary, the difference between primary text and secon-
dary text plays two interdependent roles. On the one hand, it permits us to create new
discourses ad infinitum: the top-heaviness of the original text, its permanence, its status as
discourse ever capable of being brought up to date, the multiple or hidden meanings with
which it is credited, the reticence and wealth it is believed to contain, all this creates an open
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possibility for discussion. On the other hand, whatever the techniques employed, commenta-
ry’s only role is to say finally, what has silently been articulated deep down. It must – and the
paradox is ever-changing yet inescapable – say, for the first time, what has already been said,
and repeat tirelessly what was, nevertheless, never said.
(Death and the Labyrinth, 221)
Thus we can see a shift in his works on literature in texts published after 1970,
which we have already seen, and that also entails the defence and need for a new
critical discourse: precisely the problem of French criticism of his time and that
Roland Barthes described in “Voies nouvelles de la critique littéraire en France”
(Œuvres complètes, I, 145–148). In “La folie, l’absence d’œuvre” (Dits et écrits I,
440–449), meanwhile, Foucault showed that these secondary languages would
not function as languages “exterior” to literature. Criticism, he says, forms part of
the heart of literature, of the “void” that that literature establishes inside its own
language. These texts, says Foucault, are the necessary movement, but necessarily
unfinished, given their relation with literature, and literature’s nature. Criticism is
writing, in the same way that it is possible to find criticism within literature itself.
This conception of criticism as writing, which is fuelled by the same language
as literature itself or as the language of thought, is the central theme of the second
part of “Langage et littérature” (1964). Foucault here delves into the nature of the
being of language in its relation with criticism, its “recent change”, and its contrast
with the multiplication of the discourse of what Foucault ironically calls “homo
criticus”, a figure that likewise emerged from the beginning of modernity in the
nineteenth century. In this study, Foucault states that the true acts of criticism
should be sought in literature itself, in poems by René Char or in fragments of
Blanchot, in the texts by Francis Ponge, in those that criticism converts into
writing: “We could say that criticism has become a general function of language in
general but without an institution, without its own subject” (Foucault, “What is
the Language of Literature?”, 46). And from here, in a text also from 1964, “Le
Mallarmé de J.-P. Richard”, Foucault writes that a book is not important because
of the things it brings up, but when the language around it is disrupted, making a
void that becomes its place of residence (Foucault, “Langage et littérature”).
Thus, according to Foucault, it is not possible to make the primary indistin-
guishable from the secondary discourse. Nevertheless, given that such a status
is historical, we already find in every text the possibility of its transformation.
This is due to the double nature and the being of language, which extend the
powers of language to all the discourses that make up a society.
In Teoría hermenéutica y literatura [Hermeneutic Theory and Literature]
(1991), J. M. Cuesta Abad states that hermeneutics starts with the idea that “be-
neath ‘common sense’ there is a hidden and more profound meaning”. If we
accept this starting hypothesis, then Foucault’s 1963 analysis of the work of
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Raymond Roussel starts from a genuinely hermeneutic supposition. When
Roussel published Comment j’ai écrit certaines de mes livres in 1935, this text
seemed to have as its only purpose to clarify once and for all the keys to inter-
preting his own work. However, Foucault considered that the key there de-
scribed was not a purpose but rather a threshold, a re-beginning of reading that
multiplies the meanings. And this is one of the traits already described of
Foucauldian hermeneutics: the recognition of the plural nature of the text.
Foucault’s interest in literature is constant, but Death and the Labyrinth is
his only writing devoted exclusively to the analysis and interpretation of a liter-
ary work. His purpose, he repeats successively, is to “show” the reader the
thresholds of Roussel’s work. And here, undoubtedly, this “making visible” is
loaded with the reference to the Marxist thought of “donner à voir” and it is, at
the same time, an appeal to the Foucauldian idea that literature is thought in
images – that is (and according to what has already been shown) that the read-
ing of the literary text makes visible a “poetic thought” in the image, ahead of a
referent (mimesis) (“Le Mallarmé de Jean-Pierre Richard”, 1964).
This ability of reading to “show the invisible” is shown incessantly throughout
all his work. Reading is thus susceptible to showing a truth that had previously
been kept silent (Histoire de la folie, Histoire de la sexualité). This enables us to
connect this first stage of Foucault’s production with those ideas that I developed
in the previous chapter. In contrast to aletheia, which is the truth-being of logos,
in the Berkeley lectures Foucault took on the classic concept of parrhesia as
“saying everything” for his reading methodologies. Aletheia is to show being
“clearly”, not to hide it. In Aristotle’s rhetoric, this was related to showing the
truth to everyone in a clear way, avoiding enigmas, which was based on “common
sense”, the sense that is shown most clearly to the majority. The saying-everything
of parrhesia, however, is related precisely to saying the opposite of what the
majority think, to go against opinion; it is a way of speaking that belongs to criti-
cism that reveals a “difficult” truth. And in Foucault it is directly related to the
double being of language, the paradox and the enigma.
Language is that space by which a being and its duplicate are united and separated; it’s a
relation of that hidden shadow which shows things by hiding their being. It’s always
more or less a rebus .
(Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 121)
In this way, when Foucault warns us that the procedure expounded by Roussel
gives us the key and at the same time redoubles the work itself of meaning, he
tells us that another meaning has to be looked for that is not the evident, the habi-
tual, that rereading is always necessary. Thus a “space of infinite uncertainty”
opens, put forward from the fact that “it is impossible to know whether there is a
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secret or none, or several, and what they are” (Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth,
11–12). And this is because the identity of words is an experience of two faces: in
the word the place of an unforeseen meeting is revealed between the most distant
beings in the world (“it is distance abolished; at the point of contact, differences
are brought together in a unique form: dual, ambiguous, Minotaur-like”, 16). It
could therefore be said that there is already a metaphorical power in language that
is inherent to it, but above all, that there is a paradoxical being that gives language
its double potentiality and, ultimately, its wealth contained in a finite and even
reduced materiality (like a Borgesian library). Therefore, in the metaphorical
proposition, as in paradox, two realities completely removed from each other
come together. That having been said, the metaphor has been given an epistemo-
logical capacity (that of knowing through similarities), while the paradox has been
criticized for its logical (criticism of irrationalism: literature and madness) and on-
tological (being A and not A at the same time) consequences. Roussel’s machines,
according to Foucault, adopt these two fundamental functions: to join two distant
realities, superimposing them in a non-dialectic juxtaposition in the way of the
metaphor (such as the worm-musician, the cockerel-writer, the breadcrumb and
marble), or like the paradox, uniting incompatibilities (the thread of water and the
thread of cloth, chance and rule, inability and virtuosity) or uniting realities with-
out a possible relation of size (scenes composed in the interior of embryonic grape
seeds; musical mechanisms hidden in the thickness of decks of tarot cards).
Therefore, given the self-consciousness of his writing, which is the anti-
pode of automatic writing, it is in Roussel’s writing that this double being of
language can be appreciated. Roussel’s writing is able to show, through the
various procedures, “the duality of language which starts from a simple core,
divides itself in two, and produces new figures” (16). Roussel thus shows a
movement inherent to language with ontological consequences: the signifier-
signified connection can “undergo a metamorphosis”, multiplying the possibil-
ities of each word, that is to say, their “meanings” (17).
In short, for Foucault as for Nietzsche or Dumarsais, language has a tropo-
logical origin with political consequences that, according to Foucault, have
nothing to do with “figures of style”, that is, with saying the same thing in
another way. On the contrary, “all of Roussel’s language, in its reversal of style,
surreptitiously tries to say two things with the same words”. It is precisely in
this tropological space where Roussel’s writing is placed:
In the space created by this displacement, all the forms of rhetoric come to life – the twists
and turns, as Dumarsais would put it: catachresis, metonymy, hypallage, and many other
hieroglyphs drawn by the rotation of words into the voluminous mass of language.
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Roussel’s experiment is located in what could be called the “tropological space” of vo-
cabulary.
(Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth, 17–18)
5.2 Donner à voir: Politics of Form and the Marxist
Tradition of Literature
For Foucault, literature, with its power to make visible “novel forms of being”, of-
fers modes of liberation from society’s models of normalization. Language gains
Independence and autonomy in its materiality, but it is precisely through this from
where language says everything because, as he expounded in “L’extralinguistique
et la littérature”, it cannot say everything.
In this sense, the politics of literary form that Foucault propounds comes
close, critically, to classical Marxist literary theory, to the early Lukaćs of
Theory of the Novel, and to the later Althusser of aleatory materialism in “Le
courant souterrain du mateŕialisme de la rencontre” [“The Underground
Current of the Materialism of the Encounter”] (1982).
It was Mikhail Bakhtin, Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev (the Bakhtin
Circle) who developed the importance of linguistic form and placed language in
the centre. For these authors, language is an ideological phenomenon par excel-
lence. It also concerns what up until now has been called “internal experience”.
For these authors, the mental contents of individuals only exist as signic expres-
sion and, therefore, belong to the ideology of a period. For Lukács as well as for
Bakhtin and his circle, the heterogeneity and conflictedness of language is an indi-
cator of social transformations. But language is not a mere reflection of what is
real; in Voloshinov’s words, “existence reflected in sign is not merely reflected but
refracted” (Voloshinov,Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 23). With Lukács,
Foucault shares this idea of form as a sociological question. However, for Lukács
one can observe in the analysis of form “the vital temporal and historical ele-
ments”, and this analysis of form allows him to explain how the appearance of a
new historical subject matter produces new formal laws. Yet Foucault introduces
the performative capacity of literary form, because the analysis of the form allows
us to perceive not only changes or events but that the form itself produces effects
on history.
Without a doubt, the dialogue between Foucault and Althusser is more com-
plex. Recall that for Althusser, society is formed by structural hierarchies and
subjectivity is an effect of these. The subject is not subject until invoked in the
discourse, and then is made present. It is what he calls interpellation: “the inter-
pellation of human individuals as ideological subjects produces a specific effect
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in them, the unconscious-effect, which enables these human individuals to
assume the function of ideological subjects” (“Three Notes on the Theory of
Discourse”, 56). Therefore, subjects are actively conditioned – ideology is per-
formative, in the ideological system, through repressive apparatus (tribunals,
prisons, bureaucracy) and ideological apparatus (family, school, religion).
Ideology, according to Althusser, has an illusory effect that makes one accept
as natural a relation with the world that in reality is a representation, or what,
in Guy Debord’s words, we know as spectacle (The Society of the Spectacle).
So, if for Althusser literature is a superstructural phenomenon, this means
that it is ideological. Literature forms part of the reproduction which the system
of production induces for its continuity. Hence, art and literature form part of
these illusory media. And, although in “Se débarrasser de la philosophie” (“The
Functions of Literature”, 1975) Foucault argues for a sociology of literature that
demystifies the functions of the discourses that are called literature at a particular
historical moment,61 there is never a straight identification between literature and ide-
ology. Althusser, however, seems to distinguish, in a Platonic mode, between a “true
art” and “art as simulacrum. This true art is what “makes us see” something of reality,
that is, the very ideology of what it comes from (Althusser, “A Letter on Art in Reply
to Andre Daspre”, 8), because although art cannot exit from ideology, it can show it.
The nature of “making visible” in Foucault is certainly of a different nature, as I have
already shown. But both give a principal place to literature’s potential to show.
In order to understand this difference between the Althusserian “making
visible” and Foucault’s “donner à voir”, we need to think about the influence
that the Frankfurt School had in their idea of politics of literature. The excess of
literature that Foucault speaks of, that “untameable” materiality, maintains a
complex dialogue with the thought of the Frankfurt School. Remember that in
the latter, the influence of psychoanalysis is what led them to consider reality
not only as objective reality but also that which comes from desire, denial and
oneiric freedom. From this we can understand how these authors reverse the
classic Marxist approach and value art for its negativity, that is, for its capacity
to move away from the evident real to the other “real”. The revolutionary role
of negative dialectic consists of attributing in the dialectic process an autonomy
to negation/denial that it had been denied. If dialectics results in a synthesis of
identity, says Adorno, the revolutionary value of negation/denial is eliminated.
Moreover, this revolutionary art, mainly avant-gardist, also confronts the
61 “What is really that activity that consists of putting into circulation fiction, poems, stories… in
a society. It should also be analysed […] what is it that makes some sacred and come to function
as ‘literature’?” (Foucault, “Utopian Body”, 64). [My translation].
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objectualization of art massified as commerce (“loss of aura”). Because of this,
it is no surprise that Adorno defends poetry, in his lecture “On Lyric Poetry and
Society” (Notes to Literature, 37–54), which is without doubt the least massified
literary genre and that pays most attention to form. What the Frankfurt School
achieve is to separate the autonomy of art from Kantian lack of interest, and
give that autonomy a reflection not of the objective real but of the desire for a
reality to come (utopia). In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno says:
Art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as
autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than
complying with existing social norms and qualifying as “socially useful”, it criticizes
society by merely existing.
(308)
From this perspective, we will better understand that literary analyses do not
focus on standard works of realism but on the avant-garde or on authors like
Kafka, Magritte, Baudelaire, etc. In their studies on the literary avant-garde,
they find a concept of radical freedom that calls into question the capitalist
order. Therefore, language will no longer be a mere vehicle of ideology, as has
happened in classical Marxist realism, but a resistance that is borne out of its
autonomy. This autonomy of literature is what we can recognize in the material
autonomy of the literary text, which we have been able to analyze in Death and
the Labyrinth, a book that also belongs to the avant-garde tradition.
But we cannot forget a fundamental aspect that Foucault still shares with
the Althusser who argues for freedom in the face of necessity and the introduc-
tion of the aleatory, although we find in Foucault a broader development of his
politics of literature: the aleatory comes in through literary language itself. For
Althusser, however, the non-irreducibility of literature, as he puts it in “Letter
on the Knowledge of Art”, is a “making visible the ideology” [“Donner a voir
l’ideologie”], which in Foucault represents only one of the constants of premodern
literature. Foucault had found, in his interest for Structuralism and for the
unusual linguistic forms of Raymond Roussel, modes of experimentation in his
search for new structures of relation and novel forms of being as aesthetics of
existence. As Judith Revel has stated, it is the production of the new through
new relations between what is already there.
The difference that the collaborators and students of Althusser, Etienne
Balibar and Pierre Macherey, introduce in “On Literature as an Ideological
Form”, is that the work is a place of conflict between different ideologies and a
practice with effects on society, what the authors call “production of literary
effects”, that is, an ideological effect or that which we call real. But it would be
J. Rancière, another former follower of Althusser, who marks a radical about-
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turn to the proposals of French Marxism and with whom we can establish a dia-
logue of greater current interest.
5.3 Politics of Literature: A Dialogue with Jacques Rancière
Jacques Rancière starts with a question that the late Althusser and his aleatory
logic as critique of dialectic leave open. It concerns the question for the “poten-
tial/power of the negative”. According to Negri in the introduction to Machiavelli
and Us, Althusser’s theory of aleatory materialism is developed as suitable prac-
tice when Althusser focuses on the study of the “power of the negative” in a mo-
ment in which all resistance “like in great mysticism, all contact and, with
greater reason, all commitment with the world, with power, are here definitively
abolished”62 (Machiavelli and Us, 23). This new practice is, therefore, materialist
and aleatory. Althusser asked, in the 1980s, “how to set into motion a thought of
the practice, resolutely materialist, having this negativity as its basis? How can
power emerge in a practical way out of negativity?” (24). The answer of both
authors to the same problem marks the insuperable distance between them.
Althusser approaches the theology of liberation63 in order to give an answer and
considers that the place for maximum possibilities, the place of power itself, is in
the poverty of Christian origin as the place that shows the urgency of the action of
the post-metaphysical and post-bourgeois subject. From this place, which is the
place of power, the nation of the poor can be freed with a revolutionary practice.
This interpretation of aleatory materialism and its practice is, nevertheless, what
marks the definitive distance with the proposals of Foucault and Rancière.64
Rancière puts forward a concept of equality based on the limits of this
power of the negative. This is how we can understand how his principle of
equality is sustained upon the paradox of the passive politics of equality. But
what really goes against the Althusserian proposals is that a large part of the
weight of Rancière’s politics of equality falls on fiction and, in particular, on
62 My translation.
63 A. Negri quotes the unpublished text: “Sur la théologie de la libération. Suite à un entre-
tien avec le P. Breton”, 28 March 1985 (handwritten pages, IMEC Archive).
64 The dialogue here would be more fruitful with the proposals of Agamben, who responds to
the Althusserian challenge from the legacy of Foucault. For a development of these questions,
see The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (2011), in which Agamben replies to
this potentiality of poverty through the aesthetic of existence and the government of self that
Foucault expounds in his Collège de France lectures.
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his concept of mimesis and of distribution of the sensible. Rancière makes this
a priori principle of equality a principle of performativity at the same time.
On the other hand, the theoretical principles of Foucault’s politics of litera-
ture, as I have laid out in the first chapter, consider a principle of social distribu-
tion determined by the distinction between rational and irrational, a principle of
social verisimilitude, or what I have called a “social-fictional pact”, and, lastly,
an evental capacity of literature that enables it to make visible a reality that
forms the margins of that social verisimilitude, and which, as we have seen, had
a direct relation with Deleuze’s concept of virtuality. The dialogue between these
concepts allows us to observe how Foucault and Rancière set forth an updating
of the political power of literature.
First, remember, the concept of madness as a principle of social division
described by Foucault refers to a principle of distribution that is historical and
movable, which in modernity is based on the principle of rationality and
which, in turn, is determined by a socio-economic principle: the distinction in
society between those that produce wealth and those who do not.
For his part, Rancière defines what he calls the distribution of the sensible
(le partage du sensible) as “the system of self-evident facts of sense perception
that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the
delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it” (Rancière,
The Politics of Aesthetics, 12). Rancière thus denounces that the political divi-
sion is concomitant with the imposition of a separation according to the use of
the word that is determined by the exercise of one or other technē. Since Plato,
ontological-political determination depends on action as rational principle.
That is to say, we cannot think two things at the same time because we cannot
do two things at the same time, because we do not have the time to do them
simultaneously. According to Rancière, these borders between the discursive
modes are at the basis of our democracy and precede the division between
those who govern and those who are governed. The anthropological foundation
is also built upon it, which coincides with the political distribution of the sensi-
ble and with an aesthetic, which is a political aesthetic. Such a definition is
what was stated by Aristotle in Politics of man as a political animal. That is to
say, what separated those who have the right to speak and those who do not,
between those who have the word and those who do not.65 As a consequence of
65 This criticism of the unequal foundation of democracy is very similar to the concept of
bounded democracy that Etienne Balibar formulates in Les frontières de la démocratie (2005),
for whom the border and partition are found in the origin of democracy and, at the same time,
they contradict it. As Rancière speaks of grievance, Balabar speaks of the “legitimate violence”
of our societies in the north.
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this co-foundation of the political-linguistic, aesthetic and anthropological dis-
tribution, politics for Rancière refers to “what is seen and what can be said
about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the
properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (13).
Therefore, we find that both authors define the social distribution in terms
of discrimination based on the force of work, that is, those who work and those
who do not, in Foucault’s terms, and on the time conceded to “take the word”,
in Rancière’s terms. In both cases, this social discrimination entails making
these subjects invisible and a discrimination of the subjects who are not given
the principle of reasoning.
In both, this social discrimination leads them to revise the Aristotelian-
Platonic tradition that connects art and politics. Let us not forget that poiesis in
the classical era was seen as a category of technē, which means that art, in its
premodern foundation, participates in this separation. For this reason, the aes-
thetic that is at the basis of politics determines that the artistic practices partici-
pate in the common as ways of doing and making that take part in the general
distribution of the forms of being and the forms of visibility (13). Thus, says
Rancière, the problem of literature, the reason why Plato banished the poets,
emerges precisely because it situates the citizens outside of their place. This is to
say, the problem of poiesis is, for Plato, that the theatre is founded “on the im-
possibility of doing two things at once” (13) and because “it disturbs the clear
partition of identities, activities and spaces” (13). Hence Plato and Aristotle had
made an ontological, anthropological and political hierarchy coincide with an
aesthetic hierarchy in what Aristotle calls fable. For Rancière, therefore, the ques-
tion of fiction is a question of distribution of places, and literature in modernity
would come to deregularize the structure or hierarchy of political beings. This is
Balibar propounded a key question for the comprehension of the concept of border. His
work makes it possible to trace a genealogy from the Latin word limes in its different defini-
tions throughout history. Although it is true, says Balibar, that there are identities (active and
passive, desired and suffered, individual and collective) in different degrees. And, like walls,
their multiplicity, their character of constructions or fictions, does not make them less violent
(the legitimate violence of our societies of the north). Ultimately, he stresses the relation be-
tween identity and border, and in his most spectacular formulation, between identity and
wall: since States are constituted by subjects, whose precedents are in the national-imperial
States as subjects. This shows that “in the historical complexity of the concept of border,
which presents itself to us again and at the same time evolves and has new forms, takes in the
problem of the institution” (Balibar, Les frontières de la démocratie, 85) [My translation]. In
other words, the border presents itself as a condition of possibility for a multiplicity of institu-
tions that may or may not be democratic, even though the wall is, in itself, anti-democratic. It
is what Balibar calls “bounded democracy”, as I’ve already considered.
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because, in Rancière’s opinion, modern literature is fundamentally democratic
and unbalances the structures and rules of representation of the sense of commu-
nity. But how does it do this? How does it confront the structuring of the percep-
tive space, what Rancière calls the police? According to his explanation in an
interview with Eric Alliez in 2000, published as “Biopolitics or politics?”, literature
confronts the structure of the whole, “the set of acts that effectuate a supplementary
‘property’, a property that is biologically and anthropologically unlocatable,
the equality of speaking beings”. Literature thus acts as a device of equality,
as a fiction of equality (Rancière, Dissensus, 92).
Foucault, for his part, critiques the Aristotelian concept of fable, as we have
seen in Chapter Two. His aim was to underline the fundamental nature of fiction
that had remained in a subordinate place in Aristotle’s Poetics compared to the
fable. Foucault recalls the Aristotelian definition of the fable as configuration of
the work based on elements placed in a certain order and of fiction as the plot of
the relations established, through the discourse itself, between who speaks and
what is spoken about. But although fiction for Foucault is an “aspect” of fable,
nevertheless, and this is crucial, causal logic is a mode of fiction and not a basic
structure of the story, as it had been since Aristotle. Fiction, therefore, affects the
modes of articulation of all discourse. And he adds that the modes of fiction are,
moreover, historical when he states that the relation between fable and fiction is
determined by “the mythical possibilities of culture”: its writing or plot depends
on the possibilities of the language (langue), while its fiction is determined by the
possibilities of the act of speaking (parole): “In that analagon of discourse that
the work constitutes, this relation can only be established within the very act of
speaking; what is recounted must indicate, by itself, who is speaking, and at what
distance, and according to what perspective, and using what mode of discourse.
The work is defined less by the elements of the fable or their ordering than by the
modes of fiction, indicated as if obliquely by the very wording [énoncé] of the
fable. A narrative’s fable resides in the mythical possibilities of the culture; its
writing resides in the possibilities of the language; its fiction, in the possibilities
of the speech act” (Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, 137–138).
This makes it possible to consider that the verisimilitude of a narrative,
what a society is prepared to accept as credible, depends on a specific historical
moment and not on the logical structure of the narrative. But, as well as affecting
the modes of historical narration, what a society accepts as fictional, that is
to say a social-fictional pact, would also affect veridiction, or that which a
society accepts as modes of telling the truth. And what allows this overlapping
between fiction and veridiction in Foucault’s work is the gaze.
In a text from 1963, “Distance, Aspect, Origin”, Foucault defines fiction as
“the flight of the arrow that hits us between the eyes and offers up everything
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that appears” and as “the verbal nervure of what does not exist, just as it is”
(Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, 103–104). And, years later, in “The Stage
of Philosophy” (1978), he declared that his interest was then in the description
of the mode in which the West had organized its games of veridiction through
the gaze, “the spectacle of the world”:
It is indeed the theatre of truth that I would like to describe. How the West has built itself
a theatre of the truth, a stage of the truth, a stage for this rationality that has now become
one of occidental imperialism’s distinctive features, because its economy, the Western
economy, may have reached its summit, the essential forms of the Western way of life
and the political predominance of the West are undoubtedly coming to a close. But some-
thing has remained, something that the West is undoubtedly passing on to the rest of the
world, namely a certain form of rationality. It concerns a certain kind of perception of
truth and error, a certain theatre of truth and falsehood.
(“The Stage of Philosophy”, 150)
He also developed this focus in the last years of his research. In the Louvain
lectures, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling (1981), he fully confronts the question of how
and in what conditions a mode of veridiction could appear in history, following
Nietzsche’s “Wahrsagen”. It is a question of defining the modes of veridiction in
their plurality, to explore the forms of obligation by which each one of these
modes links to the subject of truth-telling, to specify the regions to which they
apply and the domains of objects that are made evident, and lastly the relations,
connections and interferences that are established between them. In short, it is a
question of a historical politics of the truth or of a political history of veridictions.
Therefore, I believe it to be of particular interest to undertake a reading of the
genealogy of veridiction and literary fiction, in order to understand the modes in
which the subject is emancipated through a political aesthetics of self.
According to Rancière, therefore, literature would counter the division that is
at the basis of politics with the transparent fact of Ut Pictura Poiesis. But not as a
mere return to classical dictate but, very much to the contrary, removing the con-
cept of truth as veritas that is found at the basis of the Horatian motto, and intro-
ducing here a political revision of aletheia. Rancière introduces, as opposed to
the traditional veritas in which the word and the thing coincide, an aletheia that
here separates truth from reason. In contrast to Plato and Aristotle, truth is no
longer adaptation to the idea, and neither will perception be to look at the idea
as in the Platonic myth either. Whereas the truth of veritas is identified with the
rectitude of enunciative representation, aletheia functions as a fictional mode of
emancipation insofar as it transcends the political distribution of the sensible.
The concept of aletheia had already been revised in the twentieth century by
Sigmund Freud and Martin Heidegger, among others. In both, the concept of
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Unheimlich plays an essential role.66 For Freud, the uncanny is a phenomenon in
which what was familiar is transformed into something disturbing and what should
remain hidden has appeared. In the case of Heidegger, in “The Origin of the Work
of Art”67 (1935), in the literary word truth happens (Ereignis) as aletheia, and the
work acquires a status very close to that of the monument in Rancière, “that which
preserves memory through its very being” (Rancière, Figures of History, 22):
To be sure, the sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he does
not use it up. That happens in a certain way only where the work miscarries. To be sure,
the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that color is not used up but rather only
now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the poet also uses the word – not, however, like
ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but rather in such a way that the
word only now becomes and remains truly a word.
(Heidegger, Basic Writings, 173)
The concept of truth in Heidegger as aletheia entails an ‘unconcealing’ of what
the object is in itself. Thus the truth of the labourer’s boot is its usefulness for
working in the field, its call by the soil. The oblivion of being is the oblivion of
the genuine definition of being, it is automatization. This is why, as for the
Formalists, art is the path for truth, because it unconceals it and deautomatizes it
and reopens the combat between story and world, says Heidegger, “so that the
strife may remain a strife” (Heidegger, Basic Writings, 175). Therefore, the truth of
the work of art occurs as “making visible” (aletheia) through the estrangement of
the familiar (Unheimlich). Literature estranges language and presents it to us in
another way. In terms of classic literary theory, the function of literature coin-
cides with Shklovsky’s concept of defamiliarization (ostranénie) that involves the
deautomatization of perception of the alienation of language that we relate with.
According to the Russian theorist:
The goal of art is to create the sensation of seeing, and not merely recognizing, things;
the device of art is the “defamiliarization” of things and the complication of the form,
which increases the duration and complexity of perception, as the process of perception
is, in art, an end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is the means to live through the
making of a thing; what has been made does not matter in art.
(Shklovsky, “Art, as Device”, 162)
66 In this regard, Lacan’s concept of anguish can also be read here, which defines it as a
mode of conception of the real.
67 However, note that the difference that strikes one at the beginning of Heidegger’s text re-
garding Rancière’s proposal is that Heidegger makes it very clear that what he is talking about
is what he considered “the great art”. We do not find this concept in Rancière, who worked on
both literature and cinema under equal conditions. His concept of equality is transversal and
also includes the artistic genres.
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Rancière, however, defines literature and art as the place in which “their own
truth happens” in the indifference of the theme and the necessity of the work.
Literature is, therefore, “the pure making visible” in the state of perplexity or mute-
ness (Unheimlich) that modern literature produces as contradictory poetics, which
the author calls “mute letter” (Rancière, Mute Speech). In this mute speech, the
concept of writing unfolds and is, at the same time, speech orphaned of all its body
that can lead it or bear witness to it. And it is also hieroglyph that bears the idea of
writing in its own body (Rancière, Mute Speech, 17). The contradiction of literature
could well be defined as the tension between these two beings of writing.
Thus, the concept of aletheia in Rancière, like this making visible, is a pro-
found critique of the mimesis that Aristotle defined as “imitation of human ac-
tions”. And it is very close to the definition of the concept that Auerbach
described in his book of the same name in 1942:
In modern literature, the technique of imitation can evolve a serious, problematic, and
tragic conception of any character regardless of type and social standing, of any occurrence
regardless of whether it be legendary, broadly political, or narrowly domestic; and in most
cases it actually does so. Precisely that is completely impossible in antiquity. There are, it is
true, some transitional forms in bucolic and amatory poetry, but on the whole the rule of
the separation of styles […] remains inviolate. Everything commonly realistic, everything
pertaining to everyday life, must not be treated on any level except the comic, which admits
no problematic probing.
(Auerbach,Mimesis, 31)
And this, Rancière asserts, due to its lack of historical consciousness. Rancière
thinks, therefore, along with Auerbach and opposing Aristotle, that literature is
closer to history than to philosophy, questioning the principle of verisimilitude
that governs the classical forms of poiesis. For Rancière, as for Agamben, telling
the history is ultimately telling a story:
A story, une histoire, is an arrangement of actions according to which there has not sim-
ply been this and then that, but a configuration that fits the facts together and allows
them to be presented as a whole: what Aristotle calls a muthos – a storyline, or plot, in
the sense in which we speak of the plot of a play.
(Rancière, Figures of History, 7–8)
But the story does not coincide with the Aristotelian proposal because, for
Rancière, on the contrary there is no tie of causality that orders the plot and
legitimates the established order. Rancière thus makes a critique of the narrative
nature of the story using the resources of literary analysis. And so the politics of
the literary text in particular, and the role of literature and art in their relation
with the story, is to reorder the official history in another way. Thus art and litera-
ture “quietly assert their aptitude for all kinds of learning” (Rancière, Figures of
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History, 17). History, therefore, is reordered and “is that time in which those who
have no right to occupy the same place can occupy the same image” (Rancière,
Figures of History, 13). Literature and the arts are capable of this mode of telling in
another way, and they do so, says Rancière, “consciously or unconsciously.
Intentionally and beyond what was intended”68 (17). And this is because literature
enables “suspension between two different regimes of explanation”. In this sus-
pension, truth as memory takes place, or what Rancière describes thus:
unfold the fullness nestled in its simple presence. By cutting the thread of any reason, you
leave the scene, the attitude, the face, with a muteness that gives them double the power:
stopping the gaze on this evidence of an existence linked to the very lack of a reason, and
unfolding that evidence as a potentiality belonging to another sensory world.
(18–19)
Another possible world that, nevertheless, already is, only we have not seen it,
we have not given it presence. Literature therefore actualizes a virtuality of the
present close at hand, to utilise the expression with which Agamben responds
to the metaphysics of presence.
In this way, Rancière responds to the decision that links action and rational
thought. The virtuality of another present thus enables:
1. Thinking of two things simultaneously, at the same time and so opposing
the action-reason determining that has been at the basis of the distribution
of the sensible since Plato and Aristotle, which attributed a situation and a
time to each citizen in accordance with the technē they developed.
2. Proposing a mode of thinking the time of the new mythologies as virtuality of
the present. Already far from the future of utopias, and in line with other work
that has been undertaken since Deleuze and more recently with Agamben.
Therefore, the truth of literature moves closer to Foucault’s definition of it as a
virtuality of the present: in plain sight but, at the same time, hidden. Thus
Rancière gives back to literature its deautomatizing – as contradictory – charac-
ter (this was the essential thesis of Mute Speech) and gives aletheia a radically
political value.
The difference that mediates between them is, however, that the demand
for the political and cognitive equality of all operates at the basis of Rancière’s
68 A parenthesis to refer to this ‘unconsciously’: the ontological dimension of the literary text
as Blanchot and Foucault had described it in their texts from the sixties would here be reinter-
preted as a political ontology of the text. The ludic dimension of this unconscious speech (re-
call Foucault’s text on Raymond Roussel) is reinterpreted by Rancière as the pure making
visible of the literary text. Thus for Rancière the nature of the literary text is radically political.
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thought. He describes equality as a predialectic potentiality, which in literature
is the pure “making visible” as indetermination:
To write is to see, to become an eye, to put things into the pure medium of their vision,
that is, in the pure medium of their idea. It is moreover an ‘absolute’ manner of seeing.
(Rancière,Mute Speech, 116)
In a similar way, Foucault takes on the Nietzschean project of a critique and,
therefore, of opening to a new, common thought that, says Nietzsche in Ecce
Homo, is based on “the art of separating without creating hostility; to refrain from
confounding things; to keep from reconciling things; to possess enormous multi-
fariousness and yet to be the reverse of chaos” (Nietzsche, The Essential Nietzsche,
164). This description also summarizes the proposal of a non-dialectical, differen-
tial and plural thought. Thus, simplifying a good deal, Foucault’s thought is based
upon political-linguistic action69 and Rancière’s thought on the suspension of
the division between those that know and the ignorant, between those adept
at government and those who are passive and must be governed.
Let us remember that, for Rancière, the politics of literature “is indissolubly
both a science of society and the creation of a new mythology” (Rancière, The
Politics of Literature, 20). This is in such a way that in Rancière the statement
“politics of fiction” also functions in a second sense: namely, the proposal of
an aesthetics of equality would be functioning as a new mythology in which
equality is put forward as historically a priori of all thought. Because, we could
simplify, emancipation is possible if we first think it is possible. Thus the logic
of equality is traced against the logic of distribution that is also the logic of
non-contradictory thought (according to Aristotle, the possibility of thought
cannot escape the principle of identity).
With Christoph Menke’s Force (2013), we are able to delimit the reach of
this historical a priori and what defines that political equality as an aesthetic. In
this book, Menke considers that Arendt’s statement that man is neither free nor
equal by nature refers to a pre-political state of nature. For Menke, this means
accepting that we acquire our capacities through education, training and prac-
tice. Therefore, for Menke, equality is an equality of potentiality, an equality of
force (kraft), not something given.
It is hence necessary to attain equality not as something given but as a fiction.
And I utilize the term fiction in the same way that it has been described in this
69 Furthermore, in the struggle, the roles are susceptible to being interchangeable: think, for
example, of Kafka’s story In the Penal Colony, in which the condemned happily takes up the
role of his torturer when the situation allows it.
128 5 Foucault and Literary Theory in the 21st Century
work. But, unlike Menke, Rancière’s aesthetic of equality can only be formulated
in radical inactivity: equality must be thought far from the logic of action, because
this has been what, from its origin, has determined the division of bodies as stag-
ers of a technē, of capacities. As Rancière underlines, action “is a mode of thought,
a structure of rationality that defines both a norm of legitimate social behaviours
and a norm of composition of fictions” (Rancière, The Lost Thread, 101).
Thus the politics of fiction/the fiction of politics is defined in Rancière
through his definition of the concept of equality as an a priori. This is an
a priori that at the same time functions as a virtual present, and therefore as an
historical a priori: an as if that succeeds in bringing an actualization of equality
without falling into the logic of action that is, lastly (or firstly) that which be-
gins the division (distribution of the sensible). In this way, from this virtuality,
the impossible becomes real.
Thus does Rancière respond to the tyranny of the plot as logical verisimili-
tude that, since Aristotle, has approximated truth to coherence and left out
what is possible and true but implausible. And, at the same time, the principle
of equality is also a performative a priori. It is action for the enunciated other:
the world is enunciated as though it were other. The possibility of this contradic-
tory formulation belongs to the very nature of literature, that is, it is a fictional
and non-rational logic.
We can, therefore, summarize that we find a dialogue between the “making
visible” of the political mimesis of Jacques Rancière and Michel Foucault.
Rancière builds a materialization of the invisible that, in turn, is sustained
upon the discussion of Althusser’s concept of “donner à voir” in literature. For
Rancière, literature is no longer a mere ideological object capable of showing,
in its best versions, the ideological tale in which we live, being confused with
the real. Literature is a “making visible” of a part of the real that had been hid-
den under the ideological story – or what he calls “the distribution of the sensi-
ble” – but that, nevertheless, is found right there. Foucault, in turn, also gives
central place to the visualizing capacity of literature, in close connection with
his concept of “social partition”, as we have seen in the section devoted to the
politics of literature and, in particular, to madness as principle of social parti-
tion.70 If the politics of literature of these thinkers is in dialogue with the
Marxist tradition of literature, as it has been described, it is not surprising that
both authors undertake a revision of the Aristotelian concept of mimesis in
order to redefine the concept of “realism” of literature. The attention Foucault
70 See Chapter 2.3 Madness and literature as principal of social partition.
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gives to the literature of Sade, Roussel and Baudelaire, might seem to distance
him from this realist interest but, as we have seen in Chapter 3, on the veridiction
of literature, literature is conditioned by its “veridiction” both in the writing of
Sade (“I only tell the truth”) and Roussel and his resolution to “tell the truth” of
how he constructed his literary texts.
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6 Conclusions
The main purpose of this study has been the analysis of the contributions of the
later Foucault in the framework of a politics of literature. I have therefore begun
with the hypothesis of a politics of literature in Foucault established in his
later publications, following chronological order, beginning with the recently
published Folie, langage, littérature (2019), which brings together previously
unpublished pieces from the 1960s and 1970s. In these, we find a new approach
to the relations of literature with politics, from the year 1967, with the publication
of “L’extralinguistique et la littérature”, where Foucault shows the relations of
literature with the historical world through the limits of language and its deictic
“necessity”, indicating what it cannot speak of, such as the richness of the work
that is introduced into the world as a fold of language.
But literature is also political because it is critique as well. The truth of
literature is performative, not mimetic, and its truth is parrhesiastic. Literature
is capable of opposing a normalization of the behaviors or forms of lives thanks
to its militancy of Cynical inheritance. Literature attains this critical sense by
two routes: through the lives of its authors, who propound novel forms of being
out of experience or “style of life”, and, secondly, from an immanent perspec-
tive. Thanks to its parrhesiastic nature, literature has the potentiality of dissent-
ing in its dialogic and polyphonic structure, to use the Bakhtinian terms, whom
Foucault cites. Literature is, therefore, a critical discourse that makes it possible
to think dissension through its very structure.
First, literature develops its political potential on a discursive level, which
is possible for three reasons:
1. Literary practice manages to produce novelty, to inaugurate a meaning as
excess.
2. The fable is conditioned by the verisimilitude of an episteme, which I have
called the social-fictional pact, or what a society is prepared to accept as
credible. This comes from the limited nature of literature. Literature does
not cease referring to the world deictically.
3. The structure of modern literature is capable of accommodating different
voices without consensus, fragments without reconcilable unity.
Similarly, Foucault described the literary experience of modernity as an exer-
cise of radical mimesis, as “extreme attention to what is real”, while also being
a practice of a freedom that simultaneously “respects this reality and violates
it”, or what he calls “extracting the poetic within history”. That is to say, litera-
ture is a polyvalent concept: literature is capable of gathering collective forms
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of expression as a linguistic space of resistance (speak/parole), while also of
subjection as institution or norm (language/langage) and without omitting the
chance of its own materiality (tongue/langue).
Thus Foucault is asserting that literature is a fold of the outside and is
event, which means that the extralinguistic happens in the language. Because
literature, Foucault says, is not a self-referential art. And this is because the ex-
tralinguistic is what surrounds performative acts, so that the extralinguistic has
been presented under the prism of the real capable of being modified. The ex-
tralinguistic, in its most simple definition, is what is exterior to language, sus-
ceptible to interrelate and be modified by language, as the performative acts of
language demonstrate. And this is where the interaction between linguistic and
extralinguistic is established, in action, in language’s possibility of action upon the
other that is not language but the world. And, of course, this connects literature
with its parrhesiastic capacity.
Therefore, the constitution of subjectivity will depend on the subject’s ability
to speak, on the subject’s linguistic capacity. A linguistic capacity that, nonethe-
less, both for Foucault and for Heidegger, has been dominated by rationality, or
what in 1978 he called “the theatre of truth”.
Secondly, literature develops its political capacity in its relation with a subject
capable of creating new experiences or styles of life. From the introduction of
paideia as a path of education of subjects that was necessary for exercising citi-
zenship. The subject must face the forms of normalization at the same time as
being able to constitute themselves into object of transformation. We have seen
this argument in the chapter I devoted to Sade and the classical and Christian
technologies of the self. One of the most controversial aspects is what makes
that constitution of man possible as object of his technology, of an aesthetic of
existence. According to Foucault, “desire” is that force or motor that drives the
subject to exercise their will of resistance or of self-transformation. This work of
the later Foucault on the strategies of resistance and of constitution of the sub-
ject is widely developed today. It is what I have called the legacy of Foucault to
think the present, and which I have analyzed through the contributions of
Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben.
Lastly, I have examined the texts from the 1980s that reflect upon the politicity
of Greek tragedy. Foucault admits that Greek tragedy still has much to say to us,
not only about the organization of the first Western democracy, its laws and its
difficulties; that is something we have known for a long time, and it was already
commonplace in the 1980s, when Foucault was writing and investigating them.
What Foucault comes to tell us of novelty here is that Greek tragedy still has much
to tell us about ourselves, as modern subjects. Along this line of debate on the
132 6 Conclusions
relevance of tragedy, we find the study by Christoph Menke, Die Gegenwart
der Tragödie: Versuch über Urteil und Spiel (2005) [Tragic Play. Irony and
Theater from Sophocles to Beckett], and the more recent Retorno a Atenas.
La democracia como principio antioligárquico (2019) [Return to Athens:
Democracy as anti-oligarchic principle], by José L. Moreno Pestaña, and
Simon Critchley’s Tragedy, the Greeks and Us (2019), to mention only some
of the works that have been discussed here.
From tragedy to the modern novel, the inheritance of parrhesia comes to us
from the Cynics, along with a structure of non-unitary work of the symbol,
which was typical of the plays of Sophocles and the early Euripides. But this is
problematized at the same time that the concept of parrhesia and the egalitar-
ian right to speak is problematized. Benjamin stated, with regard to the alle-
gory, that baroque drama had discovered the fragmentary nature of the world
as opposed to the totality aimed at by the symbol. Allegory breaks with the
univocal relation between image and signification. Foucault, in his reading of
the problematization of parrhesia in Greek tragedy shows us, however, that the
fragmentary nature of the symbol had already appeared in the last tragedies of
Euripides and that its reading must be political.
All of this also entails the social division between the governors and the
governed, between those who have the right to speak and those who do not.
Madness as a principle of social partition was already presented and repre-
sented in the last plays of Euripides. This is the case of the figure of Cassandra,
who is representative of this shift from prophetess (as she was presented by
Aeschylus) to lunatic (as happens in The Trojan Women). Social fragmentation,
therefore, coincides with the fragmentation of the truth in the work. Moreover,
as Vernant stated, “through the debate that the drama sets up, it is the very
status of man that becomes the problem” (Vernant, 214), thus, as Foucault says
in The Government of Self and Others, “one cannot take care of oneself without
knowing oneself” (44).
In the last chapter, I propound an introduction of Foucault’s politics of
literature in the theoretical tradition of literary Marxism. It proposes an analysis of
Foucault’s strategies of reading, from structuralism, passing briefly through an
ontology of literature with roots in Heidegger, from which it is quickly separated,
until reaching this proposal of “releasing” the politicity of the literary work.
There are several consequences of this shift since Foucault asked the ques-
tion, “what is literature?” in “Language and literature”. Although it is accepted
that in the 1960s he defines the birth of modern literature in the eighteenth
century – coinciding with its concern as independent literary discourse, closer
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to the literary theory of the beginning of the twentieth century, Formalism and
Structuralism – from the end of the 1960s but, above all, from the 1970s,
Foucault develops a genealogy of modern literature brings it back to Greek
tragedy – when he proposes a politics of literature similar to Deleuze, and
sociological, close to Said and Bourdieu.
It is from there that Foucault establishes that literature itself is history and
belongs to it, and that it is event, capable of doing things in the world. Not only
because it shows unseen aspects (the critique of Merleau-Ponty) of ideology
(Althusser), but because it shows the partition of the social and strategies of
resistance. The “donner à voir” of Merleau-Ponty and Althusser, finds here a
performative development as parrhesia. Lastly, I give particular attention to the
relation of Foucault’s politics with Rancière’s politics of literature, and the
question regarding that which literature makes visible and which is habitually
not shown being, nevertheless, “already there”. Foucault, like Rancière, con-
siders that nobody in democracy speaks to not say anything, even those who
are described as athuroglōssos in the classical era. Dialogue, moreover, wishes
to analyze the question of a material invisibility or of a material negativity in
both authors that would, at the same time, be a critique.
In short, from all I have shown, we can draw conclusions in two directions.
On the one hand, the revision of the place that literature occupies in Foucault’s
work gives it a political force that makes it possible to develop from it a fictional
capacity as alternative narrative and a critical capacity as “making visible”, in
his particular revision of the concept of the gaze in Western thought.
It is through this perspective that the consequences that the concept of fic-
tion has in Foucault’s work can be understood. Fiction, as desire, functions as
a force that is no longer the power of the negative, but rather the making visible
of being at every instant as subject of self.
On the other hand, the aesthetics of Foucault is an ethics and a technē of
self. Hence politics and ethics are at the basis of this concept, because the
consideration of the common good in this truth-telling of a free subject (par-
rhesia) is a critical practice and, in this sense, the subject who practices it
puts their own life at risk. The definition of a free subject who cannot be con-
figured except in interrelation with others, and whose desire to live is, at the
same time, a risk and a desire, is one of the keys to understanding the reach of
the political aesthetic of Foucault that also comes from the legacy of Cynicism –
Cynicism as choice of the theatre of life in the body itself, which certain forms of
Christianity had inherited. And it was also derived from the revolutionary move-
ments in the nineteenth century that took aspects from the different forms of
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Christian spirituality (The Courage of the Truth, 171). Cynicism, the idea of a
mode of life that is the scandalous, violent and disruptive manifestation of
truth, forms and has formed part of the revolutionary practice and of the
forms assumed by the revolutionary movements throughout the nineteenth
century. Revolution in the modern European world was not merely a political
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